Gadsberry v. Swayze

• Decision Date: 14 December 1925
• Docket Number: 25279
• Citation: 140 Miss. 726,106 So. 442
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: GADSBERRY et al. v. SWAYZE et al. [*]

106 So. 442

140 Miss. 726

GADSBERRY et al. v. SWAYZE et al. ^[*]

No. 25279

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 14, 1925

Division B

Suggestion of Error Overruled Jan. 11, 1926.

APPEAL from chancery court of Yazoo county, HON. V. J. STRICKER Chancellor.

Suit by Miss Etta Gadberry and others against D. A. Swayze and others. Decree for defendants, and complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

T. H Campbell and Ruth Campbell, for appellant.

The whole case involves a construction of the will of Sarah Caldwell, and the court must determine whether or not under this will it was contemplated that an illegitimate should take, in view of the language used. In construing this will the court should place itself in the position of the testator at the time of the execution of the will. Schoottman v. Hoffman, 73 Miss. 199, 1 Jarman on Wills, 428; 1 Redfield on Wills, 418-443.

With knowledge on the part of Sarah Caldwell, the testator, that her niece had given birth to an illegitimate child two years after the will was written and with like knowledge on her part that she had provided in her will, which was then written and in existence, that the property devised should go to the heirs ("children") of Lutie Perry, if married, can it be said that such illegitimate child fulfilled the requirement on the part of the testator that the property should go to the child of Lutie Perry, if she married? We say not. We are not dealing with the laws of descent and such interpretation as the court may place thereon, but with a will which is substituted therefor and in which the testator may impose such requirements as her fancy desire and wish may dictate, and by its very terms the testator required and stipulated in plain unequivocal terms that the children of Lutie Perry should take, provided said Lutie Perry married, and not having married, it is plain and evident that a child born to her not in lawful wedlock takes nothing.

Briefly stated, our position is that the word "heirs" as used in the will of Sarah Caldwell is synonymous with "children" and that the word "children" when used in a will as descriptive of a class means only "legitimate children" where there are no words used to convey a different intent, or unless the testator's intention to include them is clear; that it is the general rule that a devise under a will to the children of a named person refers only to "legitimate children" where there are no words used to convey a different intent, or unless the testator's intention to include them is clear.

Now, what kind of children did the testator intend should receive the estate in preference to the husband of Lutie Perry, legitimate or illegitimate children? Clearly, only legitimate children. We invite the court's attention to a consideration of the authorities on this subject. Johnson v. Delone, etc., Co., 77 Miss. 27; 28 R. C. L., 214.

In the foregoing presentation we have construed the will so as to give effect to the language of the testatrix as used by her. However, if the court should arbitrarily say that the words, "if married," were not used by the testatrix in order to characterize a legitimate heir of Lutie Perry, the niece, as the object of the testatrix's bounty and thus eliminate these words, "if married," from the will and make for the testatrix a will reading as follows: "To my niece Lutie M. Perry I give my real estate during her life and to go to her heirs, if any; if not, to go to her husband," still we say that the word "heirs" in such a will means only legitimate "heirs" or "children." The authorities are general and abundant that such construction must be given to the word "heirs" as we will now proceed to show. 40 Cyc., page 1451; 28 R. C. L., sec. 222, page 251; Hicks et al. v. Smith et al. (Ga.), 22 S.E. 153; Robinson v. Georgia R. R. Co., 97 Am. State Rep. 156; Brisbin v. Huntington et. al., 128 Iowa 166, 5 A. & E. Anno. Cas. 931 and note; Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254, 80 A. S. R. 625; Sheaman v. Angel (S. E.), 23 Am. Dec. 166; note, page 415, Thomas v. Thomas, 73 Am. St. Rep.; Alliance Assurance Co. v. Francis in re Pearce, Ann. Cas. 1916A 410; Peerless Pacific Co. v. Burkhard, 90 Wash. 221, reported in Ann. Cas. 1918B, page 247 and full note. The word "child" in the absence of any facts or circumstances indicating a different interpretation carries with it the meaning of legitimate offspring. Tillery v. Tillery, 155 Ala. 495, 46 So. 582; Thompson v. McDonald, 22 N.C. 463.

It is well settled then that when the word "child," or "children," is used in a statute, without qualifying words, it means legitimate child or children, and does not include an illegitimate child or illegitimate children, unless the context broadens its meaning, or some further statutory provision clearly manifests an intention to include them. Mississippi: Porter v. Porter, 7 How. 106, 40 Am. Dec. 55; R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 77 Miss. 727; R. R. Co. v. Williams, 78 Miss. 209; Runt v. I. C. R. R. Co., 88 Miss. 575, 41 So. 1.

The words "child" or "children" in a deed or other conveyance must be held to mean a legitimate child or legitimate children, unless the context is such as to require a different meaning, or the circumstances surrounding the execution of the paper are such as to make the words import other than legitimates Johnstone v. Taliafera, 107 Ga. 6, 32 S.E. 931; 45 L. R. A. 95; Hall v. Cressey, 92 Me. 514, 43 A. 118.

The case of Shelton v. Minnie, 107 Miss. 133, 65 So. 114, is referred to in the note and its holding pointed out. This case was relied on and referred to in the brief of opposing counsel. The case is not in point on the question now under consideration. The point at issue in the case of Shelton v. Minnie, was not whether the term "children" included illegitimate as well as legitimate children, but whether or not a named and designated beneficiary (who was the illegitimate child of the insured) had the right to be named as such beneficiary under the by-laws of the company and could take as such beneficiary under said by-laws.

There are certain rules which are applicable to the construction of all wills, one of which is that a gift to children prima facie imports legitimate children. Hill v. Crook, 7 Moak ; (Eng.) 1 L. R. A. ; 6 H. L. 265, 42 L. J. Ch. 702, 22 W. R. 649; Dorin v. Dorin, 13 Moak (Eng.) 90 L. R. , 7 H. L. 568, 45 L. J. Ch. 652, 31 Times L. Rep. 281, 23 W. R. 570; In re Eve (1909), 1 Ch. (Eng.) 796 (1909) N.W. 86.

In the case at bar, not only does there not exist any manifest intention on the part of Sarah Caldwell, the testator, to include illegitimate children of Lutie Perry, but the very language employed, "if married, etc.," forecloses such illegitimates from ever taking.

Frankly, we think this review of the authorities is unnecessary and apart from the facts in the instant case because the language of the will is plain and unambiguous; this being true, it is the duty of the court to give effect to the words employed by the testator; and when this is done, the proper effect must be given to her language, "and if married." When this is done, the illegitimate daughter of Lutie Perry cannot take as a purchaser under the will, but only as an heir at law of Sarah Caldwell, the testator, together with the other heirs at law of Sarah Caldwell.

E. L. Brown and Wise & Bridgforth, for appellees.

The sole question raised by the demurrer is whether or not this illegitimate daughter of Lutie M. Perry is the ultimate limitee of the will of Sarah Caldwell. If she is, the other descendants of the brothers and sisters of the half-blood have no interest in the subject-matter of the suit. The question is purely one of law.

The device reads: "To my niece, Lutie M. Perry, I give my real estate during her life; and if married, to her heirs if any; if not, to go to her husband. In case she should die without husband or heirs, then to the church, etc." Technically, heirs is a word of limitation, and not of purchase, except when the context plainly demonstrates the contrary. When such demonstration is made, an illegitimate is as technically an heir of the mother as is a legitimate. All illegitimates and all legitimates are heirs of the mother in this state. If the word "heirs" is not construed to mean children, Lutie took a fee, and her deed passed to the whole estate to demurrant Swayze. Counsel opposite realize that "heirs" has not its technical meaning here. They base their contention upon the language, "if married," which was naturally introduced to express the event which would precede her having "heirs," in the sense of children, as well as the event which would precede her having a "husband." In limiting to the offspring or husband of an unmarried lady, the testatrix naturally dropped in "if married," lest it might be inferred that she then had a child or husband. The expression is perfectly natural, and cannot be distorted into, "if she have legitimate children or a legally married husband." "If married" is the contingency upon which the instrument contemplated the existence of a husband, no less than the existence of a child, of the unmarried lady. This is literally true; so that the construction contended for imputes to the testatrix having contemplated that her favorite niece might have a child or a husband, though not married. Such cannot be found to be within the bounds of legal reason.

Omit "if married" and the lawyers would see the technical significance of "heirs," and the layman would unconsciously perceive that Lutie was then married and had children. Miss Caldwell was a layman, and undesignedly dropped in "if married" to signify that Lutie was not then married. Had "if married" been omitted the word "heirs" would have been a word of limitation, technically...