Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Sorum
| Decision Date | 27 May 1902 |
| Docket Number | 6731 |
| Citation | 90 N.W. 799,11 N.D. 164 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Traill County; Pollock, J.
Action by Gaar, Scott & Co. against J. A. Sorum, as sheriff. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Reversed.
Turner & Lee; Newman, Spalding & Stambaugh, for appellant.
Personal property brought into the state after April 1st in any year is not taxable for that year, for the reason that the statute fixing the date for listing, assessment and valuation requires, not only that the property be valued as of that date but that it be listed in the name of the person owning it on that date; and also that it have a status as taxable property in this state on that day; otherwise, the rule of uniformity required by the constitution and sought to be established by the laws would be violated. § 176 Const.; § § 1181, 1189, 1190, 1211, 1212, 1199, 1203 and 1182, Sub. 10, Rev. Codes.
In 1890 our legislature adopted the Revenue Tax Laws of Minnesota eliminating the provision requiring judgment and sale thereunder. In 1895 the provisions of the Compiled Laws were reenacted and in 1897 the law of 1890 was restored. The Minnesota tax law has been construed, Martin v Drake, 41 N.W. 942, 40 Minn. 137; Knowlton v Sups., 9 Wis. 378; State v. Winnebago County, 11 Wis. 40; Hayden v. Rowe, 28 N.W. 187; Day v. Pelican, 69 N.W. 371; Pa. Coal Co. v. Porth, 23 N.W. 105; Dodge v. Nevada Nat. Bank, 109 F. 726; Southern Ins. Co. v. Board, 21 So. 914; Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N.Y. 316; Clarke v. Norton, 49 N.Y. 243; Overing v. Foote, 65 N.Y. 263; People v. Commis., 91 N.Y. 593. The foregoing cases are decided under similar statutory constitutional provisions. The state under its constitution may, by classification, fix different dates for different classes of property. Wis. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Lincoln, 15 N.W. 121; Nelson Lumber Co. v. Loraine, 22 F. 54. In every instance the statutory date fixed is taken as the criterion to determine what personal property is taxable and to whom it should be taxed. Some arbitrary rule of date has been found necessary, and, although, in many instances working hardship and inequality to some extent in taxation, it has been found the best regulation that could be established by law. Board v. Wilson, 24 P. 563; Shaw v. Dinnie, 5 Gilm. 418; Hunnewell v. Cass Co., 22 Wall. 477; People v. Kohl, 40 Cal. 127; State v. Hardin, 34 N.J.L. 79; Field v. City, 10 Cush. 65; De Arman v. Williams, 5 S.W. 904; Lamb v. Rawles, 33 Ind. 386; Ry. Co. v. State; 13 Lea 248; Sully v. Poorbaugh, 45 Ia. 455; Wangler v. Black Hawk Co., 9 N.W. 314; Johnson v. Lyon, 106 Ill. 64; Graham v. Chautauqua Co., 2 P. 549; Hull v. Johnson, 63 P. 455. The words "Taxation by uniform rule," as used in § 176, means by one and the same unvarying standard. Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 15, and cases above cited.
J. F. Selby, for respondent.
The proviso in § 1211, Revised Codes, nowhere appears in the 1878 revenue laws of the state of Minnesota; nor does the provision "All personal property, wherever and whenever found between the 1st day of April and the 1st day of June shall be listed by the assessor" appear in the Minnesota statute. The exemption of land from taxation after a certain date under the provisions of their statute was before the supreme court of Wisconsin, and it was there held that the provision of the statute to the effect that real estate might be assessed at any time between the 1st day of May and the time appointed for the sitting of the board of review, was legal and not in conflict with the constitution. Wis. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Lincoln County, 15 N.W. 121. Notwithstanding the constitutional provision that all taxation shall be equal and uniform, it is competent for the legislature to provide that property brought into the state subsequent to the taxing date may be assessed for taxation for the then current year. Kelley v. Rhoads, 51 P. 593; Kelley v. Rhoads, 63 P. 935; Hull v. Johnson, 63 P. 455; Hudson v. Miller, 63 P. 21; Prairie Cattle Co. v. Williamson, 49 P. 937; Collins v. Green, 62 P. 813; Hull v. Johnson, 67 P. 548. Property coming into the state after the regular assessing period may be assessed and taxed by proper statutory provisions without invading the uniformity of the taxation. Wright v. Stinson, 47 P. 761. If the words "then value" in the proviso to § 1211, Rev. Codes, are given their literal meaning, the proviso would conflict with the general rule of assessing property with reference to its value on April 1st. If it exists as an exception to the general rule established by the statute, the exception must give way to the general rule. Collin v. Green, 62 P. 813; Hull v. Johnson, 63 P. 455. This statute has been sustained against the objection that it was special legislation. Mpls. & Nor. Elev. Co. v. Traill Co., 9 N.D. 213.
The plaintiff is a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of threshing machines in the city of Richmond, Ind. This action was brought to recover the sum of $ 59.22 paid by the plaintiff to the defendant as sheriff of Traill county for an alleged personal property tax assessed by the taxing officers of said county in the year 1900 upon a certain threshing engine and separator, of which the plaintiff was the owner. Payment of the tax in question was made by plaintiff under protest, and under the coercion of a seizure of its property by the defendant sheriff. The defendant interposed a general demurrer to the complaint, and the same was sustained by the trial court. Judgment was ordered and entered dismissing the action. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment, and assigns the order sustaining the demurrer to its complaint as error.
The complaint, in substance, alleges that the property which was the basis of the tax exacted from plaintiff was not in Traill county, or in this state, on the 1st day of April, 1900, but was at plaintiff's factory, at the city of Richmond, in the state of Indiana, on said date; that said property was listed and assessed for taxation in said city and state for said year; that the property in question was not shipped into this state and into the city of Hillsboro, in Traill county, until April 27, 1900; that subsequent to said last-named date it was assessed by the city assessor of said city of Hillsboro for the year 1900, and said assessment returned to the county auditor of Traill county; that the tax in question was based upon the assessment so made and returned. Further reference to the averments of the complaint will not be necessary.
The facts stated present the single question in controversy in this case, which is whether, under the revenue laws of this state, property coming into existence or brought into the state after April 1st in any year is taxable for that year. It is conceded that, if property brought into the state after April 1st is subject to taxation for the current year, the property in question was lawfully assessed, and the complaint does not state a cause of action. If, on the other hand, property coming into the state after April 1st is not taxable for that year, then the sum of money which plaintiff seeks to recover concededly was exacted without authority of law, and the complaint states a cause of action for its recovery. It will thus be seen that the entire controversy is as to the taxability of the plaintiff's property when assessed.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that "personal property brought into the state after April 1st in any year is not taxable for that year." Counsel for defendant, on the other hand, maintains that not only is property which has a situs in the state on April 1st of any year taxable for that year, but that "all personal property, whenever and wherever found, in this state between the 1st day of April and the 1st day of June of each year, is subject to assessment and taxation under the general revenue laws of the state; and this, whether the property was owned in the state on the 1st day of April, or came into the state on or after that date, before the 1st day of June, and during the assessing period." Briefly stated, the position of counsel for plaintiff is that only such personal property as is in the state on April 1st is taxable; whereas, counsel for defendant contends that all personal property having a situs within the state at any time between the 1st day of April and the 1st day of June of any year is subject to taxation for that year, and should be assessed. The solution of the question thus presented turns upon the provisions of chapter 126 of the Laws of 1897, which chapter is now embodied in chapter 18 of the Political Code (Rev. Codes 1899), under which the assessment in question was made. Counsel for both parties agree that all property which is made taxable by said chapter is required to be listed and assessed with reference to its value on the 1st day of April, and this is undoubtedly a proper construction of the provisions relating to valuation; but, as has been stated, counsel disagree radically on the question as to what property is subject to taxation. It is urged on behalf of the defendant that the legislature has authorized the assessment and taxation of all personal property which has a situs in the state at any time during the assessing period,--that is, between April 1st and June 1st,--without regard to its existence or presence in the state on April 1st, and the trial court so held. An examination of the provisions of the statutes which control this question leads us to a different conclusion.
The revenue laws now in force in this state were borrowed from the state of Minnesota, and were first adopted in chapter 132, Laws 1890, the parent statute being chapter 11, Gen. St Minn. 1878. Th...
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