Gagne v. Vaccaro
Decision Date | 06 March 2001 |
Docket Number | (SC 16351) |
Citation | 766 A.2d 416,255 Conn. 390 |
Parties | J. WILLIAM GAGNE, JR. v. ENRICO VACCARO |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Katz, Sullivan, Vertefeuille, Zarella and Dranginis, JS.1 James F. Stapleton, with whom was Richard P. Colbert, for the appellant (plaintiff).
William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, was Hugh D. Hughes, for the appellee (defendant).
The principal issue in this appeal is whether, in the absence of a written contingency fee agreement between an attorney and his client, as required by General Statutes § 52-251C,2 recovery by that attorney against a successor attorney should be permitted on the basis of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, regardless of whether bad faith by the successor attorney or the client's waiver of § 52-251c has been established. We conclude that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the failure by the plaintiff, J. William Gagne, Jr., to comply with § 52-251c did not preclude him from recovering under the doctrines of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment from the defendant, Enrico Vaccaro, the successor attorney, a reasonable fee for services he had rendered on behalf of his former client. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, which set aside a jury verdict for Gagne and found in favor of Vaccaro, and we reinstate the jury's award of damages in the amount of $328,469.14.
The evidence at trial established the following facts. In the fall of 1989, Richard Aldrich was injured while working for RK Contractors on construction of the Fusco Building, Goodwin Plaza, in Hartford. Shortly thereafter, while Aldrich was in the hospital, Gagne, who practiced an extensive amount of labor law, was approached at a carpenter's union meeting by an agent who asked him to visit Aldrich. During the course of his visit with Aldrich, Gagne agreed to represent him in the personal injury action arising from the accident. Although they discussed terms of the contract and agreed to a contingency fee of 25 percent, Gagne did not reduce the agreement to writing.
Over the next four years, Gagne worked on the case and ultimately engaged in settlement negotiations with Herbert Lustig, the attorney representing the primary and secondary insurers of RK Contractors. Lustig proposed a structured settlement of the claim totaling $2,307,000 over Aldrich's lifetime, which had a guaranteed present value of $1,585,000. Following these settlement negotiations, Gagne flew to Aldrich's home in Colorado to discuss the proposal. Upon Gagne's return, he instructed his associate, Harry Elliott, to follow up on a variety of matters related to the settlement proposal, including confirming the amount of attorney's fees allowable under § 52-251c.
Approximately one month before the meeting in Colorado, unbeknownst to Gagne, Aldrich had contacted Vaccaro, an attorney who previously had represented Aldrich's son in an unrelated case. Aldrich had been unhappy that his personal injury case arising out of the construction accident had not progressed further. Following the meeting in Colorado with Gagne, Aldrich sent Vaccaro the settlement proposal given to him by Gagne. During a subsequent conversation, Vaccaro told Aldrich that he could get him more money than the settlement proposal offered by Gagne. At some point in one of their conversations, Vaccaro asked Aldrich whether he had entered into a written fee agreement with Gagne. Aldrich informed him that his agreement with Gagne had been oral. Vaccaro then promised Aldrich that he would charge him a contingency fee of only 10 percent upon transfer of the case to him. When he ultimately retained Vaccaro, Aldrich told him that Gagne had done a great deal of work on the case and that he was hiring Vaccaro on the condition that Vaccaro would agree to pay Gagne his fair share of the attorney's fee earned in the case. In fact, Aldrich would not have agreed to hire Vaccaro had Vaccaro not agreed to that condition. Vaccaro acquiesced, and Aldrich discharged Gagne and retained Vaccaro.
On January 18, 1994, in a letter requesting the file from Gagne, Vaccaro wrote: "I will either agree with your claims and forward to you a check in payment thereof when the above matters are resolved or will hold any fee in escrow pending a determination of the amount due to you." Gagne turned the file over to Vaccaro, who subsequently made a single settlement demand in the amount of $1,750,000. The demand was accepted and on April 25, 1994, the case was settled. Vaccaro's file in connection with his representation of Aldrich consisted of an appearance, a withdrawal, two motions for extension of time, correspondence notifying other parties in the case that he was Aldrich's successor counsel, a few letters to physicians requesting updated medical information and one letter to counsel for the workers' compensation carrier. He did not conduct any factual investigation, hire any investigators, retain any experts or take any depositions. Gagne had performed 85 to 90 percent of the work on the case.
After Gagne learned that the case had settled, he attempted to arrive at a consensual resolution of the fee arrangement with Vaccaro. Gagne also proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, that the fee dispute be resolved by arbitration before the Connecticut Bar Association Lawyer-to-Lawyer Dispute Resolution Program.
Thereafter, Gagne brought the present action, claiming that: (1) he was the third party beneficiary of a contract between Aldrich and Vaccaro, thereby obligating Vaccaro to pay him a portion of the attorney's fees recovered in the personal injury action brought on behalf of Aldrich; (2) by taking over the Aldrich case, Vaccaro also had implicitly assumed all of Aldrich's obligations to compensate and reimburse Gagne for his fees and expenses from the total fees paid to him by Aldrich; (3) Vaccaro had agreed orally and in writing that he would reimburse Gagne for the disbursements he had incurred and that he would satisfy the contingent compensation due Gagne out of any recovery realized in Aldrich's personal injury claim; (4) Vaccaro, who had received a substantial benefit from the work Gagne had performed, unjustly failed to pay him for that benefit to Gagne's detriment; and (5) Vaccaro violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. On or about August 8, 1996, Vaccaro filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming, inter alia, that Gagne's claims were barred on public policy grounds. Specifically, relying on Alan E. Silver, P.C. v. Jacobs, 43 Conn. App. 184, 602 A.2d 551, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 938, 684 A.2d 708 (1996), decided well after the events in the present case had transpired, Vaccaro claimed that Gagne's failure to obtain a written fee agreement as required under § 52-251c precluded him from recovering his fee. In opposition to the motion, Gagne advanced four grounds under which he claimed recovery despite his noncompliance with § 52-251c: (1) Alan E. Silver, P.C., had been decided improperly; (2) that case was distinguishable; (3) Aldrich waived the protection of § 52-251c; and (4) Vaccaro's bad faith actions precluded him from relying on Gagne's noncompliance with § 52-251c as a defense. The trial court, Licari, J., in ruling on the motion for summary judgment, recognized a bad faith exception to § 52-251c. Specifically, the trial court determined that when a successor attorney has acted in bad faith, using the original attorney's noncompliance with the statute to avoid compensating him, the original attorney is not barred from recovering his fee, despite his noncompliance with § 52-251c. The trial court also recognized that the client may waive the protection of § 52-251c. Because there were issues of material fact raised in connection with those two defenses by Gagne, the trial court denied Vaccaro's motion for summary judgment.3
Thereafter, the case was tried to a jury, which found in favor of Gagne on all five counts of his complaint and awarded him damages in the amount of $328,469.14.4 Pursuant to Practice Book § 16-37,5 Vaccaro then moved the trial court to set aside the verdict and render judgment for him notwithstanding the verdict, claiming that, in the absence of a written contingency fee agreement, Gagne could not recover any attorney's fees. In addition, Vaccaro contended that the evidence had been insufficient on the issue of his alleged bad faith, as well as on Gagne's claims regarding breach of contract, Gagne's status as a third party beneficiary and Vaccaro's alleged CUTPA violation.6
The trial court granted Vaccaro's motion, concluding that the evidence did not support a finding of bad faith on his part.7 Accordingly, the trial court set aside the judgment and rendered judgment for Vaccaro. Gagne appealed from the judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.8
On appeal, Gagne raises several issues addressing the trial court's decision granting Vaccaro's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.9 In addition to his response defending the actions of the trial court, Vaccaro asserts numerous claims for consideration, should we agree with Gagne and order a new trial.10 This case, however, distills to one basic question: whether, in the absence of a written contingency fee agreement between an attorney and his client, as required by § 52-251c, recovery by that attorney against a successor attorney should be permitted on the basis of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, regardless of whether bad faith or the client's waiver of § 52-251c has been established.11 With regard to this issue, Vaccaro claims that because Gagne had rendered legal services pursuant to an oral agreement,12 in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and § 52-251c, Gagne is barred from recovering against him. Specifically,...
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