Patterson v. Rodgers
| Decision Date | 28 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:10-CV-579 (CSH).,3:10-CV-579 (CSH). |
| Citation | 708 F.Supp.2d 225 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Ronald PATTERSON, Plaintiff.v.Chase RODGERS, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; Fleming L. Norcott, Jr., Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Richard N. Palmer, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Christine S. Vertefeuille, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Peter T. Zarella, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; C. Ian McLachan, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Joseph P. Flynn, Former Chief Appellate Justice of Connecticut Appellate Court; Thomas A. Bishop, Appellate Judge of the Connecticut Appellate Court; Lubbie Harper, Appellate Judge of the Connecticut Appellate Court; Paul Foti, Appellate Judge of the Connecticut Appellate Court; Lois Tanzer, Trial Court Judge of the Hartford Superior Court; Vanessa L. Bryant, Presiding Trial Court Judge of Hartford (now) U.S. District Judge, District of Connecticut; Robert Killian, Jr., Hartford Probate Judge; Travelers Casualty & Surety Company; Boce W. Barlow, Jr., Esquire; Bradford R. Carver, Esquire; Paul Lewis, Esquire, Defendants. |
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Ronald Patterson, Hartford, CT, pro se.
Plaintiff Ronald Patterson (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) has brought this action for violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against thirteen judges, three attorneys, and a corporation. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that each of the thirteen judges violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by acting “under color of law” in their capacity as judges when issuing adverse rulings in state-court actions regarding his great-grandfather's estate. He also claims that two attorneys who served as executors of that estate breached their fiduciary duties in its administration. Lastly, he alleges that the corporate defendant and its attorney engaged in fraudulent conduct in state-court litigation regarding probate bonds issued on the aforementioned estate.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 The decision to grant or deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis is “within the sound discretion of the court.” Monti v. McKeon, 600 F.Supp. 112, 113 (D.Conn.1984) (citing United States v. Jeff-Lewis Savings & Loan Association, 530 F.Supp. 623, 628 (N.D.N.Y.1982); Venable v. Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1090, 95 S.Ct. 683, 42 L.Ed.2d 683 (1974)). A motion to proceed in forma pauperis must be filed with the district court and accompanied by an affidavit demonstrating the movant's inability “to pay fees and costs or to give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court herein evaluates the basis for Plaintiff's motion to determine whether it should be granted.
I DISCUSSIONA. Deficiencies in Plaintiff's Affidavit
The Court notes at the outset that Plaintiff has failed to include all requested financial information in the affidavit appended to his motion. Specifically, he has failed to provide the amount of “last salary or wages received” from his last employer. Doc. # 1, p. 3. As Plaintiff's prior employment terminated in October of 2007, the omitted information does not appear to significantly impact Plaintiff's ability to pay the costs of filing this action. This deficiency is not, therefore, fatal to granting the motion. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Conway, No. 3:09mc97 (WIG), 2009 WL 1043905, at *1 (D.Conn. March 27, 2009) ( in forma pauperis motion granted despite movant's discrepancies on financial affidavit where discrepancies had no significant impact on movant's ability to pay). The inquiry does not, however, end there.
Plaintiff has also failed to provide an actual list of the cases he previously filed in this District, including case numbers, captions, and dispositions-despite the fact that the application form specifically requires this information. Plaintiff has written, “see attach[ed]” and then signed the declaration under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. In fact, Plaintiff has not attached a list of cases even though he is a frequent pro se filer in this District, having filed eighteen lawsuits over the past twenty-two years.2
As Magistrate Judge Garfinkel of this District noted in Burke v. State of Connecticut Judge Patchen, No. 3:08mc118(WIG), 2008 WL 1883923, at *1 (D.Conn. April 28, 2008):
While this information concerning prior lawsuits is particularly relevant in prisoner cases because of the “three strikes” rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), it is also relevant in non-prisoner cases for purposes of ascertaining whether there are related cases or whether a plaintiff is abusing his in forma pauperis status by filing multiple, frivolous lawsuits. The Court has not found any case that has denied a non-prisoner in forma pauperis status based solely on his failure to answer questions regarding prior lawsuits. Nevertheless, the Court cautions Plaintiff that his continued blatant omission of this information will not be tolerated.
2008 WL 1883923, at *1 (emphasis added). Having examined the cases previously filed by Plaintiff in this District, the Court finds that they are unrelated, dissimilar both in nature and content from the action at hand. The Court cautions Plaintiff that henceforth he must comply with providing all required information when filing submissions with the Court, but does not deny his motion on that basis.
B. Mandatory Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
The Court must next assess Plaintiff's in forma pauperis motion by conducting a screening to determine whether Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth any viable claims. Section 1915, the very statute that authorizes this Court to grant in forma pauperis status, also protects against abuses of that privilege. Section 1915(e) thus mandates that the Court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... (B) the action or appeal-(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 3 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see, e.g., Johnson v. U.K. Government, No. 3:07-CV-106 (JCH), 2007 WL 4522458, at *1 (D.Conn. Dec. 18, 2007) () (citations omitted).
An action is considered “frivolous” when either: (1) “the ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless,’ such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy;” or (2) “the claim is ‘based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.’ ” Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). A claim is based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir.1990) ( per curiam ), or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint, Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1995).
In reviewing the complaint to determine whether it states a viable claim, the court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the complaint” and draws inferences from these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir.2000) (citing King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir.1999)). Dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is then only appropriate when “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 597 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A district court is duty bound to dismiss the complaint upon reaching the conclusion that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d at 596 ().4
In analyzing whether Plaintiff's claims are “frivolous,” “fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or barred by immunity, the Court necessarily determines whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. A federal court has limited jurisdiction pursuant to Article III of the Constitution. In order for this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff must set forth a colorable claim under the Constitution or federal statute, creating “federal question” jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.5 Otherwise, there must be complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and all defendants and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. Id. § 1332(a); 6 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267-68, 3 Cranch 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (February Term 1806). See also Da Silva v. Kinsho International Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 363 (2d Cir.2000) ().
In the present case, the Plaintiff invokes federal question jurisdiction.7 Doc. # 4 (Amended Complaint, hereinafter “Complaint”), 8 “Jurisdictional Basis,” p. 1. This Court has the duty to review Plaintiff's complaint “at the earliest opportunity” to determine whether there is in fact subject matter jurisdiction. See Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 107-08 (2d Cir.1997) (); Univ. of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir.1999) ().
Where there is a lack of subject...
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