Ga. Advocacy Office v. Jackson, 19-14227

• Decision Date: 14 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-14227,19-14227
• Citation: 4 F.4th 1200
• Parties: GEORGIA ADVOCACY OFFICE, M.J., K.H., on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs – Appellees, v. Theodore JACKSON, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Fulton County, Mark Adger, in his official capacity as Chief Jailer, Meredieth Lightbourne, in her official capacity as Medical Director, Tyna Taylor, in her official capacity as Detention Captain, Pearlie Young, in her official capacity as Detention Lieutenant, Defendants – Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

4 F.4th 1200

GEORGIA ADVOCACY OFFICE, M.J., K.H., on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs – Appellees,

v.Theodore JACKSON, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Fulton County, Mark Adger, in his official capacity as Chief Jailer, Meredieth Lightbourne, in her official capacity as Medical Director, Tyna Taylor, in her official capacity as Detention Captain, Pearlie Young, in her official capacity as Detention Lieutenant, Defendants – Appellants.

No. 19-14227

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

July 14, 2021

Sarah Elisabeth Geraghty, Atteeyah Hollie, Ryan Primerano, Southern Center for Human Rights, ATLANTA, GA, Devon Orland, Attorney General's Office, ATLANTA, Michael A. Caplan, Caplan Cobb, LLP, ATLANTA, GA, Anne Jessamyn Isham Kuhns, DECATUR, GA, for Plaintiffs - Appellees.

Ashley Jenell Moore Palmer, Michelle Arrington, Thomas Blaylock, Kaye Woodard Burwell, Fulton County Attorney's Office, ATLANTA, GA, for Defendants - Appellants.

Before WILSON, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

The District Court below entered a preliminary injunction requiring Fulton County Jail officials to provide regular out-of-cell time to female inmates with psychiatric disabilities and to improve the sanitary conditions in their cells. The officials appealed. We consider whether the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law under the terms of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). We hold that it has, and accordingly dismiss this appeal as moot and vacate the preliminary injunction order.

I.

The Plaintiffs in this action are the Georgia Advocacy Office, a nonprofit dedicated to serving disabled Georgia residents, and two psychiatrically disabled female inmates of the Fulton County Jail ("the Jail"). On April 10, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a class action for injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on behalf of "all women with psychiatric disabilities who are now or will in the future be confined in the Fulton County Jail system."¹ The Defendants named in the complaint were Theodore Jackson, Sherriff of Fulton County; Mark Adger, Chief Jailer for the Sherriff's Office; Meredieth Lightbourne, Medical Director for the Sherriff's Office; Tyna Taylor, Detention Captain for the South Fulton Municipal Regional Jail; and Pearlie Young, Detention Lieutenant for the South Fulton Municipal Regional Jail.

Plaintiffs alleged the conditions at the Jail violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments" and the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. They also alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Plaintiffs based their claims mainly on the Jail's alleged practice of confining psychiatrically disabled female inmates to isolation cells (called "mental health pods") for months at a time as well as the unsanitary conditions in those cells. Their equal protection claim arose from the Jail's alleged policy of barring female inmates from receiving jail-based competency restoration services.²

On April 7, 2019, Plaintiffs moved the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to "(1) Offer at least four hours of daily out-of-cell time to all women in [mental health pods], including one hour per day of outdoor time; and (2) Within 30 days, establish and present to the Court for its approval a plan, designed to be implemented within another 30 days, for providing a medically appropriate environment for women who experience psychiatric disabilities and are assigned to [mental health pods], including sanitary conditions of confinement and out-of-cell therapeutic activities." Plaintiffs also requested "expedited discovery and a hearing at which Plaintiffs will show that the requested relief satisfies the requirements of the [PLRA]."³

On July 23, 2019, after a three-day evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted Plaintiffs’ requested preliminary injunction.⁴ The order contained the findings traditionally required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction—likelihood of success on the merits, that the balance of hardships favored Plaintiffs, irreparable harm, and public interest. The Court also recognized that the PLRA required additional "particularized findings," and indicated that it would make those findings in a "forthcoming opinion."

That opinion—styled "addendum order"—was issued 62 days later on September 23, 2019. The opinion explained the Court's earlier findings in greater detail and made additional findings that the PLRA's requirements were satisfied.

On October 18, 2019, Defendants took this interlocutory appeal from the District Court's two orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).⁵ Defendants argue the District Court abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction because neither the traditional requirements for a preliminary injunction nor the PLRA's additional need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements were satisfied.

After the benefit of oral argument, we find that the preliminary injunction has expired by operation of law, making this appeal moot. We accordingly dismiss the appeal and vacate the order imposing the injunction as well as the subsequent addendum order.

II.

Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, to expedite prison litigation and end judicial overreach into the management of prisons. Put simply, "Congress meant to get the federal courts out of the business of running jails." Benjamin v. Jacobson , 172 F.3d 144, 182 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Calabresi, J., concurring).

To that end, § 3626(a)(1) strictly limits the circumstances in which district courts can issue "prospective relief"⁶ in civil actions challenging prison conditions:

Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.

§ 3626(a)(1)(A). These requirements are commonly referred to as the "need-narrowness-intrusiveness" requirements. See United States v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr ., 778 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2015). Section 3262(a)(1) also sets out "principles of comity" that further limit the issuance of prospective relief:

(B) The court shall not order any prospective relief that requires or permits a government official to exceed his or her authority under State or local law or otherwise violates State or local law, unless—

(i) Federal law requires such relief to be ordered in violation of State or local law;

(ii) the relief is necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right; and

(iii) no other relief will correct the violation of the Federal right.

§ 3626(a)(1)(B).

Recognizing that district courts might enter preliminary injunctive relief in prison cases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a), Congress set out additional requirements for such relief in § 3626(a)(2) :

In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, to the extent otherwise authorized by law, the court may enter a temporary restraining order or an order for preliminary injunctive relief. Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity set out in paragraph (1)(B) in tailoring any preliminary relief. Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically expire on the date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the court makes the findings required under subsection (a)(1) for the entry of prospective relief and makes the order final before the expiration of the 90-day period.

In sum, § 3626(a)(2) does three things. First, it confirms that courts can issue preliminary injunctions in prison cases "to the extent otherwise authorized by law." Second, it provides that preliminary injunctive relief must meet the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements. Third, it provides that preliminary injunctive relief shall expire within 90 days unless the court does two things: (1) makes the need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings for prospective relief under § 3626(a)(1), and (2) makes the order final.

This appeal primarily concerns the third function—we will call it the "unless" clause—and particularly the meaning of the phrase "makes the order final." Since the District Court here entered the challenged preliminary injunction well over 90 days ago, we must decide whether it did what was necessary to prevent its expiration by operation of law on the 90th day. If it did not, then this appeal is moot and we lack jurisdiction absent an applicable exception. United States v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 778 F.3d at 1229.

Plaintiffs argue the preliminary injunction has not expired. According to them, all the "unless" clause requires district courts to do to avoid expiration is to "finalize a preliminary injunction's terms to ensure that they comply with ... [the] need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria." Under this reading of the statute, the District Court did all it needed to do to prevent expiration when it issued its addendum order making the required need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings.

Defendants, by contrast,...