G.P. v. Huntington Beach City Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | G060503 |
| Parties | G.P., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HUNTINGTON BEACH CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No 30-2019-01060053 Deborah C. Servino, Judge. Affirmed.
Gravitas Law Group and David J. Scharf for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Harbottle Law Group, Sydney J. Blaauw and S. Daniel Harbottle for Defendants and Respondents.
G.P., a former student at a middle school in the Huntington Beach City School District (the District), and his mother, Maria P., appeal from the trial court's entry of judgment after granting summary judgment in favor of the District[1] on plaintiffs' causes of action for negligence, "sexualized" harassment, and disability discrimination. The District prevailed against plaintiffs' negligence and disability discrimination causes of action based on their failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. The trial court also found appellants failed to rebut the District's evidence that the alleged derogatory name-calling perpetrated by fellow middle school students against G.P. was not "sexualized" within the meaning of the relevant anti-discrimination statutes. We find appellants' challenges to these summary judgment rulings to be without merit. We therefore affirm the judgment.
Consistent with the standard of review, in which we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684 (Meridian)), we adopt appellants' version of the facts as set out in their opening brief. We nonetheless abbreviate our recitation because the trial court's exhaustion ruling was not fact dependent; nor are the facts of the name calling disputed.
As appellants recount in their opening brief, they submitted in opposition to summary judgment a declaration by one of G.P.'s fellow students, E.S., from his fifth-grade science class. According to E.S., on one occasion when she "was sitting in Mr. Carter's 5th period" classroom, the teacher was "at his desk . . . not paying attention," but E.S. "looked up" from her phone and saw G.P. "sitting in the back of the room with [E.O.], [T.K.], and [L.S.] standing around him." E.S. "could tell they were teasing [G.P.] about something and heard them call him a 'Fucktard'. [G.P.] told them to stop multiple times, but they kept teasing him and were blocking his path to leave." E.S. felt "it was obvious [G.P.] was being picked on," and the teacher had to have noticed, but did nothing. "The three boys finally pushed [G.P.] into the cabinets in the back of the classroom which made a loud noise." According to E.S., "The bullying had gone on all year in this classroom."
She mentioned in her declaration another incident that did not involve any bullying of G.P., but rather other bad behavior by the trio; G.P., who "was assigned to their group but was not participating in the play fighting," also "got in trouble" when the teacher yelled at him, too. E.S. "did not think it was fair" and "told her mom she needed to call Mrs. P[.] about how [G.P.] was being treated in Mr. Carter[']s science class." E.S.'s mother did so and, as a result, Maria P. "sent emails directly to Cynthia Guerrero, the Principal at the time."[2]
Appellants also presented G.P.'s deposition in which he stated that "[d]uring eighth grade, [the bullying] got [] worse." "Every single day and every single time" E.O. saw G.P. at school, he would call him "a faggot," and whenever E.O. " E.O. would say of G.P. and other students, "'These kids are gay for each other' . . . several times a week."
G.P. testified during his deposition that he did not identify as gay or transgender and that he did not believe E.O. thought he (G.P.) was gay.
Appellants asserted seven causes of action in a third amended complaint against the District, all of which the trial court rejected in its summary judgment ruling. Appellants challenge only the court's rulings on their claims for negligence, disability discrimination, and sexual harassment.
We review a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) When a defendant moves for summary judgment, the defendant has the initial burden of presenting evidence sufficient to establish either that the plaintiffs cannot prove one or more elements of their causes of action, or that there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) If the defendant does so, the burden then shifts to the plaintiffs to produce admissible evidence demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact as to the claim or defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at p. 850.) Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is one such complete defense. (E.g., Tahoe Vista Concerned Citizens v. County of Placer (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 577, 594.) Claims or theories advanced to thwart summary judgment that are not supported by evidence will not raise a triable issue. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163, 166.)
"'[A]lthough we use a de novo standard of review here, we do not transform into a trial court.'" (Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 379 (Dinslage).) We approach a summary judgment appeal, as with any appeal, with the presumption the judgment or trial court ruling is correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham).) Therefore, "'"[o]n review of a summary judgment, the appellant has the burden of showing error, even if he did not bear the burden in the trial court."'" (Dinslage, at p. 379.)
Appellants fail to show error in the trial court's summary judgment ruling on their negligence claim. Nor did the court err in its ruling similarly disposing of appellants' claims in their eighth cause of action for alleged violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 () and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA; 42 U.S.C § 12131 et seq.).
Confronted with a welter of assertions in appellants' first cause of action, the court observed that appellants "labeled [it] a negligence claim." The court noted the negligence was apparently premised on the District's alleged breach of a host of duties said to be embodied in various statutory code sections-including under "the IDEA," i.e., the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.)
The trial court found that, "[t]o the extent this claim is based [on] the District Defendants' failure to provide a free appropriate public education ('FAPE') pursuant to the IDEA, Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing the present lawsuit and the statute of limitations has expired to do so." We agree.
The IDEA establishes an administrative exhaustion requirement for claims alleging denial of a child's right to a free, appropriate public education despite educational disabilities the child may face. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(1).) "In the event of a dispute regarding the child's FAPE, the IDEA and California law afford students, parents and the [local education agency] the procedural protection of an impartial administrative, or 'due process,' hearing." (B.H. v. Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 563, 572.)
The IDEA's FAPE guarantee is "the yardstick for measuring the adequacy of the education that a school offers to a child with a disability: Under that standard, . . . a child is entitled to 'meaningful' access to education based on her [or his] individual needs." (Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools (2017) 580 U.S. 154, 167 (Fry).) In other words, because the IDEA's express purpose is '"to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education' [citation], [states] receiving federal funding under the IDEA must make such an education [i.e., a FAPE] 'available to all children with disabilities.'" (Id. at pp. 166-167.)
As pertinent here, we read appellants' negligence claim to be based on the District's alleged failure to protect G.P. from bullying that arose from, or was compounded by, disabilities he suffered. As appellants phrase it in their appellate briefing, their
Appellants summarize their negligence claim more specifically thusly "The Defendant[s] had an affirmative duty to protect G.P. from this harm [i.e., bullying] but deliberately failed to do so because the Defendants considered G.P. to be the problem due to his behavioral issues which stemmed from his disabilities and were exacerbated by the constant harassment." According to appellants, defendants alleged G.P. "is a child with disabilities including Aspergers and a speech disorder that would sometimes manifest in problematic behavior." They assert they "offered" in opposition to summary judgment evidence that "Defendants fail[ed] to properly conduct Child Find under the IDEA [a process to identify children with disabilities and furnish appropriate educational resources] . . ....
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