Gainesville, J. & S.R. Co. v. Edmondson

• Decision Date: 20 July 1897
• Citation: 29 S.E. 213,101 Ga. 747
• Parties: GAINESVILLE, J. & S. R. CO. v. EDMONDSON et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

29 S.E. 213

101 Ga. 747

GAINESVILLE, J. & S. R. CO. v. EDMONDSON et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 20, 1897

Syllabus by the Court.

1. To authorize a plaintiff to recover damages from a railroad company for the destruction of property by fire caused by the running of its locomotive, it must appear that such damage was occasioned by the fault or negligence of the company or its agents. If, without more, it should be shown that the fire was occasioned by operation of the locomotive negligence on the part of the company would be presumed.

2. When, however, the evidence only raises a suspicion that fire was communicated to the property destroyed by the passing engine, and the uncontradicted testimony was that the engine was in good order, and equipped with a proper spark arrester in good condition, and no evidence appearing that in the handling of the engine sparks were emitted or fire thrown therefrom at the time, before, or after the conflagration for which damages are sought, a legal recovery cannot be had, and the court erred in refusing to grant a new trial.

Error from superior court, Walton county; N. L. Hutchins, Judge.

Action by W. T. Edmondson and others against the Gainesville Jefferson & Southern Railroad Company to recover for the destruction of a building and contents by fire. From a judgment for plaintiffs, and an order refusing a new trial defendant brings error. Reversed.

Jos. B. & Bryan Cumming and Henry D. McDaniel, for plaintiff in error.

W. S. McHenry, for defendants in error.

LITTLE J.

An action was brought against the railroad company to recover damages sustained by reason of the burning of a gin house and certain valuable contents. The petition alleged that the burning was caused by the negligence of the company and its agents in and about the running of its locomotives and machinery by negligently and carelessly throwing out sparks from the locomotives. The plaintiffs had a verdict. The defendant company made a motion for a new trial, which was refused, and it excepted. The motion contains several grounds relating to the charge of the court and its refusal to charge. As, however, the case goes back, and our judgment of reversal is made on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, we do not deem it necessary to pass on the other alleged errors set out in the motion.

1. The rule by which a railroad company can be held liable for damages occasioned by fire emitted from or otherwise thrown out by its locomotives is well settled. The law governing this class of cases is necessarily, from the comparatively recent use of steam in the propelling of cars on railroads of modern origin, and the principles which control the cases are derived by analogy. One of the earliest cases to which our attention has been called is that of Vaughan v. Railway Co., an English case decided in 1858, and reported in 3 Hurl. & N. 742. In this case the court of exchequer held that railroad companies, by using fire, were responsible for any accident which might result from its use. On appeal, however, the court of exchequer chamber reversed this ruling, and the doctrine is now clearly and well established that when the legislature has sanctioned and authorized the use of a particular thing, and it is used for the purpose for which it is authorized, and every reasonable precaution is observed to prevent injury, the sanction of the legislature carries with it this consequence: that, if damage results from the use of such thing, the party using it is not responsible. Therefore, in case of railroads authorized to propel their cars by steam, the gist of their liability for injuries caused by the escape of fire is negligence. This is now the law of England and of every state in the Union except where altered by statute. 1 Thomp. Neg. p. 152, par. 8, citing a large number of cases in note 7 which fully support the text. We have in this state no statute law which changes this rule of liability, and, unless in cases of this character the fire is occasioned by some act of negligence on the part of the company or its agents, no liability attaches to the railroad company to respond for the damages sustained. Railroad Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Ga. 534. See, also, Railway Co. v. Timmermann, 61 Tex. 660; Railroad Co. v. Schultz, 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 275, and note. This negligence must refer either to the condition of the locomotive from which the fire emanated, or to its handling or management at the time the fire was occasioned. Johnson v. Railroad Co. (N. D.) 48 N.W. 227. It will be understood, of course, that this rule of liability is not exhaustive of the entire scope of a railroad's responsibility in fire cases, but is applicable to the questions made by the pleadings and evidence in this case. Modern science and ingenuity have not yet reached a point where it is possible to propel locomotives by the use of steam in such manner as to absolutely prevent the emission of sparks of fire in their operation. The law does not require that engines shall be so constructed, equipped, or managed as that no sparks of fire shall escape from them; and, even if a fire does...