Gale v. Rittenhouse
Decision Date | 07 September 2004 |
Parties | Terry L. GALE, Appellant, v. Dorothy N. RITTENHOUSE, et al., Respondents. |
Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Gordon P. Heinson, Theresa A. Peterson, Fabyanske, Westra & Hart, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Robert C. Hoene, John P. Worrell, Hoene & Krause, St. Paul, MN, for respondents.
Considered and decided by WRIGHT, Presiding Judge; KALITOWSKI, Judge; and PARKER, Judge.
Appellant challenges the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to respondent on the basis that appellant lacked standing to bring the action in district court. We affirm.
SAM offered to purchase Gale's partnership interest, but Gale declined the offer and presented a counteroffer. The parties attempted unsuccessfully to reach an agreement in January 2003, well over 90 days after Gale's departure on August 10, 2002. But neither party initiated arbitration proceedings.
Gale filed a complaint alleging that (1) the partnership was dissolved in either 1997 or 2002 and (2) she is entitled to 50% interest in the partnership's assets. Rittenhouse filed a counterclaim alleging that Gale waived her right to arbitrate the fair market value of her interest in the partnership by filing a civil action in district court. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court concluded that Gale had not waived her right to arbitrate the fair market value of her partnership interest and granted summary judgment in favor of Gale on Rittenhouse's counterclaim. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Rittenhouse on Gale's complaint, concluding that Gale did not have standing to bring a district court action under the limited partnership agreement or the uniform limited partnership act. Gale now appeals.
Did Gale have standing to bring an action in district court under the limited partnership agreement or the uniform limited partnership act?
Gale asserts that she had standing to seek a declaratory judgment that the partnership was dissolved as a matter of law under section 322A.63 of the uniform limited partnership act and sections 13.6 and 14.1(02) of the limited partnership agreement. See Minn.Stat. § 322A.63 (2002). The district court, however, construed Gale's complaint as an action for judicial dissolution of the partnership under section 322A.64 (2002) and determined that because Gale was a removed partner she lacked standing to bring an action under the uniform limited partnership act. The district court further determined that "[t]he partnership agreement clearly provides that the purchase price of the removed partner's partnership interest shall be determined by arbitration."
Whether a party has standing to sue is a question of law, which appellate courts review de novo. Joel v. Wellman, 551 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Minn.App.1996),review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996). "Standing is the requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court." State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn.1996). "[A] party whose legitimate interest is `injured in fact' has standing unless the legislature has indicated that the interest asserted is not to be protected." Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn.1989) (quoting Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Minn. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 301 Minn. 28, 32, 221 N.W.2d 162, 165 (1974)). Pleadings are interpreted according to their plain meaning and the general rules of pleading. See Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn.2000).
In her complaint, Gale requests the district court to grant "a declaratory judgment determining that the Partnership must be dissolved, terminated and liquidated." This language is ambiguous as to whether Gale sought a judicial dissolution or a determination that a nonjudicial dissolution occurred under the uniform limited...
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