Gaddis v. Williams

Decision Date17 May 1921
Docket Number9888.
Citation198 P. 483,81 Okla. 289,1921 OK 173
PartiesGADDIS v. WILLIAMS ET AL.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

In an action on a series of promissory notes, each note constitutes a separate cause of action.

Though in fact all of the notes were given in consideration of one transaction and the notes all matured before an action is brought to recover on any of the notes, the holder of the notes may bring his action in the justice court on one or more of the notes, so that the aggregated amount does not exceed the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, and the fact that all of the notes are due does not constitute a splitting of a cause of action.

Where two separate actions are brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendant in the justice court, and each action is appealed to the district court, the actions are tried de novo, and the district court does not have any greater or different jurisdiction than is conferred on the justice court.

Where the district court consolidates such actions so appealed and renders a judgment for an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the justice court, held, that the district court did not have jurisdiction to render such judgment, and the same is void.

Appeal from District Court, Washington County; R. B. Boone, Judge.

Separate actions by J. J. Williams and J. Matt Gordon against Bert L Gaddis on 12 notes. Judgment for plaintiffs before justice of the peace, and defendant appealed to the district court. The actions were consolidated, judgment was rendered against defendant, who thereupon appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Rowland & Talbott, of Bartlesville, for plaintiff in error.

Chas W. Pennel, of Bartlesville, and Eugene Forbes, of Weatherford, for defendants in error.

MILLER J.

This action was commenced in the justice court of J. E. Hickey, a justice of the peace of Bartlesville township, Washington county, by the plaintiffs, J. J.

Williams and J. Matt Gordon, filing two separate actions in the justice court against Bert L. Gaddis. Each one of these actions was brought on six separate causes of action to recover on six separate promissory notes of $25 each, except one note which was for $33. In each action pending in the justice court judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs and against the defendant. The defendant appealed each of said cases to the district court of Washington county, and, as so appealed, they became cases No. 4505 and No. 4506. The district court of Washington county, over the objection of the defendant, made an order consolidating the two cases and rendered judgment for the sum of $308 and interest. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, saved his exceptions to all the proceedings of the court, and perfected this appeal. For convenience the parties will be referred to as they appeared in the court below.

The defendant makes five assignments of error. In the first assignment of error the defendant complains that the giving of the several notes arose out of one transaction and exceeded the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, as the aggregate amount of the 12 notes was $308. The bringing of two separate actions when each and all of the notes were due constituted a splitting of causes of action.

We do not agree with this contention. Each note was a separate cause of action. Bringing two separate actions on the 12 notes did not constitute a splitting of causes of action.

In Nesbitt v. Independent District of Riverside, 144 U.S 610, 12 S.Ct. 746, 36 L.Ed. 562, Mr. Justice Brewer, in stating the case said:

"That all of the said five bonds and the coupons attached belong to the same series and were issued at the same time, under the same circumstances and part of the same transaction."

In the opinion he states:

"Now, the present suit is on causes of action different from those presented in the suit at Des Moines. Bonds 16, 17, and 18 were not presented or known in that suit; and while bonds 14 and 15 were presented, alleged to be the property of plaintiff, and judgment asked upon six coupons attached thereto, yet the cause of action on the six coupons is distinct and separate from that upon the bonds or the other coupons. Each matured coupon is a separable promise, and gives rise to a separate cause of action. It may be detached from the bond and sold by itself. Indeed, the title to several matured coupons of the same bond may be in as many different persons, and upon each a distinct and separate
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