Gallagher v. Gingrich

• Decision Date: 09 April 1898
• Citation: 105 Iowa 237,74 N.W. 763
• Parties: GALLAGHER v. GINGRICH ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

105 Iowa 237

74 N.W. 763

GALLAGHER

v.GINGRICH ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 9, 1898.

Appeal from district court, Lyon county; George W. Wakefield, Judge.

Plaintiff brought this action against the defendants, his co-partners, doing business under the name of Alvord Milling Company, alleging that said co-partnership was insolvent, and praying that its affairs be wound up and a receiver appointed. By consent of said co-partners, E. H. Parch was appointed receiver, and proceeded to settle the affairs of said co-partnership under the orders of the court. The Alvord Savings Bank, a creditor of said co-partnership, had an attachment lien upon the property of the copartnership at the time the receiver was appointed, subject to several other liens prior thereto. Under an order of the court, the receiver sold the property, said Alvord Savings Bank being the purchaser. In closing up the affairs of said receivership, it was ordered by the court that the receiver be allowed a compensation of $60 per month from January 28 to November 26, 1895, and $50 were allowed for the receiver's attorney. It was also ordered that certain sums be allowed to the miller and to the engineer employed by the receiver in operating the mill, and that $15.11 for coal be also allowed. It was also ordered “that the receiver's expenses be a first charge upon the proceeds of the property sold by the receiver. The purchaser of said property, the Alvord Savings Bank, is hereby ordered to pay into the hands of the receiver the purchase price of the property so sold, the sum of five hundred fifty-three and 26/100 dollars, to all of which the Alvord Savings Bank excepts.” From this order, the Alvord Savings Bank appeals. Affirmed.J. M. Parsons, for appellant Alvord Sav. Bank.

E. E. Wagner, for appellee E. H. Parch.

GIVEN, J.

The proceeds arising from the sale of the partnership property are insufficient to pay the several liens thereon and costs and expenses of their receivership. Appellant, holding the junior claim, and being the purchaser of the property, insists that the receiver took the property subject to all liens existing against it at the time; that the liens are entitled to preference over the costs and expenses of the receivership; and that, if the assets are not sufficient to pay both, the receiver must look to the parties who caused his appointment for his compensation and expenses. Hanna v. Trust Co., 16 C. C. A. 586, 70 Fed. 2, is relied upon to support...