Gabaldon-Cochran v. Cochran

Citation868 N.W.2d 501
Decision Date25 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. 20140338.,20140338.
PartiesLaTanya GABALDON–COCHRAN, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Jeremy COCHRAN, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

LaTanya L. Gabaldon, Mashantucket, CT, plaintiff and appellant; self-represented.

Patti J. Jensen, East Grand Forks, MN, for defendant and appellee.

Opinion

CROTHERS, Justice.

[¶ 1] LaTanya Gabaldon, formerly known as LaTanya Gabaldon–Cochran, appeals from a district court judgment granting her a divorce from Jeremy Cochran. Gabaldon argues the court's property distribution is not equitable, the court erred in awarding Cochran a cash payment as part of the property distribution and the court failed to include all of her educational debt in the marital estate. We affirm.

I

[¶ 2] Gabaldon and Cochran were married in July 2011, and do not have any children together. At the time of the divorce, Gabaldon was 26 years old and Cochran was 38 years old. The parties lived in Arizona before they were married, but they relocated to North Dakota in August 2011 when Gabaldon began attending law school at the University of North Dakota. Gabaldon graduated from law school in the spring of 2014 and was employed as a judicial law clerk at the time of the divorce trial. Before the parties moved to North Dakota, Cochran was employed as a law enforcement officer by the Coconino County Sheriff's Department in Arizona, and he began working for the University of North Dakota Police Department after he relocated to North Dakota.

[¶ 3] In January 2014, Gabaldon filed for divorce. After a trial, the district court granted the parties a divorce, distributed the marital estate and ordered neither party would be awarded attorney's fees or spousal support. The court awarded Gabaldon $31,463.57 in assets, $13,149.55 in debts, and ordered she pay $17,500 to Cochran. The court awarded Cochran $60,005.41 in assets, $7,839.55 in debts, and a cash payment of $17,500 from Gabaldon. The court found the property distribution was equitable and returned to each party the assets and debts they brought into the marriage. Gabaldon received a net award of $814.02, and Cochran received a net award of $69,665.86.

II

[¶ 4] Gabaldon argues the district court's property distribution is clearly erroneous. She claims the distribution is not equitable, the court's decision to order a cash payment to Cochran was induced by an erroneous view of the law and the court failed to include her $25,000 educational debt to the Hopi Tribe in the marital estate.

[¶ 5] Our standard for reviewing the district court's property distribution is well-established:

“A district court's distribution of marital property is treated as a finding of fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard of review. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. This Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, and the district court's findings of fact are presumptively correct.”

Feist v. Feist, 2015 ND 98, ¶ 4, 862 N.W.2d 817 (quoting McCarthy v. McCarthy, 2014 ND 234, ¶ 8, 856 N.W.2d 762 ).

A

[¶ 6] Under N.D.C.C. 14–05–24(1), the court is required to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate, including all of the parties' assets and debts. All of the parties' assets and debts, whether held jointly or individually, are marital property, and the court must determine the value of the entire marital estate before making an equitable distribution. Lorenz v. Lorenz, 2007 ND 49, ¶ 6, 729 N.W.2d 692 ; see also Fugere v. Fugere, 2015 ND 174, ¶ 8, 865 N.W.2d 407. The court must equitably divide the marital estate using the guidelines from Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 784, 52 N.W.2d 107, 111 (1952), and Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845, 852 (N.D.1966), which require the following factors to be considered:

“The respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters as may be material.”

Feist, 2015 ND 98, ¶ 6, 862 N.W.2d 817 (quoting McCarthy, 2014 ND 234, ¶ 9, 856 N.W.2d 762 ).

[¶ 7] A property division does not need to be equal to be equitable, but a substantial disparity must be explained. Feist, 2015 ND 98, ¶ 6, 862 N.W.2d 817. We have often said that while a long-term marriage generally supports an equal division of property, a court may unequally divide property in a short-term marriage and award the parties what each brought into the marriage.” Fugere, 2015 ND 174, ¶ 8, 865 N.W.2d 407 (quoting Dieterle v. Dieterle, 2013 ND 71, ¶ 25, 830 N.W.2d 571 ). Economic fault and a party's dissipation of assets also may be relevant factors for the court to consider and are grounds for an unequal distribution. Lorenz, at ¶ 6; see also Crandall v. Crandall, 2011 ND 136, ¶ 18, 799 N.W.2d 388.

[¶ 8] Gabaldon and Cochran requested each party receive the property and debt they brought into the marriage. Both parties submitted a property and debt listing under N.D.R.Ct. 8.3, and agreed on the valuation of the property and debt. At the trial, Gabaldon testified she did not want any property that was currently in Cochran's possession. She presented an exhibit listing how she would like the court to divide the parties' property and debts, and she testified her proposed distribution would result in Cochran receiving net assets and debts that are approximately $60,000 more than the assets and debts she would receive. Cochran's requested distribution was consistent with Gabaldon's proposed distribution. The district court distributed the parties' assets and debts as they requested; however, the court also ordered Gabaldon pay Cochran $17,500, and the court did not include a debt of $25,000 Gabaldon alleged she owes to the Hopi Tribe for funds provided to her for her law school education. The court explained that if it did include the alleged debt to the Hopi Tribe in the marital estate, it would allocate that debt to Gabaldon and would not change the rest of the property distribution. Gabaldon received a net award of $814.02, and Cochran received a net award of $69,665.86. The court explained that its property distribution returned to the parties the assets and liabilities they brought into the marriage and added the $17,500 cash payment to Cochran.

[¶ 9] The district court considered and made findings about each RuffFischer factor. The court found there is a twelve-year age difference between the parties, Gabaldon will have an additional decade of work life, and her potential future earning ability far exceeds Cochran's potential future earning ability. The court considered that Gabaldon's law degree will provide her with potential earning opportunities which far exceed those Cochran possesses as a law enforcement officer and that her law degree was earned entirely during the marriage. The court found the marriage was of very short duration, supporting a distribution of the marital estate that returns the assets and debts to the respective party who brought the asset or debt into the marriage. The court also found Cochran established a career in Arizona and left Arizona to accompany Gabaldon to law school in North Dakota, which required him to start over with his career, and he cannot resume his career where he left off if he returns to Arizona. The court found Cochran's career was set back by approximately three years, which supported a greater allocation of the marital estate to him.

[¶ 10] The court made findings on each of the RuffFischer factors and explained its unequal distribution:

“The duration of the marriage, the parties' station in life, the parties' health and physical condition, and the parties' financial circumstances at the time of the divorce all weigh in favor of an equal division of the martial estate and/or a return of the parties to their pre-divorce circumstances. The respective ages of the parties, the earning ability of the parties, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, and the disruption of [Cochran's] career support an increased allocation of marital assets to [Cochran]. None of the RuffFischer Guideline factors favor an increased allocation of assets to [Gabaldon]. Based upon the consideration of the above factors, the undersigned determined that the above allocation of assets and debts is equitable, including the additional payment of $17,500 to [Cochran] by [Gabaldon]. The above allocation essentially returns to each party the assets and liabilities they brought into the marriage and allocates an additional payment to [Cochran] to account for the respective ages of the parties, the difference in future earning ability of the parties, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, and the disruption of [Cochran's] career.”

[¶ 11] [A] court may unequally divide property in a short-term marriage and award the parties what each brought into the marriage.” Dieterle, 2013 ND 71, ¶ 25, 830 N.W.2d 571. Gabaldon and Cochran were married for approximately three years, which is a short-term marriage. See Fugere, 2015 ND 174, ¶ 12, 865 N.W.2d 407. They did not own any real property or large assets. They each were given their vehicles, their separate checking and savings accounts, their separate retirement accounts and life insurance policies and other items they owned prior to the marriage. Cochran was awarded a few items he did not bring into the marriage, including the retirement he earned while working for the University of North Dakota Police Department, a boat, fish finder, a washer and dryer and some household...

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3 cases
  • Allmon v. Allmon
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • May 16, 2017
    ...the value of the entire marital estate before making an equitable distribution. See Gabaldon–Cochran v. Cochran , 2015 ND 214, ¶ 6, 868 N.W.2d 501 ; Lorenz v. Lorenz , 2007 ND 49, ¶ 6, 729 N.W.2d 692. Equitable division of the marital estate is governed by the Ruff– Fischer guidelines, whic......
  • Brew v. Brew
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • October 17, 2017
    ...as a finding of fact, which is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Gabaldon-Cochran v. Cochran, 2015 ND 214, ¶ 5, 868 N.W.2d 501. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, there is no evidence to support it, or if, after re......
  • Adams v. Adams, 20150365.
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • August 24, 2016
    ...all the evidence we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Gabaldon–Cochran v. Cochran, 2015 ND 214, ¶ 5, 868 N.W.2d 501. “This Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, and the district court's findings of fact are presumptively co......

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