Gairson v. Gladden

• Decision Date: 29 March 1967
• Citation: 425 P.2d 761,247 Or. 88
• Parties: William Olen GAIRSON, Appellant, v. Clarence T. GLADDEN, Warden, Oregon State Penitentiary, Respondent.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 761

425 P.2d 761

247 Or. 88

William Olen GAIRSON, Appellant, v. Clarence T. GLADDEN, Warden, Oregon State Penitentiary, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.

Argued and submitted Jan. 3, 1967.

Decided March 29, 1967.

Lawrence A. Aschenbrenner, Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.

David H. Blunt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen., Salem.

Before PERRY, C.J., and McALLISTER, SLOAN, O'CONNELL, GOODWIN, DENECKE and HOLMAN, ^* JJ.

O'CONNELL, Justice.

This is an appeal by petitioner from an order dismissing his petition seeking relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the crime of murder in the second degree. He was represented by retained counsel at trial. After the judgment of conviction was entered, petitioner's attorney was advised that petitioner desired to appeal but that petitioner had no money to prosecute an appeal. Petitioner's attorney did not advise him that an indigent defendant was entitled to court appointed counsel on appeal. It is contended that the failure to so advise petitioner deprived him of his constitutional rights. This contention is clearly without merit.

An accused has a constitutional right to be informed that he is entitled to be represented by appointed counsel in the trial of the charge against him. He has no constitutional right to an appeal and therefore if the legislature should see fit it could provide that upon appeal no one is entitled to counsel. ¹ However, if counsel is permitted on appeal, then the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the indigent be given substantially the same opportunity to employ counsel as a defendant who has the money to do so.

Petitioner takes the position that an indigent defendant not only has this constitutional right of equal protection, but also the right, apparently under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to have the state inform him that he is entitled to appointed counsel on appeal. Since the right to appeal is merely a statutory right the assistance of counsel necessary to implement that right can be of no greater magnitude and does not rise to the level of a constitutional right under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although as we have indicated above it may, under the proper circumstances, give rise to a constitutional right under the equal protection clause of the Fourteen Amendment.

When an indigent informs the court of his need for counsel on appeal, he is entitled to have counsel appointed. But neither the court nor any other agency of government is required to inquire of a convicted defendant for the purpose of determining whether he intends to appeal and if so whether he has the means to employ counsel. ² Cases in other jurisdictions have reached this same conclusion. ³

Judgment affirmed.

McALLISTER, Justice (specially concurring).

I agree that there is no constitutional right to an appeal. However, if an appeal is provided, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gives an indigent defendant a constitutional right to the same kind of an appeal as a defendant with money. The constitutional right includes Inter alia a transcript, Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), and appointed counsel, Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), reh. den. 373 U.S. 905, 83 S.Ct. 1288, 10 L.Ed.2d 200.

In my opinion, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the court to inform every defendant of his right to appeal and, if he is indigent, of his right to counsel, and to ascertain whether the defendant wishes to appeal or to waive that right. I agree that the burden should be on the defendant to inform the court that he wishes to appeal and, if he is indigent, wishes to have counsel appointed to represent him. McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Ky.App.1963); State ex rel. Dych v. Bomar, 213 Tenn. 699, 378 S.W.2d 772, 774 (1964).

I, therefore, concur in the result of the majority opinion.

GOODWIN, Justice (dissenting).

The majority holds in effect that since a right to appeal is not a due-process right but an equal-protection right, a right to counsel on appeal is likewise not a due-process right but an equal-protection right. Thus far I agree. I do not concur, however, in the view that the right to counsel on appeal, whatever its pedigree, can be waived by unwitting defendants.

Whatever logic may be marshaled in support of the majority view, the majority seems to me to be inconsistent with our own cases: e.g., State v. Neely, 239 Or. 487, 395 P.2d 557, 398 P.2d 482 (1965). The majority concedes that its view is contrary to the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Doyle v. United States, 366 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1966).

I would prefer to hold uniformly in criminal cases that an unwitting waiver is not a waiver, and that a prisoner refused representation on appeal by retained counsel because the prisoner lacks funds is entitled to be told that he has a right to appeal at public expense. If an occasional retained counsel neglects to tell his client of his rights and thus imposes a burden on the courts, then it is a burden they ought to carry. It takes only a moment to ask a prisoner after sentence if his counsel has told him of his rights to an appeal. If not, the court can tell him that if he cannot afford an appeal he is entitled to one at public expense. Such advice may breed a...