Gallagher v. Eat to the Beat, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 August 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 19-3091 (ABJ)
• Citation: 480 F.Supp.3d 79
• Parties: Margaret GALLAGHER, Plaintiff, v. EAT TO THE BEAT, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

480 F.Supp.3d 79

Margaret GALLAGHER, Plaintiff,

v.EAT TO THE BEAT, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-3091 (ABJ)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed August 4, 2020

Jonathan Philip Tucker, Justin Derek Zelikovitz, Dcwage Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Ryan Laurence Jones, Ryan L. Jones Law, LLC, Washington, DC, Sheridan Leigh England, S.L. England PLLC, Alexandria, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge On October 10, 2019, plaintiff Margaret Gallagher brought this action against defendants Eat to the Beat, Inc. and Global Infusion Group, Inc. alleging that they failed to provide her with sick leave and pay her overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. , and other District of Columbia laws. Compl. [Dkt. # 1] ¶¶ 1–2.

Pending before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 11] ("Defs.’ Mot."). Defendants contend that plaintiff is not their employee, as that term is defined under FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), and thus the Court lacks jurisdiction over the complaint. Id. Plaintiff opposed the motion. Pl.’s Opp. to Second Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 13] ("Pl.’s Opp.").

The Court finds that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the FLSA claim, and that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged in her complaint that she was defendants’ employee. Therefore, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Defendants manage events all over the world, including at The Anthem, a music venue located in the waterfront area of Southwest Washington, D.C. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Their "core business" is to provide catering and event planning services to various venues. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges that she worked exclusively for defendants from October 10, 2017 to approximately June 6, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 18, 27. While she was there, she had two job titles: "operations manager" and "assistant operations manager." Id. ¶ 23. Her duties were not structured around any one event or concert, id. ¶ 25, but they included:

i. reviewing, inspecting, and cleaning the kitchen and concessions stations in order to ensure sanitary standards;

ii. performing food preparation, such as chopping onions, defrosting hotdogs and sausages, baking pretzels, cookies, and brownies, heating sauces, creating cheese and meat platters;

iii. interviewing and hiring new employees on behalf of [d]efendants;

iv. training [d]efendants’ employees;

v. setting up furniture, props, decorations, flowers, linens, and other accommodations for concerts, artist catering, concessions, "VIP Box Hospitality," and corporate events;

vi. maintaining a close and professional relationship with [d]efendants’ business partner, The Anthem;

vii. producing a daily report on her work, attending weekly meetings for The Anthem's on-site management, and participating in weekly video conferences with the U.K. office;

viii. ordering supplies and materials to prepare for the concessions and catering business;

ix. authorizing and checking supplier invoices; and;

x. authorizing and checking staff hours for payroll.

Am. Compl. ¶ 26.

Plaintiff alleges that she worked with customers and clients that were recruited by defendants, and that she did not have the option to decline to work at any particular event. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. Furthermore, she alleges that defendants closely supervised her work, and provided her with a laptop, phone, office space, and per diem payment for travel. Id. ¶¶ 30–35.

Plaintiff was paid a flat daily rate for either "event days," during which she would typically work between fifteen and sixteen hours, or "office days," which accounted for approximately 60 hours per week. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48, 49–50. She was also paid tips and included in the tip pool for employees at The Anthem. Id. ¶¶ 54–55.

Plaintiff was terminated in June of 2019, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 30, and on October 10, 2019, she filed the instant lawsuit. Compl. She amended her complaint on December 10, 2019, and it now contains four claims: (1) failure to pay overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ; (2) failure to pay overtime wages under the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act Revision Act ("DCMWA"), D.C. Code § 32-1001 et seq. ; (3) failure to pay wages under the District of Columbia Wage Payment and Collection Law ("DCWPCL"), D.C. Code § 32-1301 et seq. ; and (4) failure to provide sick leave under the District of Columbia Accrued Safe and Sick Leave Act ("ASSLA"), D.C. Code § 32-531.01 et seq. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75–101.

On December 12, 2019, defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Defs.’ Mot.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In evaluating a motion to dismiss under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the Court must "treat the complaint's factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’ " Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted), quoting Schuler v. United States , 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ; see also Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C. , 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting Thomas v. Principi , 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying principle to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion). Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff's legal conclusions. Browning v. Clinton , 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ( rule 12(b)(6) case); Food and Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack , 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ( rule 12(b)(1) case).

I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ; Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp. , 217 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2002). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ; see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. E.P.A. , 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction."). "[B]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction is ‘an Art[icle] III as well as a statutory requirement ... no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.’ " Akinseye v. District of Columbia , 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003), quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982).

When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, unlike when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court "is not limited to the allegations of the complaint."

Hohri v. United States , 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds , 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). Rather, "a court may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case." Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics , 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000), citing Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ; see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA , 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

II. Failure to State a Claim

"To survive a [ Rule 12(b)(6) ] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In Iqbal , the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly : "First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions," and "[s]econd, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. , quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A pleading must offer more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," id. , quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. , citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

ANALYSIS

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). The Court generally derives its subject matter jurisdiction from two federal laws, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. " Section 1331 provides for ‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, § 1332 for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’ jurisdiction." Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 513, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). "A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or laws of the United States. [She] invokes § 1332...