Galicich v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 February 1939
• Docket Number: 2080
• Citation: 54 Wyo. 123,87 P.2d 27
• Parties: GALICICH v. OREGON SHORT LINE R. CO. ET AL
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

87 P.2d 27

54 Wyo. 123

GALICICH v. OREGON SHORT LINE R. CO. ET AL

No. 2080

Supreme Court of Wyoming

February 14, 1939

APPEAL from the District Court, Sweetwater County; V. J. TIDBALL Judge.

Action by Joseph H. Galicich, administrator of the estate of Walter M. Middleton, deceased, against the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company and another, to recover for the death of plaintiff's deceased. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

For the plaintiff and appellant, there was a brief by Joseph H Galicich of Rock Springs, Wyoming, and Anderson, Bowen &amp Anderson of Pocatello, Idaho, and oral argument by Mr. Walter H. Anderson.

A railroad company, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act is liable for injury due in whole or in part to the negligence of it or its agents, servants, or employees. 45 U.S.C. A. Sec. 51. Southern Pacific Company v. Ralston, 67 F.2d 958. The defendant Oregon Short Line Railroad Company was under duty to have warned Middleton of the approach of the Bertagnolli car. Westover v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P. R. Company, 266 N.W. 741, 267 N.W. 427. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Company v. Boylen, 81 F.2d 91. Landry v. Great Northern Ry. Company, 140 N.W. 75. Gulf Refining Company v. Ferrell, 147 So. 476. Chatham v. Bryceland Lumber Company, 72 So. 704, 139 La. 969. McElroy v. Swenson Construction Co., 247 S.W. 209, 213 Mo.App. 160. Chicago & Erie Co. v. Steele, 118 N.E. 824. Buchanan & Gilder v. Murayda, 124 S.W. 973, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 473. Nordhaus v. Vandalia Ry. Co., 89 N.E. 974, 242 Ill. 166, 147 Ill.App. 274. Thom v. Northern Pacific Ry. Company, 252 N.W. 660. D'Agosta v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 72 N. J. L. 358, 60 A. 1113. Albanese v. Central Ry. Co. of N. J., 70 N. J. L. 241, 57 A. 447. Burns v. Merchants & Planters Oil Company, 63 S.W. 1061. Dunphy v. Boston Elevated R. Company, 192 Mass. 415, 78 N.E. 479. W. & A. Ry. Company v. Smith, 87 S.E. 1082. Cetofonte v. Camden Coke Company, 78 N. J. L. 662, 75 A. 913, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1058. Wormell v. Maine Central Ry. Company, 79 Me. 397, 10 A. 49, 1, A. S. R. 321, at p. 325. Hietala v. Boston & A. R. R., 3 N.E.2d 377, at p. 381. A warning to be adequate must be in time to be effective, as to warn too late is the same as not warning at all. Egerter v. Central Ry. Company of N. J., 80 N. J. L. 4, 77 A. 471. Raynor v. Trolan, 22 A.D. 107, 47 N.Y.S. 897. C. & O. Railway Company v. Richards, 126 S.W. 1105. Miss. Cotton Oil Company v. Ellis, 72 Miss. 191, 17 So. 214. 3 Labatt on Master and Servant, p. 2938. Hanley v. Boston & A. R. R. Company, 190 N.E. 501, 79 L.Ed. 690. The court cannot weigh evidence on motion for directed verdict. McCarty v. O. H. Yates & Company, 14 N.E.2d 254. Streeter v. Humrichouse, 257 Ill. 234, 191 N.E. 684. Hunter v. Johnson, 76 W.Va. 154, 85 S.E. 73. Maples v. Spencer, 97 S. Car. 331, 81 S.E. 483. 64 C. J. 298. Boles v. Quincy, etc. R. Company, 187 S.W. 131. 64 C. J. 303. Where the question depends on a state of facts from which different minds may honestly draw different conclusions on that issue, the question must be submitted to the jury for determination. Where facts are disputed, or inferences therefrom are reasonably disputable, the question is one for the jury. Peters v. Alexy, 157 A. 624 (Pa.) . Jester v. Phila., B. W. & R. Company, 109 A. 774, 267 Pa. 10. Slocum v. Erie Ry. Company, 47 F.2d 216. Claris v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 54 Ida. 568, 33 P.2d 348. B. & O. R. R. Company v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 45 S.Ct. 169, 69 L.Ed. 419. It is necessary that the trial judge be sure of the soundness of his position before granting a nonsuit. Engstrom v. Dewitt, 58 F.2d 137, 57 S.Ct. 116. Where an employee is assigned to a duty, the master must take precautions to prevent injury. Pittsburgh, etc., Company v. Bennett, 116 N.E. 582. 3 Elliott on Railroads, 2nd Ed., sec. 1298. It is for the jury to say whether or not a prudent employer would have given warning under the circumstances of this case. Geneva Mill Company v. Andrews, 11 F.2d 924. The negative evidence of the witness Bertagnolli that he saw no signals waving him down, and that he heard no warnings or signals, was sufficient to carry the case to the jury on the question of whether or not such signals were given. Raynor v. City of Arcata, 77 P.2d 1054 (Sup. Ct. of Calif., Apr. 1, 1938). Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 75 P.2d 599 (S. Ct. of Calif., Jan. 20, 1938). Thompson v. Los Angeles, etc., Ry. Company, 165 Cal. 748, 134 P. 709. 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd Ed., sec. 664. Cotton v. Willmore & Sioux Falls Ry. Co., 99 Minn. 366, 109 N.W. 835, 116 A. S. R. 422, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643, 9 Ann. Cas. 935. Hough v. Boston E. R. Co., 159 N.E. 526. Under the motion for a directed verdict the plaintiff was entitled to the most favorable consideration of the evidence, together with all inferences arising therefrom, and as to all adverse evidence, the plaintiff was entitled to have the court disregard the same. 64 C. J. 455, sec. 438. Lee v. Donnelly, 95 Vt. 121, 113 A. 542. Servel v. Corbett, 49 Ida. 536, 290 P. 200. Claris v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 54 Ida. 568, 33 P.2d 348. Barrow v. Keel, 196 S.E. 366. It is the court's duty to eliminate from consideration all facts and inferences in conflict with the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, leaving for consideration only that evidence and such inferences and considerations as might reasonably be drawn therefrom. 64 C. J. 455, outer right hand column, in notes. It makes no difference, insofar as the application of the last mentioned principle of law is concerned, that the motion is made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence. Jenkins & Reynolds Company v. Alpena Portland Cement Company, 147 F. 641, at p. 644, 77 C. C. A. 625. Failure to move for nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff's evidence inferentially admitted that a prima facie case had been made and that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause thereof. Williams v. Hample, 62 Mont. 594, 205 P. 829. Christie v. Randol, 225 Mo.App. 744, 38 S.W.2d 538. Harris v. Moreland Motor Truck Company, 279 F. 543. Chicago v. Fitzgerald, 75 Ill.App. 174. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. v. Kinnaire, 76 Ill.App. 394. Only matter that is redundant, irrelevant or scurrilous may, under the statutes of Wyoming, be stricken out. Wyoming Revised Statutes, 1931, 89-1033. There was no authority in law for the granting of the motion to strike out part of the first amended complaint. 49 C. J. p. 697 et seq. A motion to strike for frivolousness or irrelevancy is to be cautiously granted, and should be denied if there is any question as to the validity of the pleading. 49 C. J. p. 699. Where an allegation does no more than set forth the semblance of a cause of action, it cannot be stricken out for sham or frivolousness. McClung v. Watt, 190 Cal. 155, 211 P. 17, at top of p. 20, left hand column. 38 R. C. L. p. 597, sec. 144. No matter should be stricken out which upon any admissible theory is or might possibly become material to the cause of action. 49 C. J. 720. A frivolous pleading is one which, assuming the truth of its allegations, is so clearly and palpably bad as to require no argument to convince the court thereof, and which would be pronounced by the court indicative of bad faith in the pleader on a mere inspection. 49 C. J. 83. Irrelevant matter is that which has no connection with the cause of action. Platt v. Norman, 11 P.2d 801. Motions to strike out are not to be encouraged and should be granted only in clear cases where the moving party will otherwise be aggrieved. 49 C. J. 685. A motion to strike out, like a demurrer, admits the truth of all facts well pleaded for the purpose of the motion. 49 C. J. 686. An averment that the defendant negligently did an act carries with it the averment that he had, or was at fault in not having the knowledge which was necessary to make his act a negligent one. Pigeon v. W. P. Fuller Co., 105 P. 976, at bottom of page, right hand column 977, continuing on top of page 978, left hand column. L. E. & St. L. C. R. Co. v. Utz, 123 Ind. 265, 32 N.E. 881. Chicago B. & Q. R. Company v. Kellogg, 55 Neb. 748, 76 N.W. 462, at page 463, left hand column. A general allegation of knowledge of misconduct is sufficient. Sooy v. State, 39 N. J. L. 135, at bottom of p. 149. Cetofonte v. Camden Coke Co., 75 A. 913, 27 L. R. A. N. S. 1058. Wabash W. R. Company v. Morgan, 132 Ind. 430, 31 N.E. 661. Randall v. City of Hoquiam, 70 P. 1111. Louisville, E. & St. L. Consol. R. Company v. Miller, 140 Ind. 685, 40 N.E. 116. Miller v. Itasca Cotton Seed Co., 41 S.W. 366.

For the defendants and respondents there was a brief by John U. Loomis of Cheyenne and T. S. Taliaferro, Jr., and Arthur L. Taliaferro of Rock Springs, and oral arguments by Mr. Loomis and Mr. Taliaferro, Jr.

The action is covered by the Federal Employees Liability Act C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44, 46. There is no duty upon the employer to warn unless the situation is such as to suggest to a reasonably prudent employer the necessity therefor. Tesch v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (Wis.) 195 N.W. 317, 319. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Hackney (Ala.) 115 So. 869, 873. Trombley v. Hood & Sons (N. H.) 146 A. 815, 816. Linville v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (W. Va.) 177 S.E. 538, 539. 18 R. C. L. 547, Section 62. Moore v. Elkhorn Etc. Co. (Ky. App.) 194 S.W. 340, 342. Stone v. Bennett (Mich.) 160 N.W. 645, 648. Torgerson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. (N. D.) 194 N.W. 741, 743. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wyer (C. C. A. 8) 8 F.2d 30, 31. Ball v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Wash. ) 173 P. 1029, 1031. The Master may assume that third persons will act with due care. He need not anticipate negligent acts by such persons or take Action to guard his employes against such negligence. Labatt's Master & Servant...