Gaies v. Hulbert

• Citation: 2021 NY Slip Op 33598 (U)
• Decision Date: 14 January 2021
• Docket Number: Index No. 906543-18
• Parties: MITCHELL GAIES and SUSAN SIKULE, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN HULBERT, Defendant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New York)

2021 NY Slip Op 33598(U)

MITCHELL GAIES and SUSAN SIKULE, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN HULBERT, Defendant.

Index No. 906543-18

Supreme Court, Albany County

January 14, 2021

Unpublished Opinion

Supreme Court, Albany County, Motion Term Hon. Margaret Walsh, Supreme Court Justice, Presiding

Christopher W. Rust, Esq.

TOWNE RYAN & PARTNERS, P.C.

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

Kyle A. Satchell

SANTACROSE & FRARY

Attorneys for the Defendant

DECISION AND ORDER

Margaret Walsh, Supreme Court Justice

The Plaintiffs commenced this action on October 23, 2018 seeking damages from the Defendant arising from an incident that occurred on July 15, 2018, when two German shepherd dogs owned by the Defendant escaped from the Defendant's yard, entered the property of Plaintiff Mitchell Gaies and fatally mauled the Plaintiffs' cat, Manny. In addition to the loss of Manny, the Plaintiffs allege that they suffered bites and other injuries stemming from the attack. In their verified complaint, the Plaintiffs assert causes of action for negligence, strict liability, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Defendant now moves for partial summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and limiting damages for the loss of the cat to his fair market value, if any. The Plaintiffs oppose.

"A party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, producing sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issue of fact" (Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 72, 81 [2003]). The Court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party (see Escobar v. Velez, 116 A.D.2d 735, 735 [2d Dept. 2014]). If the movant makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to tender evidence in admissible form sufficient to raise a material issue of fact requiring resolution at trial (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562 [1980]). The Court is mindful of its obligation to "'focus on issue finding rather than issue determination, and [to] deny the drastic remedy of summary judgment if there is any doubt as to whether a material factual issue exists or if such an issue is even arguable'" (Lacasse v. Sorbello, 121 A.D.3d 1241, 1242 [3d Dept. 2014], quoting Black v. Kohl's Dept. Stores, Inc., 80 A.D.3d 958, 959 [2011]; see also Napierski v. Finn, 229 A.D.2d 869 [3d Dept. 1996][ "summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue"]). In support of his motion, the Defendant proffers the verified pleadings, signed transcripts of the Plaintiffs' depositions, as well as the Plaintiffs' Verified Bill of Particulars, Plaintiffs' Supplemental Verified Bill of Particulars and medical records.

"A breach of the duty of care resulting directly in emotional harm is compensable even though no physical injury occurred, when the mental injury is a direct, rather than a consequential, result of the breach and when the claim possesses 'some guarantee of genuineness (Ornstein v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 1, 6 [2008][intemal quotations marks and citations omitted]; Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 506 [1983]; 61 NY Jur, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, §17). Further, "[w]hile physical injury is not a necessary element of a cause of action to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, such a cause of action must generally be premised upon conduct that unreasonably endangers a plaintiffs physical safety or causes the plaintiff to fear for his or her own safety'" (Gaylord v. Fiorilla, 28 A.D.3d 713, 713-714 [2d Dept. 2006], quoting Perry v. Valley Cottage Animal Hosp., 261 A.D.2d 522, 522-523 [1999]; see also Schultes v. Kane, 50 A.D.3d 1277, 1278 [3d Dept. 2008]; Graber v. Bachman, 27 A.D.3d 986, 987 [3d Dept. 2006]; Sheila C. v. Povich, 11 A.D.3d 120, 130 [1^st Dept. 2004]).^[1]

The salient facts drawn from their depositions are deemed true for purposes of this motion, as well as all favorable inferences therefrom. The Plaintiffs Susan Sikule ("Sikule") and Mitchell Gaies ("Gaies") co-owned a ten-year-old cat named Manny ("Manny"). Gaies owned a home located at 14 Northview Drive in Latham. At that time, the Plaintiffs were a couple. The Defendant owned a home at 11 Northview Drive, located across the street from Gaies, where he kept two German shepherd dogs. In the late afternoon of July 15,2018, Manny was tethered to a stake in the backyard of the home of Gaies, and Gaies was supervising him, sitting on the raised deck some distance from where Manny was sitting. Sikule was inside Gaies' home playing board games with Gaies' grandchildren in the great room which overlooked backyard. At one point, Sikule heard Gaies scream or yell. Gaies saw two full grown German shepherd dogs enter his backyard and immediately go after Manny. Sikule went to the sliding glass door and observed one dog on either end of Manny, pulling him apart. She saw a "very large gaping hole in [Manny's] belly and he's still alive at that point" (Exhibit G, p. 13). Gaies similarly described Manny as being a "rag doll being tom apart" (Exhibit H, p. 16). Sikule opened the sliding glass door and ran down to the scene of the attack. Gaies had already run down from the deck to remove one of the dogs from its grip on Manny. Sikule tried to pry one of the dog's mouth open, while Gaies was trying to get the other dog off of Manny using both of his hands. Neither dog would release Manny. Both Plaintiffs described the dogs as being fixated on Manny. The Defendant ultimately came into the yard to retrieve his dogs after hearing the Plaintiffs' screams. After the attack, the Plaintiffs rushed Manny to the nearest veterinary hospital, but Manny was fatally wounded by the Defendant's dogs. Sikule, a veterinarian who specializes in treating cats, testified that the incident has impacted her emotionally. She was unable to go to work for a week not only due to her physical injuries but also due to the "horrific event and nature of' Manny's fatal mauling (Exhibit G, p. 35). She was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and now thinks "about the [e]ffects of a possible dog attack" when she sees an unfamiliar dog while out running (Exhibit G, p. 36). Gaies testified that he saw a psychologist due to the attack. He also has become fearful of certain breeds of unfamiliar dogs (Exhibit H, p. 47-48).

The Defendant argues that no claim for emotional distress lies as the result of the negligent destruction of one's property or for emotional distress caused by the observation of damage to one's property (Satchell Aff, ¶16, citing, inter alia, Dabb v. NYNEX Corp., 262 A.D.2d 1079,10791080 [4^th Dept. 1999]; see also Jones v. County of Chenango, 180 A.D.3d 1199 [3d Dept. 2020]). The Defendant contends that, because domestic pets such as Manny are considered to be property (see Fowler v. Ticonderoga, 131 A.D.2d 919, 921 [3d Dept. 1987]), the Plaintiffs' cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress fails. The admissible proof submitted in support of his motion reveals that a source of the Plaintiffs' emotional distress arose from their having witnessed the fatal mauling of Manny by the Defendant's dogs. In Fowler v. Ticonderoga, the plaintiff, who witnessed the killing of his dog by the town's animal control officer, sought damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Appellate Division, Third Department held that, because the plaintiff was not in the "zone of danger" as plaintiffs were in Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 230-231 (1984)^[2] and because the dog was personal property, "damages may not be recovered for mental distress caused by [the dog's] malicious or negligent destruction" (id., citing Smith v. Palace Transp. Co., 142 Mise. 93, 94; accord, Jason v. Parks, 224 A.D.2d 494, 495 [2d Dept. 1996][damages for emotional distress caused by loss of dog not recoverable]; Schrage v. Hatzlacha Cab Corp., 13 A.D.3d 150, 150 [1^st Dept. 2004]; Dabb v. Nynex Corp., supra at 10791080). The Defendant has met his initial burden of establishing with admissible proof his entitlement to dismissal of the third cause of action as a matter of law.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs do not dispute Manny's legal classification as "personal property." Rather, they point to other portions of their deposition testimony describing physical injuries inflicted upon them by the Defendants' dogs during their attack that resulted in Manny's fatality. The Plaintiffs argue that the "entire attack both to the cat as well as to their persons are the foundation [of] the claims of psychological damages" (Rust Aff. in Opposition, ¶12). The fully stated rule is that recovery for emotional distress may not be predicated upon the observation of damage to one's property in the absence of an assertion that a plaintiff was in physical danger or was placed in imminent fear of his or her own safety (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Burger King Corp., 25 A.D.3d 472, 472 [1^st Dept. 2006]; Graber v. Bachman, 27 A.D.3d at 988; see also Nicholson v. A. Anastasio & Sons Trucking Co., 77 A.D.3d 1330, 1331-1332 [4^th Dept. 2010]; Cleary v. Wallace Oil Co., Inc. 55 A.D.3d 773 [2d Dept. 2008]; Kenneth S. v. Berkshire Farm Ctr. & Servs. for Youth, 36 A.D.3d 1092, 1094 [3d Dept. 2007]; Graber v. Bachman, 27 A.D.3d 986, 988 [3d Dept. 2006][citing Dabb v. NYNEX Corp., supra]). Stated another way, a defendant may be liable in damages for emotional injuries where the defendant's breach of duty not only causes property damage but also proximately causes a plaintiff to be placed in physical...