Wis. Cent. R. Co. v. Lincoln Cnty.

• Decision Date: 20 February 1883
• Parties: WISCONSIN CENT. R. CO. v. LINCOLN COUNTY AND OTHERS.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

57 Wis. 137

15 N.W. 121

WISCONSIN CENT. R. CO.

v.LINCOLN COUNTY AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Filed February 20, 1883.

Appeal from circuit court, Lincoln county.

The action was commenced April 27, 1880, to cancel certificates of sale of the lands described in the complaint for the unpaid taxes of 1876, and to restrain the defendant, the county clerk, from issuing tax deeds pursuant to such certificates. The complaint alleges that the sales were made and the certificates issued in May, 1877, and that the defendant county is the owner and holder of all of said certificates. It also appears from the complaint that the lands thus sold were part and parcel of the lands granted by congress to this state by an act entitled “An act granting lands to aid in the construction of certain railroads in the state of Wisconsin,” approved May 5, 1864, (13 St. at Large, p. 66, c. 80,) and granted by the state by chapters 314 and 362, P. & L. Laws 1866, to the Winnebago & Lake Superior and the Portage & Superior Railroad Companies respectively. It also appears that the plaintiff company is the successor in interest of said two railroad companies, and the owner of the lands affected by this action. It is alleged that these lands were assessed as of May 1, 1876, at which time they were exempt from taxation by virtue of chapters 314 and 362 of 1866, above cited, and also by virtue of chapter 21 of 1877. The provisions of these several acts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The complaint also alleges various irregularities and breaches of duty by the assessors, the boards of review, and town clerks, in the assessment and equalization of the value of the lands, and in levying town, school-district, and county taxes thereon. These need not be specifically stated. The defendant having failed to answer the complaint within the time allowed by law, and the default having been satisfactorily excused, the court granted leave to the defendant county to interpose an answer, which it accordingly did.

The answer denies that the lands described in the complaint were exempt from assessment and taxation in 1876, or that they were assessed as of May 1st, and alleges that they were not assessed until on or about May 15th in that year. It also contains the following defense: “Defendant further alleges that this action was commenced on the twenty-seventh day of April, A. D. 1880, and more than nine months after the passage of chapter 334 of the General Laws of 1878, by reason whereof said action is barred.”

The plaintiff thereupon moved for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that the answer was “frivolous and insufficient, and did not contain a defense to the action.” The court granted the motion, and made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

“(1) That all the material allegations in the complaint are true; (2) that the plaintiff is a railroad corporation duly incorporated and existing under the laws of the state of Wisconsin; (3) that the plaintiff was, at the time the assessment was made, and still is, the owner in fee of the lands described in plaintiff's complaint, and that said lands are a part of the so-called “land-grant lands,” which were exempted from taxation by chapters 314 and 362 of the Private and Local Laws of 1866; (4) that said lands were assessed, sold, and certificates of sale issued thereon, as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, and the following conclusions of law thereon: (1) That said lands were exempt by law from sale for non-payment of the taxes mentioned in plaintiff's complaint; (2) the sale of said lands for non-payment of taxes was illegal and void, and should be set aside; (3) the certificates of sale issued thereon are illegal and void, and are a cloud upon the plaintiff's title, and should be canceled; (4) that defendant's answer is insufficient in law, and states no defense to plaintiff's cause of action; (5) that defendant should be perpetually enjoined and restrained from selling or transferring any of said certificates of sale, or from issuing deeds thereon; (6) that the plaintiff is entitled to have and recover judgment herein against the defendants for the relief demanded in the complaint, and for its costs and disbursements in this action. Judgment is therefore ordered accordingly.”

Judgment was thereupon duly entered for the relief demanded in the complaint. The defendants appealed from the judgment.

Edwin H. Abbot and Jones & Sanborn, for respondent, Wisconsin Central Railroad Company.

J. C. Spooner, S. U. Pinney, and Bump, Hetzel & Canon, for appellants, Lincoln county and others.

LYON, J.

An important if not the controlling question in the case is, were the lands described in the complaint exempt from assessment and taxation in the year 1876? Chapters 314 and 362, P. & L. Laws 1866, conferring the land grant of May 5, 1864, (which includes the lands here in question,) upon the two railroad companies therein named, (to the rights of which said companies the plaintiff company has succeeded,) each contains the following provision: “The lands granted or intended to be granted by the provisions of this section to the company hereby created, shall be and hereby are exempt from all assessments and from all taxation whatever, for the term of 10 years from the taking effect of this act, unless said company shall sooner sell or convey the same; and so much of said lands as shall be sold or conveyed by said company within said 10 years shall be subject to assessment and taxation, from time to time, as the same shall be as aforesaid sold and conveyed.”

Chapter 314 was published and took effect May 10, and chapter 362, May 9, 1866. Hence the periods of exemption therein specified expired on the tenth and ninth days of May, 1876, respectively. The allegation of the complaint is that the lands were assessed for taxation in the year 1876, as of the first day of May. The answer denies this allegation, also denies that the lands when assessed were exempt from assessment, and alleges that the lands were not assessed by the assessor for the purpose of taxation “until on or about the fifteenth day of May, 1876.” The form of both pleadings in this particular may be open to criticism, and each was criticised by the opposing counsel. Applying to both the liberal and reasonable rule of construction which now prevails, we think the complaint sufficiently avers that the assessment was made May 1st; and the answer, that it was not made until after May 10th. But, as will hereinafter be seen, we do not regard these allegations in the pleadings as of any importance. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs maintains that the assessment must necessarily have been made on or as of the first day of May, under the statutes then in force, and could not lawfully relate to a later date; and inasmuch as the exemption did not expire until May 10th and 9th, no lawful assessment for taxation could have been made in 1876.

The statutes in force in 1876, relating to assessments for taxation, provided that the assessors should proceed to make the assessment on the first day of May each year, or as soon thereafter as practicable; that personal property should be assessed as of May 1st in each year, and such assessment should not be affected by any sale or change of location of such property after that date, and that real property might be assessed at any time between the first day of May and the time appointed for the sitting of the proper board of review, in each year. Laws 1868, c. 130, § 20, and chapter 234 of 1876. The time fixed for the meeting of the board of review was the last Monday in June, annually. Although the statute plainly provided for the assessment of real property at any time before the last Monday in June in each year, counsel for plaintiff maintains that it must be construed as requiring real, like personal, property to be assessed as of May 1st; otherwise, he contends, the provision would be invalid in that it would violate the uniform rule of taxation ordained by the constitution. Article 7, § 1.

The precise question is, does a statute which provides that personal property shall be assessed for taxation as of the first day of May, while real property may be assessed in the same year any day between May 1st and the last Monday in June, contravene the uniform rule of the constitution?

Absolute uniformity in every detail in the assessment of property is impracticable, if not unattainable. It was said by the late chief justice in Plumer v. Sup'rs, 46 Wis. 163, that “it is sufficient to satisfy the constitution that the rule of the section provides for the valuation of real property at its full value, and that the assessor must use the best practicable means of ascertaining the value.” This was said in answer to an objection that a statute (chapter 334 of 1878, § 1) prescribed a method for ascertaining such value different from that prescribed by law for ascertaining the value of taxable personal property.

In the above quotation we find the true reason and scope of the constitutional rule of uniformity. It was...