Gall v. Steele

Decision Date22 May 2018
Docket NumberNo. SC 96188,SC 96188
Citation547 S.W.3d 564
Parties Susan GALL, et al., Respondents, v. Russell E. STEELE, Appellant, Kristie H. Swaim, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

The presiding judge was represented by State Solicitor D. John Sauer and Charles W. Adamson of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.

The associate circuit judge was represented by Katherine S. Walsh of the attorney general’s office in St. Louis.

The circuit clerk and deputy clerk were represented by Robert Herman of Schwartz, Herman & Davidson in St. Louis, (314) 862-0200.

Paul C. Wilson, Judge

Susan Gall ("Gall") and Linda Decker ("Decker" and, with Gall, "Plaintiffs") brought a declaratory judgment action against Judge Russell E. Steele ("Judge Steele") and Judge Kristie Swaim ("Judge Swaim") challenging two amendments to a consolidation agreement the parties entered into in 2008. Plaintiffs alleged these amendments usurped Decker’s statutory appointing authority to hire and fire deputy clerks pursuant to section 483.245.2.1 The circuit court entered summary judgment invalidating the two amendments and holding Decker has sole appointing authority over deputy clerks in the Second Judicial Circuit. Judge Steele appeals,2 and this Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 10, of the Missouri constitution.

This Court holds Decker voluntarily subjected her statutory appointing authority to the terms of the consolidation agreement she entered into in 2008. Part of that agreement provided that all disputes would be submitted for resolution to the Second Judicial Circuit en banc. When a dispute arose concerning Decker’s appointing authority, the circuit court, en banc , resolved that dispute by modifying the 2008 consolidation agreement to vest appointing authority in Judge Steele (the "May 2013 amendment") and, by later modification, in Judge Swaim (the "April 2014 amendment"). Accordingly, the circuit court’s judgment that these two amendments are invalid is reversed and, under Rule 84.14, judgment is hereby entered for Judge Steele.

Background

Judge Steele is the presiding judge of the Second Judicial Circuit, which includes Adair, Knox, and Lewis counties. Judge Swaim is an associate circuit judge in Adair County. Decker has served as Adair County’s elected circuit clerk since 1991. Gall was employed as a deputy circuit clerk in Adair County.

In March 2008, Judge Steele, Judge Swaim, and Decker entered into an agreement consolidating the Adair County circuit court’s clerical functions (the "2008 consolidation agreement"). The 2008 consolidation agreement stated, "All clerical functions performed by the Associate Division and the Probate Division Clerks for whom the Associate Circuit Judge has been the appointing authority shall be consolidated into the office of the Adair County Circuit Clerk." The 2008 consolidation agreement designated Decker as the sole appointing authority for all deputy circuit clerks and division clerks and provided she would have sole authority and discretion to hire, discipline, discharge, or terminate such clerks. It also specifically provided that "[a]ny disputes" between the parties concerning the 2008 agreement or any matter covered by that agreement would be "submitted to the Judges of the Second Judicial Circuit Court en banc for consideration and resolution upon majority vote."

In 2013, a dispute arose as to whether Decker should continue to exercise authority under the 2008 agreement. On May 2, 2013, after receiving the votes of a majority of the circuit court en banc to do so, Judge Steele signed an administrative order amending the 2008 consolidation agreement. The May 2013 amendment designated the presiding judge of the Second Judicial Circuit as the appointing authority for all deputy and division clerks and gave the presiding judge sole authority and discretion to hire, discipline, discharge, or terminate such clerks.

In August 2013, Judge Steele notified Gall she was being terminated from her employment as deputy clerk and suspended her without pay. Gall requested a pre-termination hearing with Decker, whom Gall believed was her proper appointing authority. Decker held the hearing and reversed Judge Steele’s decision to terminate Gall’s employment. Judge Steele countermanded Decker’s reinstatement decision and issued Gall a letter terminating her employment in November 2013.

In 2014, a dispute arose as to whether Judge Steele should continue to exercise authority under the May 2013 amendment to the 2008 agreement. On April 1, 2014, the Second Judicial Circuit met en banc , with Decker in attendance, and approved an administrative order amending the 2008 consolidation agreement again. The April 2014 amendment designated Judge Swaim as the sole appointing authority for all deputy and division clerks and gave her sole authority and discretion to hire, discipline, discharge, or terminate such clerks.

Gall filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit against Judge Steele and Judge Swaim in federal district court, alleging her procedural due process rights were violated because only the elected circuit clerk—not the presiding judge—had the authority to terminate her employment. Judge Steele and Judge Swaim filed motions to dismiss. The federal district court held Gall’s case raised a controlling question of Missouri law that was unclear and issued a stay giving the parties an opportunity to seek resolution of the state-law issues by a Missouri court.

In March 2015, Plaintiffs filed a two-count declaratory judgment action in Adair County.3 Count I challenged the validity of the May 2013 and April 2014 amendments. In Count I, Plaintiffs alleged the May 2013 and April 2014 amendments are unlawful because they are inconsistent with Missouri Constitution article V, section 15.4 and section 483.245.2 and because they violate separation of powers. Count II challenged only the May 2013 amendment, claiming it was void under Missouri’s sunshine law. Plaintiffs later dismissed count II without prejudice.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court entered judgment for Plaintiffs that Decker, as the duly elected circuit clerk, was the proper appointing authority for deputy clerks pursuant to section 483.245.2. The circuit court held the May 2013 amendment was invalid because "first, the attempt [to modify the 2008 agreement] was procedurally defective; and second, even if it was procedurally proper, Judge Steele had no right to unilaterally take away the Clerk’s statutorily granted appointing authority without her consent." The circuit court further held the 2014 amendment was invalid because Decker’s appointing authority over deputy clerks was established in section 483.245.2. Because this Court holds the circuit court erred as a matter of law in reaching both conclusions, the judgment is reversed.4

Analysis

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993) ; Rule 74.04. "Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Strake v. Robinwood W. Cmty. Improvement Dist. , 473 S.W.3d 642, 644 (Mo. banc 2015).

The central question in this case is whether the May 2013 amendment to the 2008 consolidation agreement giving Judge Steele appointing authority (which he subsequently used to terminate Gall) is valid. The circuit court found the May 2013 amendment was invalid because Judge Steele solicited votes from the Second Judicial Circuit en banc by e-mail rather than holding an in-person meeting. This Court disagrees.

By its plain and unambiguous terms, the 2008 agreement provides that "[a]ny disputes" between the parties concerning the 2008 agreement would be "submitted to the Judges of the Second Judicial Circuit Court en banc for consideration and resolution upon majority vote." The agreement does not specify how such disputes shall be "submitted," nor does it preclude the manner employed by Judge Steele in 2013.

"En banc " is defined as "in full court; with full judicial authority." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 745 (2002). It is undisputed Judge Steele sent an e-mail to Decker and all of the judges of the Second Judicial Circuit. This e-mail explained that a dispute had arisen under the 2008 agreement regarding whether appointing authority should be transferred from Decker to the presiding judge. Judge Steele indicated both he and Decker had signed an order amending the 2008 consolidation agreement to transfer appointing authority from Decker to Judge Steele, but Judge Swaim had declined to do so. Judge Steele attached to his e-mail the order amending the 2008 consolidation agreement. The two judges in the Second Judicial Circuit other than Judge Steele and Judge Swaim responded and confirmed their vote to adopt the May 2013 amendment. Accordingly, the May 2013 amendment is valid because Judge Steele submitted the dispute to the entire court en banc by e-mail and a majority of the members approved that amendment in accordance with the 2008 consolidation agreement’s provisions.

The circuit court also erred in declaring the May 2013 and April 2014 amendments invalid because they conflict with section 483.245.2. There is no need to address the circuit court’s precise holding, i.e., that "Judge Steele had no right to unilaterally take away the Clerk’s statutorily granted appointing authority without her consent," because that holding is based on two plainly incorrect premises. First, Judge Steele did not take away Decker’s appointing authority "unilaterally." Instead, a majority of the judges of the Second Judicial Circuit did so. Second, the circuit court en banc did not act without Decker’s "consent." Instead, it acted pursuant to the terms of the 2008 consolidation agreement into which Decker voluntarily entered.

By joining the 2008 agreement, Decker broadened her...

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  • Messina v. Shelter Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 8 Octubre 2019
    ...(citing Rule 74.04(c)(6); internal quotation marks omitted). "This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. " Gall v. Steele , 547 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Mo. 2018) (citing ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. 1993) ). On appeal, "[w]e will ......
  • Davis v. Walgreen Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 23 Abril 2019
    ...to judgment as a matter of law." Strake v. Robinwood W. Cmty. Improvement Dist. , 473 S.W.3d 642, 644 (Mo. banc 2015). Gall v. Steele , 547 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Mo. 2018).A defending party can demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment by showing: (1) facts negating any of the claimant’s neces......
  • Folsom v. Mo. State Highway Patrol
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 20 Agosto 2019
    ...court granted the motion. Folsom appeals.Standard of Review"This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. " Gall v. Steele , 547 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Mo. 2018) (citing ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. 1993) ). "Summary judgment shall ......

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