Gadreault v. Grearson
| Decision Date | 14 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:11-cv-63 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Vermont |
| Parties | Raymond Gadreault, Plaintiff, v. Hon. Brian Grearson, Frederick Bethel, Valerie J. Gadreault/Corliss, Defendants. |
(Docs. 5, 6, 8 and 10)
Plaintiff Raymond Gadreault, proceeding pro se, brings this action claiming that Defendants violated his constitutional rights during the course of two state court domestic proceedings. Defendants are Vermont Superior Court Judge Brian Grearson, Attorney Frederick Bethel, and the Plaintiff's wife, Valerie Gadreault/Corliss.
Judge Grearson has moved to dismiss the Complaint on the basis of judicial immunity. Attorney Bethel and Ms. Gadreault/Corliss have filed a joint motion to dismiss, arguing lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Also pending before the Court is Mr. Gadreault's motion for an extension of time in which to file a response to the joint motion to dismiss, as well as his request for an investigation into Ms. Gadreault/Corliss's assertion that she is proceeding pro se.
For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Gadreault's motion for an extension of time is GRANTED, and his request for an investigation is DENIED. Further, Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED.
The Complaint first alleges that during a "hearing for a protection/restraining order," Judge Grearson failed to read Mr. Gadreault his rights or provide an "expl[a]nation on what was happening." (Doc. 1 at 1.) These actions, Mr. Gadreault claims, violated his right to due process and his right to a trial by jury. Defendants submit that this claim pertains to a relief from abuse proceeding that took place in the Family Division of the Vermont Superior Court, Washington Unit. (Doc. 6 at 3.)1
Mr. Gadreault next claims that Judge Grearson and Ms. Gadreault/Corliss violated his "right to bear arms and the right not to endure unreasonable search and seizure . . . ." (Doc. 1 at 2.) Defendants again surmise that this allegation pertains to the relief from abuse proceeding, and specifically to the portion of the court's order requiringMr. Gadreault to "remove his personal effects from the parties' residence in the company of a law enforcement officer, who was authorized to remove any weapons in the home." (Doc. 6 at 4-5) (citing Doc. 6-3 at 1.) Mr. Gadreault's final claim concerning the relief from abuse proceeding is that Judge Grearson barred him from questioning Ms. Gadreault/Corliss, thus allegedly denying Mr. Gadreault the right to confront his accuser.
As to Attorney Bethel, who presumably acted as Ms. Gadreault/Corliss's counsel, the Complaint alleges that he and Judge Grearson conspired to deny Mr. Gadreault his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, going "so far as to discuss their strategy on how to fight my appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court in open court." (Doc. 1 at 2-3.) Mr. Gadreault also alleges that Attorney Bethel was allowed to "call [him] names" in the courtroom, and that Judge Grearson granted Attorney Bethel's request for an emergency hearing concerning spousal support, while denying Mr. Gadreault an emergency hearing on his request for an annulment. (Id. at 3.) Defendants believe that these latter allegations pertain to the Gadreaults' pending divorce proceeding, in which Judge Grearson is the presiding judge.
Mr. Gadreault asserts that these alleged actions by Defendants violated his rights under the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. For relief, he is seeking $400,000 in compensatory and punitive damages from his wife, two million dollars from Judge Grearson, and eight million dollars from Attorney Bethel.
Judge Grearson moves for dismissal on the basis of judicial immunity. Judges have absolute immunity from suits for damages arising out of judicial acts performed in their judicial capacities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). The immunity of the court and its members "is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice," or "because the action he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his authority." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 13 (quotations and citations omitted). Judicial immunity may be overcome only if a judge is alleged to have taken "nonjudicial actions" or if judicial actions were taken "in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 11-12.
Here, the Complaint alleges that Judge Grearson maderulings, both in the courtroom and in a written order, that violated Mr. Gadreault's constitutional rights. The Complaint also alleges that Judge Grearson conspired with Attorney Bethel in open court. There is no claim that Judge Grearson lacked jurisdiction to preside over the proceedings in question, or that any of his actions were "non-judicial." Indeed, Vermont law provides that the Family Division of the Superior Court has jurisdiction over both relief from abuse proceedings and divorce proceedings generally, see 4 V.S.A. § 33(4), (14), and all of Judge Grearson's alleged actions were clearly taken in his judicial role. The claims against Judge Grearson are therefore DISMISSED on the basis of judicial immunity. See, e.g., Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1987); Patterson v. Rodgers, 708 F. Supp. 2d 225, 235 (D. Conn. 2010).
Attorney Bethel and Ms. Gadreault/Corliss have filed a joint motion to dismiss, arguing first that the Complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rooker-Feldman is a limited doctrine aimed at "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedingscommenced and inviting district court review of those judgments." McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants report that the Gadreaults' divorce proceeding is ongoing. Consequently, no judgment was entered prior to the commencement of this lawsuit. To the extent that interlocutory orders may have been issued, such as rulings regarding the questioning of a witness, or interim orders pertaining to spousal support, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. See Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 2009) ().
The relief from abuse order, however, was litigated to a conclusion and a final order was issued. That order therefore requires additional analysis. The relief from abuse order reportedly authorized the removal of Mr. Gadreault's personal effects, including firearms, from "theparties' residence." (Doc. 6-3 at 1.) Mr. Gadreault now claims that the court's order deprived him of his Second and Fourth Amendment rights, and that the hearing itself violated his rights to due process and a jury trial. It thus appears the Mr. Gadreault's claim satisfies the first two Rooker-Feldman requirements of a "state court loser" complaining of injuries from the state judgment. See Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005) ().
It also appears that the state court order, issued on July 15, 2010, pre-dated the filing of the Complaint in this case, thus satisfying the fourth Rooker-Feldman element. (Doc. 6-1 at 1); (Doc. 1.) Less clear, however, is whether Mr. Gadreault is asking this Court to review the state court's judgment, as required by the third element of the Rooker-Feldman test. See McKithen, 626 F.3d at 154. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in order for Rooker-Feldman to apply, a plaintiff must be "plainly" seeking federal court review "to undo the [Family Court] judgment." Exxon-Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005). Here, Mr. Gadreault asks for an award of damages, and does not explicitly request that the Court review and overturn the state court ruling.
Whether an action for damages necessarily involves a "review of [the state court] judgment" such that Rooker-Feldman would apply is not well settled. Compare Ellis v. Little Flower Children's Services, 2000 WL 516887, at * 5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2000) (), with McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) () The Court need not resolve that question here, as Mr. Gadreault's claims fail on other grounds as set forth below.
In addition to arguing for dismissal under Rooker-Feldman, Ms. Gadreault/Corliss and Attorney Bethel contend that Mr. Gadreault has failed to state plausible constitutional claims, and therefore move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court set forth a "two-pronged" approach for analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). First, a court must accept a plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draw all...
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