Jones v. Barnhart

• Citation: 364 F.3d 501
• Decision Date: 14 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-1661.,03-1661.
• Parties: Tie`Ease L. JONES, Appellant v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

364 F.3d 501

Tie`Ease L. JONES, Appellant v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security.

No. 03-1661.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 23, 2004.

Filed April 14, 2004.

Zenford A. Mitchell, Pittsburgh, for Appellant.

Shawn C. Carver, Social Security Administration, SSA/OGC/Region III, Philadelphia, for Appellee.

Before ALITO, CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges, and DEBEVOISE,^* Senior District Court Judge.

CHERTOFF, Circuit Judge.

Tie'Ease L. Jones appeals from the District Court's judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. Jones challenges the ALJ's determination at steps three and five of the five-step evaluation process promulgated by the Social Security Administration to determine whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step three, the ALJ concluded that Jones's signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings did not meet or equal the criteria established for a listed impairment. At step five, the ALJ concluded the Commissioner had met its burden of establishing Jones's capacity for other work, given her impairments, pain, functional restrictions, age, education, and work experience. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the District Court's judgment.

I.

Jones was born on September 3, 1969. She has an eleventh grade education and past work experience as a nursing assistant and telemarketer. Jones filed for disability benefits on or about September 17, 1997, alleging disability due to asthma and hives.¹ Jones's application for disability insurance benefits was denied both initially and upon reconsideration. After conducting a hearing, on January 27, 1999, the ALJ rendered a decision concluding that Jones was not entitled to benefits. On October 2, 2001, the Appeals Council denied Jones's request to review the ALJ's decision.

Subsequently, Jones sought judicial review of the adverse decision, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. On January 6, 2003, the Honorable Alan N. Bloch granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment and denied Jones's cross-motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

II.

The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and appellate jurisdiction is vested in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The role of this Court is identical to that of the District Court; we must determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir.1999). Substantial evidence means" `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Jesurum v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)). "It is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla." Id. Overall, the substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review. Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir.1999).

The Social Security Administration has promulgated a five-step evaluation process to determine whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see generally Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. In step one, the Commissioner decides whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). In step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment. If the impairment is not "severe," the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). In step three, the Commissioner evaluates whether the evidence establishes that the claimant suffers from a listed impairment. If so, the claimant is automatically eligible for benefits. If the claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, however, the Commissioner proceeds to the next step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). In step four, the Commissioner reviews whether the claimant retains the "residual functional capacity" to perform his past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Finally, in step five the Commissioner considers whether work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform given his medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and "residual functional capacity." If so, the claimant is not eligible for benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). In this final step, "the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner, who must demonstrate the claimant is capable of performing other available work in order to deny a claim of disability." Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428.

The issues on appeal arise from the ALJ's determinations at steps three and five.

III.

Jones argues that the ALJ erred in step three in failing to find she was per se disabled under Listing 3.02(A). The ALJ concluded that, under step two, Jones had a severe impairment based on medical findings of chronic urticaria, asthma, chronic obstructive and restrictive lung disease, and anxiety and depression. At step three, however, the ALJ determined that after "carefully compar[ing] the claimant's signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings with the criteria specified in all of the Listings of Impairments," "the claimant's impairments do not meet or equal the criteria established for an impairment shown in the Listings." Administrative Transcript ("Tr.") at 13.

Listing 3.02 provides: "Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, due to any cause, with the FEV₁ equal to or less than the values specified in table I corresponding to the person's height without shoes." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 3.02(A). Jones's height of 69 inches corresponds to an FEV₁ value of 1.45 or less. Id. In support of her claim of disability, Jones points to February 16, 1998 test results indicating FEV₁ values of .99, 1.04, and 1.11. Tr. at 137. This Court, however, concludes that the test results alone are insufficient to support a claim of disability; rather, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that Jones did not suffer from a listed impairment.

The introductory note to the regulations governing listed respiratory impairments explains that an FEV value should not be analyzed in isolation from other evidence in assessing whether the claimant satisfies the criteria for the listed impairment:

The listings in this section describe impairments resulting from respiratory disorders based on symptoms, physical signs, laboratory test abnormalities, and response to a regimen of treatment prescribed by a treating source.

. . . .

... Because th[e] symptoms [attributable to these disorders] are common to many other diseases, a thorough medical history, physical examination, and chest x-ray or other appropriate imaging techniques are required to establish pulmonary disease. Pulmonary function testing is required to assess the severity of the respiratory impairment once a disease process is established by appropriate clinical and laboratory findings.

. . . .

Respiratory impairments usually can be evaluated under these listings on the basis of a complete medical history, physical examination, a chest x-ray or other appropriate imaging techniques, and spirometric pulmonary function tests.

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 3.00 (emphasis added). "For a claimant to show his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify." Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990) (emphasis in original).

In this case, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that Jones's impairments do not meet or equal the criteria established in Listing 3.02(A). As the District Court noted, the record includes various physician treatment notes indicating that Jones's lungs were "clear," her chest x-rays were normal, she had normal breath sounds, there was "little objective evidence of abnormality on physical examination," and that she had only "mild" bronchial asthma.²

To be sure, in Burnett v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration we required "the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his decision," and held that the ALJ's bare conclusory statement that an impairment did not match, or is not equivalent to, a listed impairment was insufficient. 220 F.3d 112, 119-20 (3d Cir.2000). Here, Jones does not specifically challenge the ALJ's ruling on the grounds that it fails the Burnett standard. Rather, Jones's only reference to Burnett appears in a long list of citations in support of the general proposition that "the ALJ must analyze all the evidence in the record and provide an adequate explanation for disregarding evidence." (Appellant Br. at 9) (emphasis in original). In any event, the ALJ's step three analysis in this case satisfies Burnett. Burnett does not require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis. Rather, the function of Burnett is to ensure that there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review. See id. at 120. In this case, the ALJ's decision, read as a whole, illustrates that the ALJ considered the appropriate factors in reaching the conclusion that Jones did not meet the requirements for any listing, including Listing 3.02(A). The ALJ's opinion discusses the evidence pertaining to chronic obstructive and restrictive lung disease, specifically referencing "[p]ulmonary function studies ... consistent with moderately severe obstructive and restrictive defects," but pointing to the lack of...