Gadson v. State
| Citation | 437 S.E.2d 313,263 Ga. 626 |
| Decision Date | 02 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. S93A1727,S93A1727 |
| Parties | Bruce GADSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Donald B. Lowe, III, Savannah, for Gadson.
Jon C. Hope, Asst. Dist. Atty., Spencer Lawton, Jr., Dist. Atty., Savannah, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Peggy R. Katz, Staff Atty., Atlanta, for State.
Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta.
Bruce Gadson was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for the robbery and shooting death of Christopher Marisco. He also entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of possession of a firearm by a first offender act probationer. The armed robbery conviction merged with the felony murder conviction and Gadson was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder, five years consecutive for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony charge and five years concurrent to the first five-year sentence for the possession by a first offender act probationer charge. He appeals and we affirm. 1
1. The facts when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution are sufficient to prove that Gadson and Milas Black had been riding in a car together and talking about robbing the Subway Sandwich Shop in Garden City and that Gadson had given Black a chrome-plated .25 caliber handgun. Gadson and Black entered the Subway and ordered sandwiches. When Subway employee Marisco rang up the sale, Black displayed the handgun and demanded and received money from the cash drawer. After the employee gave Gadson the sandwiches which he had demanded, Black shot Marisco. The evidence further showed that Gadson and Black fled the shop together and that Gadson shared in the proceeds from the cash drawer. We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Gadson guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. The Subway where the shooting took place was equipped with a video camera which recorded the incident. The audio portion of the tape does not clearly pick up the voices of the people shown due to the volume of a radio playing in the shop. Investigators had the tape sent to the FBI lab in Virginia for "enhancement." The video and several "enhanced" copies were later returned to the officer investigating the incident. Gadson argues that it was error to admit the tape into evidence over his objection as the state did not introduce any testimony from the person or persons who handled the tape in Virginia nor any evidence that the law enforcement officers who did testify made any identifying marks on the tape to distinguish it as the original tape. Gadson asserts that this lack of evidence resulted in the state being unable to prove the chain-of-custody.
The state introduced the testimony of three law enforcement officers who had viewed the original tape both before and after it was sent to the FBI lab. All three officers testified that the tape introduced at trial was the same tape that they had viewed and that there had been no alteration in the tape from the time each had first viewed the original.
"Distinct physical object[s] that can be identified and differentiated by the senses of observation" are not "subject to the 'chain of custody' requirement." Ramey v. State, 238 Ga. 111, 113, 230 S.E.2d 891 (1976). See also, Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 260 S.E.2d 60 (1979). The chain of custody requirement has been put in place to ensure the proper identification of items that have no unique observable characteristics that differentiate them from other like items. We have previously held that an audio tape is a "distinct and recognizable physical object" that can be "identified upon observation." Crosby v. State, 259 Ga. 822, 824, 389 S.E.2d 207 (1990). We have also held that properly authenticated photographs do not require proof of a chain of custody in order to be admitted into evidence. Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 732, 386 S.E.2d 316 (1989). A video tape, like an audio tape or a photograph, is a distinct recognizable physical object that can be identified upon observation. The testimony of...
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Phagan v. State
...requirement since they are distinct physical objects that can be identified and differentiated by observation. Gadson v. State, 263 Ga. 626(2), 437 S.E.2d 313 (1993).9 We assume that the persons depicted in the videotapes submitted with the appellate record are appellant and the minor. Sinc......
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Rodriguez-Nova v. State
...of the chain of custody. But the chain of custody requirement does not apply to audio and video recordings. Gadson v. State, 263 Ga. 626, 627(2), 437 S.E.2d 313 (1993).6 We note that the provisions of former OCGA § 24–4–6 were carried forward into the new Evidence Code and now can be found ......
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Burgeson v. State
...of custody fails. Audiotapes are distinct recognizable physical objects that can be identified upon observation. Gadson v. State, 263 Ga. 626, 627(2), 437 S.E.2d 313 (1993); Crosby v. State, 259 Ga. 822, 824(3)(b), 389 S.E.2d 207 7. Burgeson's contention that testimony as the result of cert......
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Johnson v. State, A97A2467.
...without merit because no chain of custody requirement exists for a distinct physical object such as a videotape. Gadson v. State, 263 Ga. 626, 627(2), 437 S.E.2d 313 (1993); see also Ingram v. State, 211 Ga.App. 252, 256, 438 S.E.2d 708 (1993). Second, the inconsistencies in the identificat......