Gagne v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 05 June 1917 |
| Citation | 78 N.H. 439,101 A. 212 |
| Parties | GAGNE v. MASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INS. CO. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Coos County; Chamberlin, Judge.
Assumpsit on insurance policy by John Gagne against the Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company to recover for sick benefits. Upon an agreed statement of facts, the court pro forma found a verdict for the plaintiff, and defendants except. Exceptions sustained, and judgment for defendants.
Ovide J. Coulombe, of Berlin, for plaintiff. Goss & James, of Berlin (W. W. James, of Berlin, orally), for defendant.
By its terms the policy expired on the 1st day of June, 1915, but was renewable from month to month at the election of the company by the payment of a monthly premium of $1.65 on or before the 1st day of each month expiring in all cases upon the 1st of the month, if not renewed. The plaintiff paid the premium due September 1st, but did not pay the October premium until October 27th, two days after his illness began, October 25th. He was insured against disability resulting from illness which is contracted and begins during the life of the policy. As the policy was not in force when the illness began for which sick benefits are claimed, unless the payment and acceptance October 27th of the monthly premium for October restored the policy and gave it life from October 1st, the plaintiff cannot recover. The effect of such payment and acceptance depends upon the agreement or understanding of the parties. It is to be given the effect they agreed it should have. The policy provided that:
"If default be made in the payment of the agreed premium for this policy, the subsequent acceptance of a premium * * * shall reinstate the policy, but only to cover accidental injury thereafter sustained and such sickness as may begin more than ten days after the date of such acceptance."
In this provision the policy follows, the statute. Laws 1913, c. 226, § 3, subsec. 3, (C) 3. In the absence of fraud, one who accepts a policy of insurance is presumed to have knowledge of the terms, conditions, and limitations therein contained. Johnson v. Casualty Co., 73 N. H. 259, 60 Atl. 1009, 111 Am. St. Rep. 609. In a suit on the contract the plaintiff must recover according to its terms. Anderson v. 2Etna, Life Ins. Co., 75 N. H. 375, 377, 74 Atl. 1051. Recovery, therefore, cannot be had for an illness beginning October 25th by virtue of a premium payment October 27th by the terms...
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...a policy of insurance is presumed to have knowledge of the terms, conditions and limitations therein contained." Gagne v. Insurance Company, 78 N. H. 439, 440, 101 A. 212. It is argued that the heading "privilege of continuance" means that the original insurance continued for 31 days, witho......
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