G.R. v. Grewal

• Decision Date: 30 November 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 19-8649 (SDW) (LDW)
• Parties: G.R., Plaintiff, v. GURBIR S. GREWAL, Attorney General for the State of New Jersey, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

G.R., Plaintiff, v. GURBIR S. GREWAL,Attorney General for the State of New Jersey, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-8649 (SDW) (LDW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

November 30, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court is Defendant New Jersey Attorney General Gurbir S. Grewal's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff G.R.'s ("Plaintiff") Complaint (D.E. 2) for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78.¹ For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1994, the New Jersey Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1, et seq. ("Megan's Law"), to "permit law enforcement officials to identify and alert the public" about sex offenders who may pose a danger to children. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1(a); see Artway v. Attorney Gen. of State of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1996). The statutory scheme established both a three-tiered notificationsystem and a registration requirement for prescribed categories of sex offenders. Id. Registrants classified as Tier One are deemed to have the relatively lowest risk to reoffend while those classified as Tier Three are deemed to have the relatively highest risk. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c). All offenders convicted of certain designated sexual offenses are required to register with the police department in the municipality where they live by providing fingerprints and residency and employment information. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-4b.

Moreover, if an offender's conduct is "characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior," the sentencing court "shall record [such] findings on the judgment of conviction" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(a) ("compulsivity finding"). Under N.J.S.A 2C:7-2(e), offenders with a compulsivity finding must verify their registration with their local police department every ninety days ("quarterly verification requirement"), as opposed to yearly for all other sex offenders. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(e).

In 2001, following an authorizing amendment to the State Constitution, the New Jersey Legislature further established a sex offender internet registry to enhance public safety "by making information about certain offenders . . . available to the public." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-12; see N.J. Const., Art. IV, § 7, ¶ 12. While Tier One and certain Tier Two offenders were not initially included in the internet registry, the Legislature amended the statute in 2014 to include offenders who have a compulsivity finding, regardless of their tier classification. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(e), as amended by S. 2636, 215th Leg., 2nd Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2014).

Plaintiff is a Tier One sex offender who was convicted of Endangering the Welfare of a Child in the 3^rd Degree on January 8, 2016. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17.) At the time of sentencing, the trial court made a compulsivity finding with respect to Plaintiff, subjecting him to the quarterly verification requirement and publication on the internet registry. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.)

Plaintiff filed the instant suit on February 7, 2019, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County. (See Compl. at 1.) He alleges that the use of the compulsivity finding to mandate more frequent registration verification and place his information on the internet registry violates his federal and state constitutional rights to procedural (Counts I and II) and substantive (Count III) due process. (Id. ¶¶ 170-92.) Defendant removed the case to this Court on March 15, 2019, and subsequently moved to dismiss the Complaint. (D.E. 1, 27.) Briefing was timely completed. (D.E. 27, 37, 41.)²

II. LEGAL STANDARD

An adequate complaint must be "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 "requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of an entitlement to relief").

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mereconclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing the Iqbal standard). If the "well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint should be dismissed for failing to show "that the pleader is entitled to relief" as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

III. DISCUSSION³

A. Substantive Due Process (Count III)

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The prohibition contains both a procedural and a substantive component. See Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 2017); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). The substantive component "limits what [the] government may do regardless of the fairness of procedures that it employs in order to guarantee protection against government power arbitrarily and oppressively exercised." Steele, 855 F.3d at 501 (citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). It "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted); see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). Thus, when a challenged statute infringes upon a "fundamental" right, the statute is subject to heightened scrutiny, and will not ordinarily be upheld "unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id. (citations omitted). However, when no such fundamental right is implicated, a challenged statute "need onlybe rationally related to a legitimate State interest" to be upheld. Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 296 (3d Cir. 2018).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that he has a substantive due process right to an evaluation of his recidivism risk before being placed on the internet registry and subject to more frequent verification, instead of being subjected to those requirements based solely on his compulsivity finding. (Compl. ¶¶ 184-92.) He alleges that the compulsivity finding "has no present bearing on his risk of re-offending sexually now or in the future," citing various empirical studies and recent scientific literature. (Id. ¶ 126; see id. ¶¶ 79-151.) He further alleges that internet publication of low risk offenders with a compulsivity finding "misinforms the public as to their true level of dangerousness" and subjects the offenders to a lifetime of "differential treatment absent any relationship to re-offense risk." (Id. ¶¶ 137-39.)

However, Plaintiff does not claim that the use of the compulsivity finding to require quarterly verification and internet publication implicates any fundamental liberty interests that would trigger heightened scrutiny. Instead, he appears to concede that only rational basis review applies. (See id. ¶ 188 (pleading that the use of the compulsivity finding as a basis for the additional requirements "is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest").) "Under rational basis review, a statute withstands a substantive due process challenge if the state identifies a legitimate state interest that the legislature could rationally conclude was served by the statute." Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation omitted). This standard of review "is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.'" Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (citation and quotation omitted). Rather, courts "are compelled . . . to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends." Id. at 321.

The Third Circuit has already held that Megan's Law's use of the compulsivity finding as a basis for distinguishing among sex offenders for registration requirements is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1267-68 (analyzing Megan's Law in the equal protection context). In doing so, the Third Circuit identified Megan's Law's legitimate state interest as that of "[p]rotecting vulnerable individuals from sexual offenses." Id. In fact, the Third Circuit has gone further to hold that Megan's Law serves a compelling state interest, satisfying heightened scrutiny. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Likewise, Megan's Law's use of the compulsivity finding to place Tier One sex offenders on the internet registry is also rationally related to that legitimate state interest. See L.A. ex rel. Z.Kh. v. Hoffman, 144 F. Supp. 3d 649, 668 (D.N.J. 2015) (Wolfson, J.) (finding that use of the compulsivity finding to place sex offenders on the internet registry survives heightened review).

Even if the compulsivity finding is an imperfect tool for measuring a Tier One sex...