Gachett v. Retail Wholesale Dep't Store Union, CASE NO. 2:11-cv-398-MEF

• Decision Date: 29 March 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:11-cv-398-MEF
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
• Parties: HENRY GACHETT, Plaintiff, v. RETAIL WHOLESALE DEPARTMENT STORE UNION, Defendant.

HENRY GACHETT, Plaintiff,

v.RETAIL WHOLESALE DEPARTMENT STORE UNION, Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:11-cv-398-MEF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

DONE: March 29, 2013

(WO - Do Not Publish)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court on Defendant Retail Wholesale Department Store Union's (the "Union") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #15) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the Union's Motion to Dismiss is due to be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Henry Gachett ("Gachett") alleges that on or about April 17, 2009, he was terminated from his employment at Wayne Farms. (Doc. #1-1, at 1.) Gachett alleges that he "sought assistance from the Union to appeal his termination from Wayne Farms, as he was a dues paying Union Member[,]" and that the Union refused to provide him with representation. Gachett further alleges that the Union deducted dues from Gachett's paycheck each month, and that Gachett relied on the Union's representations that his membership was in effect at all times relevant to this lawsuit.

On April 11, 2011, Gachett filed this suit in the Circuit Court of Bullock County, Alabama. Gachett's state court lawsuit included claims against the Union for misrepresentation, fraud, negligence/wantonness, breach of contract, and bad faith. (Doc. #1-1, at 3-5.) The Union timely removed the case to this Court on May 25, 2011. (Doc. #1.) The Union predicated its removal on federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C § 1331. Specifically, the Union argued that three of Gachett's five claims are governed by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, a federal statute which preempts any state law claim that is "inextricably intertwined" with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). See Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). Gachett timely filed a Motion to Remand. (Doc. #5.)

The Court denied Gachett's Motion to Remand by Order dated January 17, 2012 (Doc. #12), concluding that Counts One through Three of Gachett's Complaint were preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. In so ruling, the Court found that Gachett's state law claims for failing to provide union representation, fraudulent failure to disclose denial of benefits, and negligent or wanton misrepresentation concerning union benefits required interpretation of the Union's CBA with Gachett's employer, Wayne Farms. The Court did not address whether Counts Four through Six were preempted, because such issues were not raised during the remand proceedings. The Court concluded that it would exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Doc. #12, at 10.)

In its Motion to Dismiss, the Union argues that all of Gachett's claims for relief aredue to be dismissed because they are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. The Union further argues that all of Gachett's claims are preempted by the judicially created cause of action against a union for breach of its duty of fair representation and, therefore, are time-barred. Ignoring the Court's ruling on his Motion to Remand, Gachett responds that none of his claims are preempted by federal law.¹

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may defend against the allegations of a complaint by persuading the Court that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a contention necessarily implicates the requirements for pleading set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).

Under Rule 8, a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The "pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555(2007) and Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). "Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Twombly, a motion to dismiss could only be granted if a plaintiff could prove "no set of facts . . . which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986). Now, the standard is somewhat different. As the Supreme Court has explained,

[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'"

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009).

A court seeking to apply this standard should begin the analysis of a complaint "by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. According to the Supreme Court, the allegations in the complaint which merely state legal conclusions, constitute bald assertions devoid of further factual enhancement, or set forth formulaic recitations of the elements of the claim are notentitled to the assumption of the truth and should not be considered in the court's analysis of whether the complaint plausibly gives rise to entitlement to relief. Id. at 1949-51. Next, the court is to consider the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations that are entitled to the presumption of truth "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1950-51. "A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred." Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment CSX Transp. N. Lines v. CSX Transp., Inc., 522 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

The Union claims that all of Gachett's claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and the federal duty of fair representation and should be dismissed. Because the Court has already ruled that Counts One through Three of Plaintiff's Complaint are preempted by § 301, these claims will not be reanalyzed for § 301 preemption. Thus, the Court will turn to the remainder of Plaintiff's claims.

The issues before the Court are: (1) whether Gachett's remaining claims are due to be dismissed as preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and/or the federal duty of fair representation; and (2) whether Gachett's remaining claims, if they are preempted by federal law, are due to be dismissed outright on preemption grounds, or as time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.

A. Section 301 Preemption

1. Applicable Law

It is well established that a state law claim is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA unless it exists independently of the CBA. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 218; Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 (1987); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1988); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1990). A state law claim is not sufficiently independent when it depends upon an interpretation of the CBA. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 218; see also Hechler, 481 U.S. at 859 n.3 (restating the rule set forth in Allis-Chalmers that, "when a state-law claim is substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement, a plaintiff may not evade the pre-emptive force of § 301 of the LMRA by casting the suit as a state-law claim"); Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408-09 ("[A]s long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the [CBA] itself, the claim is 'independent' of the [CBA] for § 301 preemption purposes."). To determine whether a claim is independent, the Court must examine the elements of the state law claim to see if any of those require interpretation of the CBA. See Palmer v. Local 8285, 234 Fed. App'x 884, 887-88 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e must look to the elements of the state law claim to determine 'whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.'" (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213)); Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d 133, 138 (11th Cir. 2004); Jordan v. Equity Grp. Eufala Div. LLC, No. 2:08-cv-152-MEF, 2008 WL 4671781, at *2-3 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 21, 2008).

2. Application to Plaintiff's Claims

As an initial matter, the Court does not find it necessary to analyze all of Plaintiff'sclaims for § 301 preemption. Plaintiff alleges a state law claim of bad faith. (Compl., Count Five, Doc. #1-1.) However, Alabama does not recognize the tort of bad faith except in the insurance contract context. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 417 So. 2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982) (stating that the first element of the tort of bad faith is "an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant"). Plaintiff does not allege the existence of an insurance contract in his Complaint, so this claim, on its face, fails to state the most essential elements of an adequate state law claim that could be...