Gabster v. Mesaros

• Decision Date: 24 June 1966
• Citation: 422 Pa. 116,220 A.2d 639
• Parties: John GABSTER, George Rebovich, and John Stefan, Appellants, v. Father Frank MESAROS, Bishop Orestes P. Chornock and Greek Catholic Church of Clymer.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 639

220 A.2d 639

422 Pa. 116

John GABSTER, George Rebovich, and John Stefan, Appellants, v. Father Frank MESAROS, Bishop Orestes P. Chornock and Greek Catholic Church of Clymer.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 24, 1966.

John A. Metz, Jr., Metz, Cook, Hanna & Kelly, Richard M. Sharp, Sharp & Gilpatrick, Philipsburg, Earl R. Handler, Handler & Malcolm, Indiana, for appellants.

R. Carlyle Fee, Serene & Fee, Indiana, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION

EAGEN, Justice.

The court below ruled that this equity action was barred by laches and entered judgment for the defendants on the pleadings. The plaintiffs appeal.

It is fundamental that judgment on the pleadings should be entered only in a clear case. Bureau for Child Care v. United Fund, 416 Pa. 617, 207 A.2d 847 (1965).

For the purpose of this appeal, these facts must be accepted as true:

The plaintiffs are members of the congregation of the Greek Catholic Church of Clymer, Indiana County, Pennsylvania. The Church began as an unincorporated association prior to the year of 1907. During 1907, it was incorporated as a nonprofit corporation for the purpose of worshiping God according to the faith, doctrine and discipline of that branch of the Greek Catholic Church, which is in union with the The Holy See at Rome, and recognizes the Pope of Rome as the spiritual head of the Church. From its founding until the year 1935, the Church conducted all of its affairs, both spiritual and temporal, as a Greek Catholic Church in union with Rome, and all of its property was acquired and used for this purpose.

In 1935, the defendant, The Most Reverend Bishop Orestes P. Chornock, founded a sect or denomination known as the 'Carpatho-Russian Greek Catholic Orthodox Church of North and South America', which has since been renamed the 'American Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Diocese of the United States of America.' This sect is not in union with Rome, but recognizes the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Eastern Patriarch in Istanbul.

In 1935, Bishop Chornock persuaded the subject Church to abandon its union with the Church of Rome and to associate itself with his denomination. Since that time continuously until 1964, the Church has been under the spiritual leadership of Bishop Chornock who has regularly assigned and removed priests, who served the parish and administered the property and assets of the Church as one of his diocese.

This action, instituted on December 23, 1964, complains that the actions of Bishop Chornock, as above related, constituted an illegal diversion of the property of the Church from the purposes for which it was originally organized, and asks that such diversion be restrained in futuro. Bishop Chornock, the Church Corporation, and Reverend Frank Mesaros, a priest assigned by Bishop Chornock to administer the needs of the parish, are named defendants.

As noted before, the lower court ruled that the relief sought is precluded by laches. The plaintiffs contend: (1) The doctrine of laches does not apply to church disputes because of the singular concepts involved in regard to the ownership and use of property dedicated to religious worship; and, (2) In any event, the facts do not warrant the application of the doctrine of laches, because no prejudice or injury to the defendants is evident at this stage of the case.

The ruling below was correct, and we affirm.

Laches is an equitable doctrine, and its purpose is for the repose of title, claims and demands for peace and order in society. See, St. Peter's Evan. Luth. Ch. v. Kleinfelter, 96 Pa.Super.Ct. 146 (1929). The question of its application does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but rather whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party or parties are chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to institute or prosecute the claim. Lutherland, Inc., v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143 (1947). Ordinarily, the passage of time, in itself, is insufficient to warrant the application of the doctrine, and it must further appear that injury or material prejudice has resulted to the defendant through the delay. Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391, 172 A.2d 152 (1961), and Hostetter v. Sterner's Gro., Inc., 390 Pa. 170, 134 A.2d 884 (1957). However, where the delay in asserting the claim involves a grossly unreasonable time, the necessity for specifics regarding prejudice or injury becomes less crucial.

That the plaintiffs delayed for a grossly unreasonable period of time in asserting the present claim is patently clear. Further, it is self-evident that the defendants and other members of the Church will suffer material prejudice in asserting and defending their rights, and also suffer material injury if the plaintiffs' claim is sustained.

Whether or not the subject Church was founded and dedicated as one in union with Rome is one of the vital questions in issue. As a result of the plaintiffs' knowing acquiescence for thirty years, without taking action, in the existence of conditions about which they now complain, the original purpose of the Church has become obscure, the testimony of important witnesses no longer available, and the ascertainment of the true facts rendered much more difficult, if not impossible. Compare, First Nat. Bank of Pittston v. Lytle Coal Co., 332 Pa. 394, 3 A.2d 350 (1939), and Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Bird Coal Co., 334 Pa. 324. 5 A.2d 146 (1939). Moreover, plaintiffs advance no reason for the prolonged delay in properly asserting their claim. Further, those members of the congregation who have practiced the form of worship which the Church has followed continuously for thirty years, and for whom the named defendants are acting in a representative capacity, have contributed substantial sums of money thereto in justifiable reliance that the Church would continue to follow the theological course and spiritual beliefs to which they adhere. It is obvious that to now permit the Church property and assets to be used for another purpose would result in serious injury to them. See, Tozier v. Brown, 202 Pa. 359, 51 A. 998 (1902).

While laches is an affirmative defense and ordinarily will not be applied until after full inquiry into all of the circumstances, if the fact of laches appears on the face of the pleadings, relief may be denied on this ground. Grange Nat. Bank of McKean County v. First Nat. Bank, 330 Pa. 1, 198 A. 321 (1938), and Blank & Gottschall Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 355 Pa. 502, 50 A.2d 218 (1946).

It is also our studied conclusion that the doctrine of laches applies in disputes of the nature presented. Other jurisdictions have so ruled. See, Saint Nicholas Ruthenian G.C.C. v. Kapsho, 202 Misc. 893, 114 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1952), and Greek Catholic Church v. Archbishop Roizdestvensky, 67 Colo. 217, 184 P. 295, 18 A.L.R. 690 (1919). See also, Note 75 Harv.L.Rev. 1142, 1163 (1962).

It is the law in Pennsylvania that when property, real or personal, is vested in a religious society for the worship of Almighty God, that it is a charitable use and such use cannot be diverted from that to which it was originally and lawfully dedicated. Stated another way, if a congregation had been organized and holds its property as a constituent part of any particular religious denomination, it cannot sever itself from such religious denomination without forfeiting its rights and property to those of the organization, who...