Gafford v. State

• Decision Date: 10 May 1900
• Citation: 28 So. 406,125 Ala. 1
• Parties: GAFFORD v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

28 So. 406

125 Ala. 1

GAFFORD v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 10, 1900

Appeal from circuit court, Butler county; John W. Foster, Judge.

John A Gafford was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Reversed.

The appellant was indicted and tried for the murder of Francis B Lloyd, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the penitentiary. It was shown by the evidence that the deceased was killed by being shot with a shotgun by the defendant, late one afternoon while he (the deceased) was riding along the public road. The evidence for the state tended to show that the defendant lay in wait for the deceased, and fired upon him when within close range, and that there was no hostile demonstration on the part of the deceased towards the defendant, but that the deceased was riding along the road in his buggy, reading a newspaper. The evidence for the defendant tended to show That the deceased was coming from Greenville, in Butler county, along the public road, and that the defendant was walking in an opposite direction, going towards Greenville and that they met. Lloyd asked the defendant why he was carrying that gun on his shoulder. He replied that it was his gun, and he had a right to carry it; and then he asked the deceased about his having broken his promise not to have anything more to do with the sister of the defendant, one Mrs. Miller. That during the conversation deceased looked away from the defendant, into a field, and that as he did so he rose from his seat in his buggy and drew his pistol. That thereupon the defendant demanded that he put up the pistol and upon his failing to do so the defendant fired upon him, inflicting a mortal wound, from which he died immediately. During the examination of one Will Bishop as a witness for the defendant, he testified that he and his father met the defendant early in the afternoon of the killing, but prior thereto; that they met some distance up the road from where the killing occurred, and in the direction away from Greenville. Thereupon the defendant's counsel asked the witness the following question: "I will ask you whether or not you extended the defendant an invitation to come up to the house that evening." The state objected to the question on the ground that it called for irrelevant and immaterial evidence. The court sustained the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. Upon the witness further testifying that his father invited the defendant up that evening for supper, he was then asked by the defendant's counsel the following question: "What time did you eat supper?" The state objected to this question, the court sustained the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. Subsequent to the introduction of the witness Will Bishop, the defendant was introduced as a witness in his own behalf, and testified that early in the afternoon of the homicide he met Will Bishop and his father, and that the elder Bishop invited him to supper that afternoon, and that he was on his way to supper when he met the deceased; the home of said Bishop being in the direction of Greenville from his house, which was in the direction in which he was going when he and the deceased met in the road. The other facts of the case necessary to an understanding of the decision on the present appeal are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

The portion of the court's oral charge to which exceptions were reserved is set out in the opinion. At the request of the state, the court gave to the jury the following written charges: "(1) The court charges the jury that the words 'unless the evidence excludes to a moral certainty every supposition but that of guilt,' mean that the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. (2) The court charges the jury that if they believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant lay in wait, with the formed design to take the life of deceased, then, notwithstanding they may further believe that the deceased made the first hostile demonstration, defendant would be guilty of murder in the first degree. (3) The court charges the jury that the written charges read to the jury by the defendant's counsel in this case are not in conflict with the general oral charge of the court, but simply a different manner of stating the law in this case. (4) The court charges the jury that if they believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that John Gafford lay in wait for Bartow Lloyd for the purpose of killing him, and did kill him, then the defendant cannot be excused or justified under his plea of self-defense, and you must convict him." The defendant separately excepted to the giving of each of these charges, and also separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of the following charges requested by him: "(c) Gentlemen of the jury, under the evidence in this case you would be authorized to find a verdict of either murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree, sometimes involuntary manslaughter, or a verdict of acquittal; the character of your verdict depending upon the conclusions you may reasonably deduce from the evidence. (d) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that under one phase of the evidence, if believed, the defendant, if guilty of any offense at all, and provided the evidence should convinced you beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt, might be guilty of a lower offense than murder in the first degree. (e) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that under one phase of the evidence, if believed, the defendant, if you find him guilty at all, may be guilty of a lower offense than murder, provided you should be convinced of his guilt of an unlawful homicide beyond a reasonable doubt. (f) If the defendant, when he shot deceased, had reasonable grounds for believing that the deceased had a felonious design against him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, his offense would not be murder, but would be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used, and the probable grounds of such belief. (g) If the defendant, when he shot deceased, had reasonable grounds for believing that the deceased had a felonious design against his life, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, his offense would not be murder in the first degree, but would be either murder in the second degree, or voluntary manslaughter, or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used by defendant, and the probable grounds of such belief. (h) If the defendant, when he shot deceased, had reasonable grounds for believing that the deceased had a felonious design against his life, and, before defendant shot deceased, deceased did an overt act, as though to accomplish such design, even though there was no such design, and though such overt act may not have been sufficient to excuse the killing, and if the defendant had no previously formed design to unlawfully take the life of deceased, but then and there suddenly formed the intent to...