Gaffney v. Drolet
| Decision Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | A163419 |
| Parties | KATHLEEN G. GAFFNEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JEAN DROLET, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCS052125)
This is a case between two neighbors, one of whom sought to establish an implied easement for a sewer line running under the other's property.[1]
The owner of the allegedly servient property, defendant Jean Drolet, was not aware of the sewer line when he purchased his property. He became aware of it several months later when sewage started oozing to the surface of his property. There is no dispute the antiquated line is in ill repair and needs to be replaced, and its current placement does not comply with local building requirements or the state Plumbing Code.
Drolet subsequently applied for, and received, approval to make major repairs to his 100-year-old house and to raise it to add a garage and auxiliary dwelling unit. He cannot commence the work, however, because the old sewer line runs too close to the foundation of the house.
The owner of the allegedly dominant property, plaintiff Kathleen Gaffney, opposed Drolet's improvement application at every step, and when Drolet demanded that she remove the sewer line so he could commence work, she refused and sued him to establish an implied easement for the line.[2]
Drolet in turn, cross-complained for nuisance, trespass, and quiet title, and sought injunctive relief.
After a four-day bench trial, the court ruled against Gaffney and in favor of Drolet. Observing that the parties had been haggling over the sewer line for more than five years, the court quieted title in favor of Drolet and issued injunctive relief requiring Gaffney to stop using the sewer line "in a manner that impedes [Drolet] from improving [his] property," and ordered Gaffney to relocate the sewer line off the Drolet property.
Gaffney appeals, claiming she proved each of the requirements for an implied easement and the trial court committed legal errors in its assessment of the evidence. She further maintains the court erred in invalidating an easement shown on the parcel map creating the adjoining properties and in granting injunctive relief. We reverse the invalidation ruling but affirm in all other respects.
DISCUSSION[3]
"Under certain circumstances, the law implies that the parties intended to create or transfer an easement by a grant or reservation when there is no written document evidencing their intent and, in some cases, even when there is no oral agreement regarding the easement; thus, implied easements are 'an exception to the general rule that interests in real property can only be created by an express writing or prescription.' "[4] (Romero v. Shih (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 326, 349 (Romero), rev. granted Aug. 10 2022, S275023, quoting Kytasty v. Godwin (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 762, 768 (Kytasty).)
"The factual circumstances that permit the creation of implied easements are fairly well established and the implication can only arise where certain facts are present." (Romero, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 349.) An "easement will be implied when, at the time of conveyance of property, the following conditions exist: 1) the owner of property conveys or transfers a portion of that property to another; 2) the owner's prior existing use of the property was of a nature that the parties must have intended or believed that the use would continue; meaning that the existing use must either have been known to the grantor and the grantee, or have been so obviously and apparently permanent that the parties should have known of the use; and 3) the easement is reasonably necessary to the use and benefit of the quasi-dominant tenement." (Tusher v. Gabrielsen (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 131, 141 (Tusher); accord, Thorstrom v. Thorstrom (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1419-1420 (Thorstrom); Kytasty, supra,102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 768-769.)
" " (Kytasty, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 770-771, quoting Swarzwald v. Cooley (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 306, 324-325; see Zanelli v. McGrath (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 615, 635 [].)
"The requirement that the easement must be' "reasonably necessary to the beneficial enjoyment" of the property conveyed means no more than "for the benefit thereof," '" and a party seeking to establish an implied easement is not required to prove that the easement as it existed was a strict necessity or" 'the only possible way'" of accommodating the use. (Thorstrom, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1420-1421.)
" 'The law does not favor the implication of easements.'" (Kytasty, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 769; Thorstrom, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420; Sierra Screw Products v. Azusa Greens, Inc. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 358, 368.) Thus," '[w]hether an easement arises by implication on a conveyance of real estate depends on the intent of the parties, which must clearly appear in order to sustain an easement by implication. In order to determine the intent, the court will take into consideration the circumstances attending the transaction, the particular situation of the parties, and the state of the thing granted. [Citation.] The purpose of the doctrine of implied easements is to give effect to the actual intent of the parties as shown by all the facts and circumstances.'" (Kytasty, at p. 769; accord, Thorstrom, at p. 1420; Tusher, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 141-142, .)
[5] (Romero, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.)
With this overview of the law in mind, we turn to the trial court's findings on the requirements necessary to establish an implied easement.
There is no dispute that Gaffney's and Drolet's properties were originally a single, larger parcel that was previously owned by Richard and Christina Lemke.
Gaffney sharply disputes, however, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding against her on the second requirement-that "the owner's prior existing use of the property was of a nature that the parties must have intended or believed that the use would continue meaning that the existing use must either have been known to the grantor and the grantee, or have been so obviously and apparently permanent that the parties should have known of the use." [6] (Tusher, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 141.)
Gaffney called no witness who was personally present at the time the Lemkes subdivided their property and sold the parcel Gaffney now owns to a third party. The trial court therefore examined the circumstantial evidence, presented largely by Drolet. This evidence showed the following chain of events:
In 1990, the Lemkes sought approval to subdivide their property into two parcels, each with a house more than 100 years old.
Their application was reviewed by the Vallejo Sanitation and Flood Control District (Sanitation District) which imposed development acceptance requirements, including the following:
The City of Vallejo, in turn, approved the subdivision application subject to numerous conditions, including the following:
The city advised Lemke, however, it "would not require that all work be completed before the subdivision was processed and the parcel map recorded."
In accordance with the conditions imposed on the subdivision the Lemkes filed a parcel map showing a ten-foot easement for a sewer line for the parcel that was eventually sold to Gaffney. The depicted easement runs alongside the new boundary line separating the two parcels, on the parcel eventually sold to Drolet, and out toward the street. Thus, the depicted easement is not in the locale of the old sewer line running through Drolet's property and alongside the foundation of his house. The owner's statement on the parcel map specifically...
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