Gaffney v. Brown

• Decision Date: 02 January 1890
• Citation: 150 Mass. 479,23 N.E. 233
• Parties: GAFFNEY v. BROWN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

150 Mass. 479

23 N.E. 233

GAFFNEY v. BROWN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 2, 1890

COUNSEL

T.J. Gargan and P.M. Keating, for plaintiff.

Seth P Smith, for defendant.

OPINION

DEVENS J.

As the plaintiff was on the premises by invitation, as a customer at the public dining-room kept by defendant, it was the duty of the defendant to keep the room, and the approach or approaches thereto, in a reasonably safe condition for ingress and egress, and to use reasonable care, in order that no injury might occur in passing through the premises to or from the outer door. Sweeny v. Railroad Co., 10 Allen, 368, 373; Carleton v. Steel Co., 99 Mass 216; Severy v. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306. It was, on the other hand, equally the duty of plaintiff herself to use due care such as reasonably prudent and cautious persons would use, in making her ingress or egress from the premises. Sweeny v. Railroad Co., ubi supra. While the burden is on the plaintiff to show this as an affirmative proposition, it is not necessarily to be shown by affirmative evidence. The circumstances under which the injury was received being fully proved, if nothing appears in her conduct, either of act or neglect, to which the injury may be attributed, wholly or partially, an inference of due care may be drawn from the absence of all appearance of neglect. Mayo v. Railroad Co., 104 Mass. 137. When facts are undisputed, the inferences to be drawn from them may be doubtful and disputable. In such case the question of ordinary care would be within the province of the jury to settle, under proper instructions. But where facts are undisputed, and also, if viewed in the light of common knowledge and experience, necessarily show that the plaintiff did not use the ordinary precautions and vigilance which persons of reasonable prudence exercise, and no excuse for this appears, it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. Wheelock v. Railroad Co., 105 Mass. 203; Chaffee v. Railroad Corp., 104 Mass. 108.

Applying these familiar principles to the case at bar, the undisputed facts show that the plaintiff, who had entered the dining-room by the usual door, to which she was accustomed and who had dined at a table further in the rear of the apartment than that at which she usually took her meals, opened a door in the side of the apartment, for the purpose of retiring therefrom. This door was not in any way indicated as a mode of egress; and,...