Gallagher v. Astrue, 02: 11-cv-1118
| Decision Date | 20 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | 02: 11-cv-1118 |
| Parties | ROBERT GALLAGHER, Plaintiff v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff, Robert Gallagher, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), for judicial review of the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") which denied his application for supplemental security income ("SSI") and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under titles XVI and II of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-403; 1381-1383(f).
Plaintiff was born on September 12, 1966 (R. 17, 60). He received his GED and briefly attended college (R. 60). Plaintiff has past relevant work experience in several occupations, including manager/assistant manager, parcel sorter, and stock person (R. 17, 86).
Plaintiff alleges disability as of October 15, 2008 due to bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, panic disorder, left knee problem, and asthma (R. 11, 122, 130, 150-151). Therecord reflects that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since having alleged disability in October, 2008 (R. 13).
Plaintiff initially filed an application for SSI/DIB on December 11, 2008 in which he claimed total disability beginning October 15, 2008. An administrative hearing was held on July 1, 2010 before Administrative Law Judge Guy Koster ("ALJ") (R. 56). Plaintiff was represented by Barbara S. Manna, a non-attorney Claimant Disability Representative, and testified at the hearing (R. 56-89). Charles M. Cohen, Ph.D, an impartial vocational expert, also testified at the hearing (R. 85-89).
On September 29, 2010 the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision to Plaintiff in which he found that Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments including bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, anxiety disorder, asthma, hypertension, and alcohol dependence in remission since July 20, 2009 (R. 14). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's asthma and hypertension were well-controlled with medication, and his mental impairments were "integrally related to the [Plaintiff's] long history of alcohol dependence" (R. 14). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's impairments (1) did not meet or equal one of the listed impairments as defined in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, and (2) while Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to return to his previous relevant work, he retained the ability to perform a wide range of medium (packing), light (inspector), or sedentary (assembler) activity, and therefore was not "disabled" within the meaning of the Act (R. 14, 17-18).
The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on June 30, 2011 when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review the decision of the ALJ.
On August 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court in which he seeks judicial review of the decision of the ALJ. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in (1) failing to properly weigh Plaintiff's mental health symptoms and incorporate Plaintiff's limitations in determining his RFC as required by SSR 96-8p and SSR 85-15, and (2) failing to give "consideration," "deference," or "appropriate" weight to a Mental RFC Questionnaire completed by Plaintiff's current therapist. See Pl's Br. at 4-7. Plaintiff requests that the decision of the ALJ be reversed and that he be awarded DIB and SSI benefits or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded to the Commissioner. Pl's Br. at 7. The Commissioner contends that the decision of the ALJ should be affirmed as it is supported by substantial evidence.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff and will therefore grant in part the motion for summary judgment filed by the Plaintiff, deny the motion for summary judgment filed by the Commissioner, and remand the case for further proceedings.
The Act limits judicial review of disability claims to the Commissioner's final decision. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). If the Commissioner's finding is supported by substantial evidence, it is conclusive and must be affirmed by the Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). The United States Supreme Court has defined "substantial evidence" as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Capato v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 628 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). It consists of more than a scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance. Thomas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 625 F.3d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 2010).
In situations where a claimant files concurrent applications for SSI and DIB, courts have consistently addressed the issue of a claimant's disability in terms of meeting a single disability standard under the Act. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 119 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002) ( ); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 525 n. 3 (1990) (); Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2000) ().
When resolving the issue of whether an adult claimant is or is not disabled, the Commissioner utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1995). This process requires the Commissioner to consider, in sequence, whether a claimant (1) is working, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment, (4) can return to his or her past relevant work, and (5) ifnot, whether he or she can perform other work. See id.; Newell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 545-46 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 118-19 (3d Cir. 2000)).
To qualify for disability benefits under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate that there is some "medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a statutory twelve-month period." Fargnoli v. Halter, 247 F.2d 34, 38-39 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1) (1982). This may be done in two ways:
(1) by introducing medical evidence that the claimant is disabled per se because he or she suffers from one or more of a number of serious impairments delineated in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460 (1983); Newell, 347 F.3d at 545-46; Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004); or,
(2) in the event that claimant suffers from a less severe impairment, by demonstrating that he or she is nevertheless unable to engage in "any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy . . . ." Campbell, 461 U.S. at 461 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(A)).
In order to prove disability under the second method, a claimant must first demonstrate the existence of a medically determinable disability that precludes plaintiff from returning to his or her former job. Newell, 347 F.3d at 545-46; Jones, 364 F.3d at 503. Once it is shown that claimant is unable to resume his or her previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that, given claimant's mental or physical limitations, age, educationand work experience, he or she is able to perform substantial gainful activity in jobs available in the national economy. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 551; Newell, 347 F.3d at 546; Jones, 364 F.3d at 503; Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2002).
When a claimant has multiple impairments which may not individually reach the level of severity necessary to qualify any one impairment for Listed Impairment status, the Commissioner nevertheless must consider all of the impairments in combination to determine whether, collectively, they meet or equal the severity of a Listed Impairment. Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.2d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 2010); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C) ().
In this case, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act at the fifth and final step of the sequential evaluation process. In making this determination, the ALJ first determined that prior to Plaintiff having successfully refrained from using alcohol on July 20, 2009, his alcohol dependence was material to the issue of disability1 (R. 14). Second, after Plaintiff effectively stopped his use of alcohol on July 20,2009, the ALJ determined that he retained the RFC to perform a significant number of medium, light, or sedentary jobs in the national economy with restrictions to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat/cold/wetness and humidity as well as dust, fumes, odors, gasses and poor ventilation, and to perform only simple, routine, repetitive tasks, with little or no changes in the work setting, and only occasional contact with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors (R. 16).
As set forth in the Act and applicable case law, this Court may not undertake a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied...
To continue reading
Request your trial