Gadsby v. Gadsby

• Decision Date: 01 April 1931
• Citation: 175 N.E. 495,275 Mass. 159
• Parties: GADSBY v. GADSBY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

275 Mass. 159

175 N.E. 495

GADSBY

v.GADSBY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

April 1, 1931.

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Lummus, Judge.

Bill in equity by John F. Gadsby against Joseph C. Gadsby and others. From an interlocutory decree, confirming the master's report, so far as the decree sustained an exception and modified the report, and from the final decree, dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

Interlocutory decree affirmed; final decree reversed and rendered.M. C. Taylor, of Boston, for appellant.

J. H. Hurley, of Boston, for appellees.

FIELD, J.

Charles Gadsby, of Cambridge, died January 23, 1926, leaving a will executed in 1923, which was allowed. His wife died January 13, 1926. By this will the testator gave to his son, John F. Gadsby, the plaintiff, $5,000, to his son Joseph C. Gadsby, one of the defendants, $1,000 and a house of the value of $3,900, and to his son Charles J. Gadsby, another defendant, two houses of the aggregate value of $5,600, subject, however, according to the terms of the will, to a life estate in his wife, the mother of the three sons, and provided that the remainder of his estate should be divided equally among these sons. The plaintiff was named executor of the will and qualified as such.

The plaintiff in his individual capacity brought this bill in equity in the superior court against his brothers, hereinafter referred to as the defendants, joining himself, as executor of his father's will, as a party defendant-as to which joinder no question is now raised-alleging an agreement of the three brothers that, the mother having died, the father's estate should be distributed among them equally and praying that ‘a special master be appointed to sell * * * or to value, the real estate received by the defendants and that thereupon an accounting should be had between the plaintiff and the defendants, based upon the net proceeds of such sale or upon the valuation of said master, so that the agreement for an equal distribution of the estate shall be accomplished.’ There was also a prayer for an accounting for other moneys, which was waived by the plaintiff, and a prayer for general relief. The defendants pleaded the statute of frauds and other defendants but at no time set up the defence that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. The case was referred to a master whose report, modified in one particular, was confirmed by an interlocutory decree. By a final decree the bill was dismissed with costs. The plaintiff appealed from the interlocutory, decree so far as it modified the master's report, and from the final decree.

The master found the facts as above set forth. He found also that it was the intention of the testator ‘to make as equal a distribution of his property as possible between his three sons'; that each of them ‘had knowledge of the will * * * [the testator] had made’; that after the death of the mother the defendant ‘Joseph C. Gadsby suggested to the plaintiff that the intention of the father to leave his property equally to each would be defeated as the real estate devised to [the defendant] Charles J. Gadsby would be relieved of the life estate of the mother and * * * requested the plaintiff to speak to the father about changing his will so as to effect an equal distribution of the estate * * * that at this time on the advice of the physician attending the father that on account of the father's condition, it would be inadvisable to discuss this matter with him, the plaintiff and the defendants orally agreed between them that if the matter was not mentioned to the father and the will was probated and administered according to its tenor, the real estate devised to the defendant Charles J. Gadsby and the real estate devised to the defendant Joseph C. Gadsby would be sold as soon as possible and an accounting had so that an equal division of the whole estate between the three brothers would be accomplished and that the plaintiff agreed to make no charge for his services in administering the estate.’

The master found that both ‘father and mother were seriously ill and the mother's death * * * was not made known to the father on account of his serious condition’ and that he ‘died * * * without notice of his wife's decease.’ From this finding it is to be inferred-and it is not controverted by the defendants-that the matter of a change in the will of the testator by reason of the death of his wife was not ‘mentioned’ to him by the plaintiff. The master found also that ‘the estate of the father was administered promptly by the plaintiff and the legacies to himself and Joseph C. Gadsby paid and the residue of the estate, with the exception of $1600 reserved for the payment of bills, distributed between the three brothers twenty-two days after his appointment as executor * * * that all the bills of the estate were paid and * * * $150 of the father's estate remains in the executor's hands,’ that ‘no charge against the estate has been made by the plaintiff for his services as executor or attorney, but no final account has been filed by him as executor,’ and that ‘the defendants, Charles J. Gadsby and Joseph C. Gadsby, refused to carry out the agreement for the sale of their houses.’

First. On the facts found by the master, there was an agreement for the transfer, after the death of the father, of such parts of the proceeds of the sale of the defendants' expectancies as devisees under his will as would be necessary to effect an equal division of the whole estate among the three brothers. Such an agreement is binding upon the parties if it meets the usual requirements of a contract and, in addition, certain special requirements due to its peculiar nature. Not only must the defendants' promises be supported by sufficient consideration, but the agreement must provide for ‘adequate consideration’ for the performance of these promises, and it must appear that the agreement was ‘entered into fairly’ and that ‘the bargain is not unconscionable or obtained by oppression or by taking unjust advantage of the necessities' of the presumptive devisees. Jenkins v. Stetson, 9 Allen, 128, 132. See Fitch v. Fitch, 8 Pick. 480, 483;Trull v. Eastman, 3 Metc. 121, 123,37 Am. Dec. 126. Compare Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112.

The requirements, above stated, were met by the agreement. The plaintiff's promise ‘to make no charge for his services in administering the estate’ of his father was sufficient consideration for the defendants' promises. Moreover,the plaintiff's forbearance to suggest to the father a change in his will, because of his wife's death, if contemplated as consideration for the defendants' promises would have been sufficient to support them. Such forbearance was not insufficient as consideration on the ground that it was required by legal duty. It was not so required. Whatever may have been the plaintiff's moral obligation under the circumstances, he had a legal right to inform the testator of his wife's death and, without using undue influence, to suggest a change in his will to meet the changed conditions. Nor would such a suggestion by the plaintiff to his father have been so objectionable on moral grounds that forbearance to exercise this legal right would be insufficient as consideration for the defendants' promises.

The bargain was not unconscionable nor obtained by reason of any advantage taken of the defendants. Moreover, under the agreement they were to receive adequate consideration for the performance of their promises. Each defendant was to receive from the plaintiff, in exchange for the transfer of his expectancy to the extent agreed upon, a benefit equivalent to one third of a fair charge for administering an estate valued at $44,109.75, of which $34,609.75 was personalty. If the real estate was sold at the valuation placed upon it by the master, the defendant Joseph C. Gadsby would pay nothing of value for this benefit and would, moreover, receive from the other defendant the sum of $266.66, while the defendant Charles J. Gadsby would pay for this benefit the sum of $433.32, of which $166.66 would be paid to the plaintiff and the remainder to the defendant Joseph C. Gadsby. We cannot say that the benefit derived by Charles J. Gadsby from the settlement of the estate of his father without charge was so inadequate a consideration for the payment, out of the proceeds of the sale of his real estate, of this sum of money-or such lesser or greater sum as might result from the sale of the real estate for a price different from the amount fixed as its value by the master-as to invalidate the contract. Obviously the consideration passing to Joseph C. Gadsby would not be inadequate. In view of these facts, it is unnecessaryto determine whether, if the plaintiff had not agreed to administer the estate of his father without charge, the requirement of adequate consideration would have been met (see, however, Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112, 120-121, and the comment therein of Chief Justice Parsons upon the case of Buckley v. Newland, 2 P. Will. 182), or to determine whether the plaintiff's forbearance would constitute adequate consideration. Compare In re Lennig's Estate, 182 Pa. 485, 499838 A. 466, 38Estate, 182 Pa. 485, 499, 38 A. 466, 38 The agreement did not lack binding force because of the fact that it was made without the knowledge and consent of the father. In several cases in this jurisdiction (Fitch v. Fitch, supra, Trull v. Eastman, supra, and Jenkins v. Stetson, supra) it has been stated that an assignment of an expectancy is valid if, in addition to meeting other requirements, it was made with the knowledge and assent of the ancestor, but in these cases the knowledge and assent of the ancestor were shown and the court was not called upon to decide whether an assignment without such knowledge and assent would have been valid. In Fitch v. Fitch, however, where an assignment to two brothers of the...