Galdauckas v. Interstate Hotels Corp. No. 16

Citation901 F. Supp. 454
Decision Date18 September 1995
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 92-40057-NMG.
PartiesWanda B. GALDAUCKAS, Plaintiff, v. INTERSTATE HOTELS CORPORATION NO. 16, Vincent Dell'Olio, Collin Foran, Interstate Hotels Corporation No. 1007, and Marriott Hotel Corporation, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

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Wanda B. Galdauckas, Sutton, MA, pro se.

David R. Bohanan, Millbury, MA, for Wanda B. Galdauckas.

Louis M. Ciavarra, Bowditch & Dewey, Worcester, MA, Carol Chandler, Andrew L. Matz, Stoneman, Chandler & Miller, Boston, MA, Arch Y. Stokes, John R. Hunt, Cassandra Kirk, Stokes & Murphy, Atlanta, GA, for Vincent Dell'Olio, Collin Foran, Interstate Hotels Corp., Marriott Hotel Corp., Interstate Hotel No. 16.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GORTON, District Judge.

Pending before this Court are the motions of the defendants, Interstate Hotels Corporation No. 16 ("No. 16" or "the hotel"), Vincent Dell'Olio, Collin Foran, Interstate Hotels Corporation No. 1007 ("No. 1007"), and Marriott Hotel Corporation, now known as Marriott International Inc. ("Marriott Inc."), for summary judgment on the sixteen count complaint filed by the plaintiff, Wanda B. Galdauckas.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked as a waitress at the Worcester Marriott hotel restaurant, which is operated by No. 16, from 1981 until October 7, 1990. During that time she received sixteen written reprimands for infractions of the rules. In October, 1990, a fellow waitress, Grace Luongo, allegedly observed plaintiff taking money from a customer and giving him change. Luongo stated that plaintiff had not rung the transaction through the cash register and upon later investigation, plaintiff could not produce a register receipt. Plaintiff alleges that she allowed the customer to leave without paying because he did not have enough money. Later, a man paid $10 to the hotel's front desk, stating that it was for a meal he had ordered from plaintiff that day. Luongo testified that the man who paid the bill was not the same man she had seen that morning. After that incident, Galdauckas was placed on probation and was subsequently fired.

In her complaint, Galdauckas, who was 68 years old in 1990, alleges that she was fired because of her age. Galdauckas claims that the restaurant manager, Vincent Dell'Olio, continually harassed her about her age, encouraged other employees to make similar age-related comments (e.g. "You are a member of the Geritol Generation," "Wanda must have served the Last Supper"), and told her that she should retire. Galdauckas claims that defendants' story regarding this alleged theft or breach of billing policy, has been manufactured by the hotel as a pretext for their decision to fire her because of her age. In the sixteen count complaint, plaintiff charges that the defendants violated federal and state age discrimination laws, and also committed commonlaw torts.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment shall be rendered where the pleadings, discovery on file and affidavits, if any, show "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court views the entire record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the nonmoving party, and indulges all reasonable inferences in her favor. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.1993).

With respect to a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." FDIC v. Municipality of Ponce, 904 F.2d 740, 742 (1st Cir.1990), quoting, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant satisfies that burden, it shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of a genuine material issue. Id. In deciding whether a factual dispute is genuine, this Court must determine whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); accord Aponte-Santiago v. Lopez-Rivera, 957 F.2d 40, 41 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Anderson). The nonmovant's assertion of mere allegation or denial of the pleadings is insufficient on its own to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS BY NO. 1007 AND MARRIOTT INC.

Defendants No. 1007 and Marriott Inc. allege that they have no connection to the daily operation of the Worcester Marriott or to the events surrounding plaintiff's employment and discharge. Those defendants move for summary judgment on that ground.

A. Argument by No. 1007.

Affidavits submitted by this defendant state that No. 1007 is located in Pittsburgh, PA and was created in order to operate the Springfield Sheraton Hotel. No. 1007 claims that it holds no stock in No. 16. Plaintiff alleges that all of the offensive actions took place in the Worcester Marriott, and there is no indication that plaintiff ever had contact with the Springfield Sheraton Hotel or No. 1007. Consequently, No. 1007 contends that plaintiff was not its employee, and that it is not properly named as a defendant in this case.

Defendants also argue that even if there were a formal corporate connection between No. 1007 and No. 16, that would not make No. 1007 liable for actions occurring at the Worcester Marriott because there is no evidence that No. 1007 1) controlled the employment practices and decisions at No. 16, or 2) dominated No. 16's operations.

B. Argument by Marriott Inc.

Marriott Inc. contends that the only connection between itself and the Worcester Marriott is that the Worcester Marriott is licensed to use the "Marriott" trademark name and the Marriott Inc. reservation system. Marriott Inc. states that it is not involved with the day-to-day operation or management of the Worcester Marriott Hotel.

C. Discussion.

Because there is no evidence to indicate that No. 1007 and/or Marriott Inc. had any connection to the Worcester Marriott or the events complained of by the plaintiff, the summary judgment motions submitted by Interstate No. 1007 and Marriott Inc. will be allowed.

IV. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

Plaintiff asserts that the defendants have violated 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("the ADEA") (Count I), and M.G.L. c. 151B, the state anti-discrimination statute (Count II). In light of the recent decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Systems, 419 Mass. 437, 646 N.E.2d 111 (1995), the state and federal statutes differ, and these claims will therefore be considered separately.

A. Analysis for violation of the ADEA.

When the plaintiff in an action for age discrimination, in violation of the ADEA, produces no direct evidence of age discrimination, the case is governed by the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The analysis is as follows:

1) Plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of discrimination.
2) Defendant must rebut this prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision to discharge the plaintiff.
3) Plaintiff must show that the employer's proffered reason is actually a pretext for age discrimination.

Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir.1991).

B. Prima facie showing of discrimination.

In order to make a prima facie showing of discrimination in an age discrimination case, plaintiff must demonstrate that:

i) she was over the age of forty;
ii) her work was sufficient to meet her employer's legitimate expectations;
iii) her employer took adverse action against her; and
iv) the employer sought a replacement with roughly equivalent qualifications, thus revealing a continued need for the same services and skills.

If such points are shown, an inference arises that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff on account of her age. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823; Menzel v. Western Auto Supply Co., 848 F.2d 327, 328 (1st Cir.1988).

In this case, plaintiff alleges that she was sixty-eight years old at the time of her termination, that her performance was sufficient, that she was continually harassed and ultimately fired on account of her age, and that a new waitress was hired in her place. Because there is a factual dispute as to whether plaintiff's performance was sufficient, plaintiff presents a marginal, prima facie case.

C. Defendants' legitimate reason for the discharge.

Defendants are required to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. This is a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion. Here, the defendants contend that plaintiff was discharged because of an incident which, they assert, at worst involved theft, and at best involved fund mismanagement. As outlined above, plaintiff allowed a customer to leave the restaurant without paying for his meal. When questioned about this event by Dell'Olio, plaintiff was unable to produce a cash register receipt for the meal, and instead gave Dell'Olio a cash register check from the previous day. The hotel requires servers to turn in their checks at the end of the day, and plaintiff was unable to explain why she was in possession of the old check.

Plaintiff does not contest the fact that she allowed the customer to leave without paying, but offers an explanation for her actions. Plaintiff insists that she did not steal from the restaurant, nor did she attempt to steal. Plaintiff alleges that she allowed the customer to leave in order to obtain money with which to pay his bill, and that she acted in accordance with the hotel's policy of maximizing customer satisfaction and dealing thoughtfully with an awkward situation. The...

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