Gaines v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 19 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-432,Appellate Case No. 2013-002367 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Barbara Gaines, Respondent, v. Joyce Ann Campbell, Appellant. |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Greenville County
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge
REVERSED
Marcus Kirk McGarr, of Marcus K. McGarr, PA, of Greenville, for Appellant.
John Robert Peace, of John Robert Peace, PA, of Greenville, for Respondent.
Joyce Ann Campbell appeals the trial court's order granting Barbara Gaines's motion for a new trial. Campbell asserts the trial court erred in granting the new trial because its decision was based on the following misapprehensions of law: (1) a defendant must present an expert to contradict anopposing expert's testimony; (2) cross-examining an expert amounts to the pitting of witnesses; (3) an expert cannot be cross-examined on other "possible" causes of an injury; and (4) a closing argument with no direct appeal to any specific juror violates the rule against appealing to a juror. Because the trial court's order granting Gaines's motion for a new trial was controlled by an error of law, we reverse.
This appeal arises out of a car accident in which Campbell rear-ended Gaines in January 2010. While Campbell admitted she was negligent and at fault in causing the accident, she asserted her actions did not proximately cause the damages alleged by Gaines. A trial was held in August 2013.
During the trial, Campbell asked the jury to return a verdict in the amount of Gaines's emergency room bill, which totaled $3,941, while Gaines sought compensation for all of her medical bills, including a spinal surgery she had after the accident, and an award for her physical pain, suffering, and emotional distress. The stipulated total of Gaines's medical bills was $77,966.56. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict for Gaines in the amount of $3,941.
After the trial, Gaines moved for a new trial, arguing the verdict was contrary to both the law and the evidence of the case. After a hearing on Gaines's motion, the trial court invoked the thirteenth juror doctrine and granted a new trial, finding an award of damages for only the emergency room bill to be grossly inadequate and unsupported by the evidence. This appeal followed.
We note at the outset the trial court's order granting Gaines's motion for a new trial conflated the standards for a new trial pursuant to the thirteenth juror doctrine and a new trial absolute. We address the two standards below as well as the language of the trial court's order.
A trial court must grant a new trial absolute if the amount of the verdict is grossly inadequate or excessive and clearly indicates the figure reached was the result of prejudice, passion, caprice, or some other improper motive. O'Neal v. Bowles, 314 S.C. 525, 527, 431 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1993). However, the jury's determination of damages is entitled to substantial deference. Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 404,477 S.E.2d 715, 723 (Ct. App. 1996). The trial court must explain the reasons for granting or denying new trial motions based on inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict. Cf. Pelican Bldg. Ctrs. of Horry-Georgetown, Inc. v. Dutton, 311 S.C. 56, 61, 427 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1993) (). "The decision to grant a new trial absolute . . . rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and ordinarily will not be disturbed on appeal." Becker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 339 S.C. 629, 635, 529 S.E.2d 758, 761 (Ct. App. 2000). A trial court abuses its discretion if its conclusions are controlled by an error of law or if its findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence. Id.
On the other hand, under the thirteenth juror doctrine, the trial court may grant a new trial if it finds the verdict is unsupported by the evidence. Folkens v. Hunt, 300 S.C. 251, 254, 387 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990). "This ruling has also been termed granting a new trial upon the facts." Id. Basically, the court, "as the thirteenth juror[,] 'hangs' the jury." Id. Id. When acting as the thirteenth juror, the trial court "possess[es] the veto power to the Nth degree" and is presumed to recognize and appreciate this responsibility and exercise its discretion with fairness and impartiality. Worrell v. S.C. Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 313-14, 195 S.E. 638, 641 (1938). "A trial order granting or denying a new trial upon the facts will not be disturbed unless [its] decision is wholly unsupported by the evidence, or the conclusion reached was controlled by an error of law." Vinson, 324 S.C. at 403, 477 S.E.2d at 722.
In the instant case, the trial court gave several reasons for granting Gaines's motion, and it found the jury's award of damages "grossly inadequate," which are typically characteristics of a new trial absolute. However, at the end of the order, the court discussed case law on the thirteenth juror doctrine and stated it was "invoking the 'Thirteenth Juror Doctrine'" to grant a new trial. Thus, in light of this express wording, we will review this case under the thirteenth juror doctrine.
As discussed above, the trial court is not required to explain its rationale for granting a new trial under the thirteenth juror doctrine. Folkens, 300 S.C. at 254, 387 S.E.2d at 267. However, if the trial court chooses to do so, this court will review the reasons provided by the trial court. See Lane v. Gilbert Constr. Co., 383 S.C. 590, 597-600, 681 S.E.2d 879, 883-84 (2009) (); Youmans v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 380 S.C. 263, 282, 287-88, 670 S.E.2d 1, 10, 13 (Ct. App. 2008) (); id. at 282, 670 S.E.2d at 10 ().
In the present case, the court gave several reasons for granting Gaines's motion. We discuss these reasons below.
Campbell argues the trial court erroneously believed she was required to present expert witness testimony to contradict an opposing expert's testimony and failed to consider the fact that the credibility of the experts' statements was at issue.
We agree with Campbell that she was not required to present her own expert witness as the jury could choose not to believe the testimony of Gaines's expert witnesses. See Terwilliger v. Marion, 222 S.C. 185, 188, 72 S.E.2d 165, 166 (1952) (). However, we disagree with Campbell's claim that the trial court was requiring her to produce her own expert witness when it stated in its order that she "did not present any evidence to refute [Gaines's] experts and relied solely on [Campbell's] cross examination of the witnesses to contest the proximate cause issue." It appears, in making this statement, the trial court was merely recounting the events of the trial. The court never stated Campbell was required to present her own expert witness, and, furthermore, it agreed when Campbell's attorney stated during the new trial hearing that he did not have to bring in an expert. Accordingly, we disagree with Campbell's assertion of error.
Campbell next contends the trial court erred when it found her cross-examination of Dr. Christie B. Mina objectionable because Campbell asked Dr. Mina to comment on Gaines's veracity and asked Dr. Mina if she was calling the emergency room physicians "quacks." Campbell argues she needed to questionDr. Mina about the discrepancies in Gaines's testimony regarding her prior neck injuries because Dr. Mina had agreed it would be difficult to connect an incident to an injury, absent the patient giving an accurate and proper history. The trial court found Campbell's cross-examination of Dr. Mina objectionable because Campbell "repeatedly and argumentatively questioned Dr. Mina about the veracity of other witnesses," which "was in clear violation of South Carolina's long standing and basic rule prohibiting the 'pitting' of witnesses."
"It is improper to cross-examine in a way that requires a witness to attack another witness's credibility." State v. Benning, 338 S.C. 59, 63, 524 S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ct. App. 1999); see also Burgess v. State, 329 S.C. 88, 91, 495 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1998) ( ). "[A]n expert is not to comment on the veracity of another witness's statements." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Lisa C., 380 S.C. 406, 418, 669 S.E.2d 647, 653 (Ct. App. 2008).
In the present case, Campbell informed Dr. Mina that Gaines had stated during a deposition she had never had a problem with her neck significant enough to seek medical treatment before the accident. Subsequently, Campbell asked Dr. Mina to...
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