Tonneson v. Cambridge Coll.
| Decision Date | 29 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-12004-RWZ |
| Parties | JENNIFER TONNESON v. CAMBRIDGE COLLEGE and EILEEN BROWN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
ZOBEL, D.J.
Plaintiff Jennifer Tonneson brings this 15-count complaint against her former employer, Cambridge College and its former Acting President and Chancellor, Eileen Brown, for gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4, breach of contract, defamation, and several additional statutory violations and common law torts arising out of her termination. Defendants move to dismiss several counts of the complaint.
Tonneson was hired by Cambridge College in 2004 to be its Vice President of Finance & Administration. Each year she executed a one-year contract which set forth the terms of her employment. She was initially hired by then-President Mahesh Sharma, who was himself terminated after an investigation in 2008. Defendant Brown was then named Acting President. Tonneson's employment was terminated shortlythereafter.
She now contends that despite consistently receiving positive performance reviews, she was terminated without notice in breach of her employment contract, and that her termination was due to her allegations of improprieties regarding personal expenses defendant Brown charged to the College. Cambridge College insists that Tonneson was an at-will employee terminated in compliance with her employment contract due to performance issues.
Defendants move to dismiss Counts I-VI, IX-X, and XII-XIV.
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) requires the court to appraise the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery." Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At the same time, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 2008). Dismissal is only appropriate if the pleadings fail to support "'a plausible entitlement to relief.'" Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007)).
Several claims are based upon violations of Massachusetts law; thus the courtmust look to the constructions placed upon these statutes by Massachusetts courts. See Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 263 (1st Cir.1994), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
Defendants assert discrete grounds for dismissing each of the allegedly inadequate counts. I address each count in turn.
Plaintiff first claims that Cambridge College breached its employment contract with her when it terminated her without cause and without notice.
To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege "that there was a valid contract, that the defendant breached its duties under the contractual agreement, and that the breach caused the plaintiff damage." Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 351 (D. Mass. 2011) (citations omitted).
First, there is a dispute as to what constitutes the employment contract. No contract was attached to the complaint. Defendants point to a written letter agreement dated August 13, 2007, signed by both parties, which delineates the key parameters of Tonneson's employment. See Defs.' Mem. of Law in Support of their Mot. To Dismiss, Ex. A. Plaintiff, however, alleges the existence of a supplemental verbal agreement.
Although a court is ordinarily prohibited from looking beyond the four corners of a complaint when appraising its sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6), courts have long recognized "exceptions for documents the authenticity of which are [sic] not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs' claim; or fordocuments sufficiently referred to in the complaint." Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). In the absence of any written documentation provided by plaintiff, this court can consider the 2007 employment agreement.1
The 2007 employment agreement contains no provision requiring that termination be for cause. While it does contain a provision requiring 30 days' notice prior to termination, it also states that in lieu of providing such notice, the College may pay 30 days' additional salary, or severance.2 Defendants contend that plaintiff was paid 30 days' salary. Plaintiff appears to dispute this. See Compl. ¶¶ 50-51; 65-66; 90. In light of this dispute, dismissal of this claim is not warranted at this stage.
Plaintiff's claims of defamation focus on statements to various publications, including comments by defendants to the Boston Globe which appeared in an article published on July 14, 2008. She points to the statements by Brown that Tonneson "was associated with the defendant College's terminated President Mahesh Sharma"; "was no longer with the university"; that her departure was a "mutual decision" and that"the college had declined to grant [Tonneson] the severance package she requested."3 See Compl. ¶¶ 69-72.
Under Massachusetts law, a defamation claim has five elements: "(1) that the defendant published a written statement; (2) of and concerning the plaintiff; that was both (3) defamatory, and (4) false; and (5) either caused economic loss, or is actionable without proof of economic loss." Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 566 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Phelan v. May Dep't Store Co., 819 N.E. 2d 550, 553 (Mass. 2004).
Defendants concede making the comments at issue. Such comments, they assert, are, however, absolutely protected under two defenses: (1) they were truthful; and (2) the subject matter (misuse of funds) is a matter of public concern.
Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation action under Massachusetts law. See Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 47 N.E.2d 595, 598 (1943). Here, plaintiff does not argue that the allegedly defamatory statements were literally false. At the time the statements were made, she no longer worked at the College; it had declined to grant her the severance package she requested. Nor does she allege the remaining comments were false, only, at worst, misleading. Accordingly, the defamation claims may be dismissed.
Plaintiff's claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress appear to derive from defendants' hiring the Eagan Group, a private investigation firm, to investigate an anonymous newsletter circulated to members of the College community which criticized the administration. As part of the firm's investigation, several former FBI agents interviewed plaintiff, and 24 hours later, she was terminated without notice and without cause. Plaintiff contends that Brown's conduct was "extreme in degree and outrageous in character" and it resulted in "the intentional and reckless infliction of emotional distress." Compl. ¶ 103.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof of four elements under Massachusetts law: "(1) defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or reasonably should have known that emotional distress was likely to result from such conduct; (2) the conduct was "extreme and outrageous," "beyond all possible bounds of decency," and "utterly intolerable in a civilized community"; (3) the defendant's conduct proximately caused plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the distress was so "severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." Davignon v. Clemmey, 322 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
The intentional tort requires acts that are "extreme and outrageous," either reasonably viewed as an attempt to "shock and harm a person's peace of mind," or "if not individually such, are part of a pattern of harassment intended to accomplish the same end." Smith v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp.2d 155, 172 n.26 (D. Mass. 2010) (internal citations omitted). Here, plaintiff's allegations do not meet the high standard for "extreme and outrageous" behavior. At worst, plaintiff alleges that she was terminatedwithout cause in retaliation for her being a whistleblower, discriminated against on the basis of her gender, the subject of defamatory remarks, and questioned by an outside investigatory group. Even if true, such conduct is not "beyond all bounds of decency and ... utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress requires plaintiff to demonstrate: "(1) [defendant's] negligence; (2) [her] emotional distress; (3) causation; (4) objective evidence of physical manifestation of mental distress; and that (5) a reasonable person would have suffered emotional distress under the circumstances of the case." Baldwin v. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 529 F. Supp. 2d 204, 212 (D. Mass. 2008) (citing Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 414 Mass. 129, 132, 137-138, 605 N.E.2d 805 (1993)). Plaintiff has failed to allege any physical manifestation of mental distress. Accordingly, her claim is dismissed.
To make out her claim that Brown "willfully and intentionally" interfered with her advantageous and/or contractual relationship with the...
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