Ga. Ice Co. v. Meakin

• Decision Date: 28 February 1883
• Citation: 70 Ga. 637
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: Georgia Ice Company. vs. Porter & Meakin.

70 Ga. 637

Georgia Ice Company. vs. Porter & Meakin.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

FEBRUARY TERM, 1883.

[This case was brought forward from the last term, under §4271 (a) et seg. of the Code.]

Attachments. Officers. Nullities. Judgments. Corporations. Levy and Sale. Before Judge Hillyer. Fulton Superior Court. April Term, 1882.

On June 23, 1879, an attachment was sued out by Porter & Meakin against the North American Ice Company, and was levied on certain real estate. No defence was made, and a judgment in attachment was rendered for the plaintiff April 1, 1880. A claim was interposed to the levy thereunder by the Georgia Ice Company.

When the claim case was called for trial, claimant's counsel moved to quash the execution and attachment proceedings, on the ground that the affidavit was made by J. H. Porter, on behalf of his firm, before C. D. Woodson, N. P., and the attachment was issued by the latter. In support of this motion, it was shown that Porter was cashier of the Merchant's Bank, and owned stock therein, and that Woodson was a clerk in the same bank. The court overruled the motion.

The evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs was, in brief, as follows: The land on which the ice factory is located, and which is now in controversy, was purchased in 1875, one Brown negotiating the purchase and taking the deeds in the name of One Coughlin. On December 20, 1879, after the levy of the attachment, Coughlin made a deed to the property to the Georgia Ice Company, the expressed consideration being $1.00. The property was returned for taxation in 1878.and 1879, and assessed as belonging to the North American Ice Company. Coughlin made no return for those years. The goods, for the purchase money of which suit was brought, were delivered on the order of one Becker, who was in charge of the factory at the time, and represented himself as being the agent of the North American Ice Company; and the goods were so charged. The work which formed the subject-matter of some of the charges was done at the factory. The North American Ice Company had a sign over the door, and there was a safe in the office with their name on it. The plaintiffs had previously sold and charged goods in the same way, and the bills had been paid.

The evidence on behalf of the defendant was, in brief, as follows: One Beath had certain patents for making ice, and for the purpose of putting them into practical operation, he formed a partnership with Coughlin and John P. Jones. They were to furnish the necessary money, and own four-fifths interest in the patents throughout the United States. Coughlin furnished the money to buy the ground and erect this factory. The title was taken in his name, but it was really for the benefit of the partnership. About a year after this, when the factory was nearly completed, a question arose as to the proper manner of holding the patents, it being suggested that, if they were held by the partnership, any one of the partners might use them for his own private benefit. For the sole purpose of holding these patents, the North American Ice Company was then incorporated, and the title to the patents was conveyed to it. In the early part of the year 1879, the company conveyed away its patents, and Beath\'s connection with it ceased. In 1878, when the bill sued on was contracted, Becker occupied the ice factory, stating that he did so by permission of John P. Jones. He was making experiments in regard to making ice on his own account, and the premises were closed except while he was there. He employed his own workmen and paid them himself. The bill of Porter & Meakin was made while he was there. At the time of the trial, Beath was the manager of and a stockholder in the Georgia Ice Company. He swore that no part of the property levied on ever belonged to the North American Ice Company, and that none of its money was used in the purchase of the land or the erection of the building.

The jury found the property subject. Claimant moved for a new trial on the following grounds:

(1) Because the court refused to quash the attachment proceedings.

(2) Because the court erred in charging the jury as follows: " The general principle of law is that no person is bound by a judgment, unless he has had his day in court. If he is served with the process, he is bound....