Gage v. Mears
Decision Date | 26 April 1904 |
Parties | GAGE et al., Appellants, v. MEARS, Interpleader, Respondent |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Pemiscot Circuit Court.--Hon. Henry C. Riley, Judge.
Judgment affirmed.
Wilson Cramer for appellants.
The court erred in refusing the second paragraph of defendants' instruction No. 2. All the facts therein enumerated are shown by the evidence, and being undisputed should have been submitted to the jury by instruction as badges of fraud from which the legal inference of a fraudulent purpose on the part of the vendor and of knowledge or notice thereof by the vendee might be drawn. Bump on Frdl Conv. (2 Ed.), p. 34; Dry Goods Co. v. Schooley, 66 Mo.App. 406; Van Raalte v. Harrington, 101 Mo. 602; Barrett v. Davis, 104 Mo. 549.
John A Hope for respondent.
(1) There was no error in giving interpleader's instruction No. 3. It laid down the rule that financial embarrassment merely does not prevent a debtor from selling his property, which is law. Feder v. Abraham, 28 Mo.App. 454; Rupe v. Alkire, 77 Mo. 641; Daugherty v. Cooper, 77 Mo. 528. (2) The court did not err in striking out the second paragraph of defendant's instruction No. 2. It was an unwarranted comment on the evidence and singled out and gave undue prominence to certain particular things. In Forrester v. Moore, 77 Mo. 657, in which a conveyance was attacked as fraudulent the Supreme Court said it was improper to specify in an instruction certain facts as badges of fraud. Steinwender v. Creath, 44 Mo.App. 356; Bank v. Nichols, 43 Mo.App. 397; Noyes v. Cunningham, 51 Mo.App. 194.
This is the second appeal of this case. The facts as developed on the first trial are set out in the opinion of this court rendered at the March term, 1902, reported in 94 Mo.App. 307. The facts developed on the last trial are not materially different from the facts shown on the first trial, with this exception; B. A. Macke testified on the last trial but did not testify on the first trial. His evidence tends to explain the hurry in which the trade between Trawick and Mears was made and the reason it was made after night. His evidence in this regard is as follows:
As on the former trial the verdict was for Mears, the interpleader.
We held when the case was here before that there was no reason to doubt that Trawick's purpose in disposing of his property was fraudulent. There is nothing in the abstracts of the evidence to change that opinion in respect to Trawick's motive, but in the light shed upon the transaction by the evidence of Mackey, we are not prepared to say as a matter of law, that Mears participated in the fraud of Trawick, although there is much in the case that tends to show his participation. But whether or not he did so, we think, was a question of fact for the jury to pass upon...
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