Gaeta v. Carter

• Decision Date: 19 April 2004
• Docket Number: 2003-01053.
• Citation: 2004 NY Slip Op 02910,775 N.Y.S.2d 86,6 A.D.3d 576
• Parties: THOMAS A. GAETA, Appellant, v. JAMES H. CARTER, JR., et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents. LIBERTY LINES TRANSIT, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

6 A.D.3d 576

775 N.Y.S.2d 86

2004 NY Slip Op 02910

THOMAS A. GAETA, Appellant, v. JAMES H. CARTER, JR., et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents.

LIBERTY LINES TRANSIT, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

2003-01053.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department.

April 19, 2004.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Barone, J.), dated January 13, 2003, as denied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants, and the third-party defendant Liberty Lines Transit, Inc., separately appeals from so much of the same order as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying the motion of the third-party defendant Liberty Lines Transit, Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint, and substituting therefore provisions granting the motion, dismissing the third-party complaint, and severing the main action; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the third-party defendant Liberty Lines Transit, Inc., payable by the defendants third-party plaintiffs.

The plaintiff allegedly sustained serious injuries when his vehicle was struck in the rear by a truck owned and operated by the defendants third-party plaintiffs (hereinafter the defendants). When the driver of an automobile approaches another automobile from the rear, he or she is bound to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed and control over his vehicle, and to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the other vehicle. A rear-end collision with a stopped "or stopping" vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability with respect to the operator of the rearmost vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision (Chepel v Meyers, 306 AD2d 235 [2003]). However, not every rear-end collision is the exclusive fault of the rearmost driver. The frontmost driver also has the duty "not to stop suddenly or slow down without proper signaling so as to avoid a collision" (id. at 236, quoting Purcell v Axelsen, 286 AD2d 379, 380 [2001]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163). Thus, where the frontmost driver also operates his vehicle in a negligent...