Galindo v. Valley View Ass'n

• Decision Date: 01 June 2017
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 16CA1005
• Citation: 399 P.3d 796
• Parties: Erika GALINDO, individually and as parent, guardian, and next friend of Ariana Guadalupe Galindo, a minor child; and Jose Galindo, individually and as parent, guardian, and next friend of Ariana Guadalupe Galindo, a minor child, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VALLEY VIEW ASSOCIATION, d/b/a/ Valley View Hospital, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

399 P.3d 796

Erika GALINDO, individually and as parent, guardian, and next friend of Ariana Guadalupe Galindo, a minor child; and Jose Galindo, individually and as parent, guardian, and next friend of Ariana Guadalupe Galindo, a minor child, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.VALLEY VIEW ASSOCIATION, d/b/a/ Valley View Hospital, Defendant-Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. 16CA1005

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.

Announced June 1, 2017

Law Office of Stan Epshtein, Stan Epshtein, John Bellinger, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Jaudon & Avery LLP, David H. Yun, Jared R. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

The Law Office of Natalie L. Decker, LLC, Natalie L. Decker, Littleton, Colorado; Michael J. Norton, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Family Action

Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Erika and Jose Galindo, are the parents of Ariana Guadalupe Galindo, who died in utero. They have brought claims against Valley View Association, doing business as Valley View Hospital (the hospital), seeking damages on behalf of themselves and Ariana's estate. They allege that medical personnel at the hospital acted negligently in diagnosing and treating Mrs. Galindo when she went to the hospital showing signs of a ruptured placenta. They further assert that as a result of that negligence, Ariana died and they were injured.

¶ 2 The district court dismissed the claims plaintiffs assert based on Ariana's death and sua sponte certified its order as final under C.R.C.P. 54(b). Because we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that there was no just reason to delay an appeal of its order, we dismiss the appeal.

I. Additional Background

¶ 3 Plaintiffs' complaint asserts causes of action against the hospital for negligence on behalf of Mr. Galindo, Mrs. Galindo, and Ariana (or her estate); negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of Mrs. Galindo; loss of consortium on behalf of Mr. Galindo; and wrongful death on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Galindo. It also asserts that damages can be awarded for Ariana's pre-death injuries under the survival statute, section 13-20-101, C.R.S. 2016.¹

¶ 4 Shortly before trial, the district court ordered the parties to brief the issue whether an unborn fetus (who was not subsequently born alive) is a "person" within the meaning of the wrongful death and survival statutes. (The wrongful death statute, section 13-21-202, C.R.S. 2016, and the survival statute apply in the event of the "death of a person.")²

¶ 5 The court postponed the trial. After considering the parties' briefs, the court ruled that Ariana was not a "person" within the meaning of the statutes, and it dismissed the wrongful death claim and the negligence claim brought on behalf of Ariana's estate.³

At the end of the order, the court wrote: "There being no just reason for delay, final judgment is hereby entered in favor of [the hospital] and against the Plaintiffs on both claims pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b)." The court didn't explain why there was no just reason for delay.

¶ 6 Plaintiffs appealed the order. After the appeal was fully briefed, the clerk assigned the case to this division. The division then ordered the parties to brief the issue whether the district court had properly certified the order as final under Rule 54(b), directing them specifically to explain why there was no just reason to delay an appeal until the entire case has been resolved, and, even more specifically, to explain what hardship or injustice would result to any party if the appeal is not allowed to proceed. See Allison v. Engel , 2017 COA 43, ¶ 1, 395 P.3d 1217 (to show that there is no just reason for delay, it must appear that "a party would experience some hardship or injustice through delay that could be alleviated only by an immediate appeal"). Having considered the parties' supplemental briefs and the record, we conclude that the district court's conclusory ruling that there is no just reason for delay is unsupported by the record or law.

II. The Requirements of Rule 54(b)

¶ 7 Rule 54(b) creates an exception to the rule that an appellate court has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments. Harding Glass Co. v. Jones , 640 P.2d 1123, 1125, 1126 (Colo.1982). But that exception is quite limited, and it must be construed consistently with the historical policy against allowing piecemeal appeals. Allison , ¶ 31.

¶ 8 A court correctly certifies a ruling as final under the rule only if (1) it is on an entire claim for relief; (2) it ultimately disposes of the claim; and (3) the court determines expressly that there is no just reason to delay an appeal on the ruling. Lytle v. Kite , 728 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo.1986) ; Harding Glass , 640 P.2d at 1125 ; Allison , ¶ 24.

¶ 9 In this case, we assume that the ruling satisfies the first two parts of this test.⁴ We focus on part three.

III. Standard of Review—No Just Reason for Delay

¶ 10 Ordinarily, we review a district court's determination that there is no just reason for delay for an abuse of discretion. Lytle , 728 P.2d at 308, 309 ; Allison , ¶ 25. We do so because determining whether there is no just reason for delay requires considering interests of judicial administration and equitable factors, see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 446 U.S. 1, 8, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) ; Lytle , 728 P.2d at 309, and "the district court is ‘most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay.’ " Allison , ¶ 25 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey , 351 U.S. 427, 437, 76 S.Ct. 895, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956) ).⁵

¶ 11 Our deference to the district court's determination therefore depends on whether we know the court's reasons, so it's important that the court not merely parrot the language of the rule ("no just reason for delay"), but clearly explain its reasoning. Still, we do not say that a court's failure to do that is some sort of jurisdictional defect. It isn't. But unless the court explains its reasoning, or the reasons are otherwise obvious from the record, "any deference we might otherwise accord the 54(b) certification decision will be nullified." Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ. , 114 F.3d 162, 166 (11th Cir.1997) ; accord, e.g. , Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc. , 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir.1993) ; Consol. Rail Corp. v. Fore River Ry. Co. , 861 F.2d 322, 325-26 (1st Cir.1988) ; Solomon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. , 782 F.2d 58, 61 (6th Cir.1986) ; see also 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 54.23 [2], at 54-68 to 54-69 (3d ed. 2015); 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2659, at 140-44 (4th ed. 2014).⁶

¶ 12 In this case, the district court didn't give any explanation as to why it was certifying the ruling, much less any explanation as to why there was no just reason for delay. The record doesn't otherwise reveal some obvious explanation.⁷ Thus, we will carefully scrutinize the district court's decision without according it deference.

IV. Analysis—No Just Reason for Delay

¶ 13 The hospital concedes that the district court improperly certified the ruling. It gleans from the court's ruling and the court's decision to stay the proceedings pending this appeal that the court sought to avoid multiple trials, and it recognizes that Allison holds that that reason is "plainly insufficient to justify certification because the same could be said about any case involving multiple claims or parties as to which a dispositive ruling is entered on one claim, or as to one party, before trial." Allison , ¶ 40.

¶ 14 Plaintiffs, however, try to justify the court's certification in four ways.

¶ 15 First, they argue that unlike the situation in Harding Glass , the claims the court dismissed in this case are "entire stand-alone claims." But that goes mainly to the first two parts of the Rule 54(b) certification test, not the issue whether there is no just reason for delay.⁸

¶ 16 Second, and similarly, plaintiffs argue that this case is not like Allison , where the court had dismissed one counterclaim while various claims and counterclaims remained pending. That's true, but the difference is merely one of degree, not kind. That this case involves dismissal of a greater percentage of claims says nothing about whether there is no just reason for delay, or even more specifically about whether any party will suffer hardship or injustice unless this appeal proceeds.

¶ 17 Third, plaintiffs assert that this appeal involves "an issue of first impression" that we "will inevitably have to address." Many cases, however, involve issues of first impression. Plaintiffs haven't cited any authority for the proposition that the presence of such an issue justifies Rule 54(b) certification, and we haven't found any. See Braswell Shipyards , 2 F.3d at 1336 (deeming that reason insufficient and dismissing the appeal).⁹ And as for whether we will "inevitably" have to address the issue, again the same could be said about issues in most any multiple-claim or multiple-party case.

¶ 18 Moreover, the assumption that we will have to decide the "person" issue at some point in this case may prove incorrect. If a fact finder determines that the hospital wasn't negligent, and that finding is affirmed on appeal, that would be an independent basis for affirming the judgment on the wrongful death claim and the negligence claim brought on behalf of Ariana's estate pursuant to the survival statute. Because all of the claims are premised on exactly the same allegations of negligence, the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion would thus bar relitigation of the matter of the hospital's negligence, even if we decided the "person" issue differently. See Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. , 109 P.3d 604, 608 (Colo.2005) (claim preclusion); Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox & O'Brien, P.C. , 990 P.2d 78, 84-85 (Colo.1999) (issue preclusion).¹⁰ In any event, the fact that we may be called...