Gadson v. State, A90A1584

Decision Date18 October 1990
Docket NumberNo. A90A1584,A90A1584
PartiesGADSON v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Charles C. Grile, Savannah, for appellant.

Spencer Lawton, Jr., Dist. Atty., John T. Garcia, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

BIRDSONG, Judge.

Eugene Gadson a/k/a Eugene Gaston appeals his judgment of conviction of armed robbery and his sentence as a recidivist.

Appellant and another man entered a Circle K store and committed an armed robbery therein. A Circle K employee made an in-court identification of appellant, and a hidden camera took pictures of the perpetrators during the crime. Held:

1. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in allowing his statement into evidence over objection. Appellant argues that the statement was not voluntary because the police promised to speak to the district attorney and recommend a lesser sentence if appellant would reveal the name of a co-accomplice. See generally Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 27(1), 230 S.E.2d 849.

The trial court found, inter alia, that appellant was advised of, understood, and voluntarily waived each of his Miranda rights; "he thereafter gave his statement freely and voluntarily without any hope of benefit or fear of injury." (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court then expanded its remarks to state that the alleged promise to help was in consideration of appellant revealing the name of the co-accomplice "and not of confessing himself"; and, that "the detective or detectives promised that they would let the district attorney know of [appellant's] cooperation in identifying this other person in hopes that that might get [appellant] a reduced sentence, and but [sic] without any promise that it would or that they had authority to make any specific promise of leniency. In other words, they'd be the courier of the information to the district attorney." (Emphasis supplied.)

Findings by the trial court, as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession, will be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Brown v. State, 259 Ga. 453(2)(b), 383 S.E.2d 882. Existence of conflicting evidence at a Jackson-Denno hearing as to whether and why a given promise occurred does not automatically cause the trial court's findings to be clearly erroneous that the confession was freely and voluntarily given. Compare Thomas v. State, 259 Ga. 202(3), 378 S.E.2d 686. In determining whether the trial court's ruling regarding the voluntariness of a confession was clearly erroneous, an appellate court may look to all the evidence contained in the record. See Robinson v. State, 194 Ga.App. 432, 433(2), 390 S.E.2d 652.

The case sub judice is distinguishable from Johnson, supra. Although contested by appellant, the detectives testified appellant made an oral confession regarding his own complicity in the crime before appellant subsequently inquired of one of the detectives whether the police would speak to the district attorney in his behalf if appellant revealed the identity of his co-accomplice. Although one detective apparently agreed to inform the district attorney's office of appellant's cooperation, the detective testified that he informed appellant that "we make no promises or anything," and that it was made "abundantly clear" to appellant that we "do not make deals." Moreover, appellant's subsequently written statement contains the following printed information, "I declare that the following voluntary statement is made of my own free will without promise of hope or reward."

Reviewing the record in its entirety, we are satisfied that the trial court's ruling that appellant's statement was freely and voluntarily given was not clearly erroneous. The trial court did not err in admitting the statement in evidence.

2. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in forcing him to trial in prison garb. The record reflects that the court observed appellant's state of dress and that an effort was made by the deputy sheriff to obtain other clothes for appellant, but that "no one was home." Appellant was dressed in an olive drab shirt and pants, described by the trial judge, without exception by appellant, as "army fatigues." The trial court further stated for the record, also without exception, that the clothes were bought from the local army-navy store, and that it was not typical prison garb. In addition appellant was wearing plastic "flip-flop" shoes, which were not "very visible." The trial court offered to adjourn court if appellant's counsel could get appellant other dress. Appellant thereafter requested no continuance for this purpose. Appellant's clothing has not been shown to be distinctively evident as prison garments either by the design thereof or by markings thereon; accordingly, appellant has failed to show error as enumerated. Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga.App. 835(1), 270 S.E.2d 61; compare Kerr v. State, 194 Ga.App. 604(3), 391 S.E.2d 449.

3. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by admitting in evidence photographs showing appellant in the store, apparently during the robbery, without laying a proper foundation for admission thereof. Specifically, appellant asserts that the camera used to take the photographs was a video camera and, accordingly, foundation had to be shown in accordance with the precedent of Allen v. State, 146 Ga.App. 815, 247 S.E.2d 540. The trial record does not establish that the camera used was in fact a video camera. Moreover, even if a video camera was employed, the pictorial evidence subject to this enumeration of error is still photographs and are not video tapes of the crime scene either with or without a sound track. Allen, supra, is a distinguishable case involving the attempted introduction of certain videotape, and does not involve the introduction in evidence of a still photograph. In Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 732(26), 386 S.E.2d 316, the Supreme Court held, "[a] photograph is authenticated by showing it is a fair and accurate representation of the scene depicted. [Cit.] Any witness who is familiar with the scene depicted can authenticate the photograph; it is not necessary that the witness be the...

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  • Fulton v. State
    • United States
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    • June 4, 1998
    ...be raised at the time that the prior conviction is tendered for admission before the trial court. See id.; Gadson v. State, 197 Ga.App. 315, 317-318(4), 398 S.E.2d 409 (1990); Mincey v. State, 186 Ga.App. 839, 841(4), 368 S.E.2d 796 (1988). Where, as under the facts of this case, the object......
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