Gallagher v. Seagate of Gulfstream Condominium Ass'n, Inc., s. 81-455

• Decision Date: 12 January 1983
• Docket Number: 81-2052,Nos. 81-455,s. 81-455
• Citation: 423 So.2d 640
• Parties: Rosemond A. GALLAGHER, et al., Appellants/Cross Appellees, v. SEAGATE OF GULFSTREAM CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Appellees/Cross Appellants.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 640

423 So.2d 640

Rosemond A. GALLAGHER, et al., Appellants/Cross Appellees, v. SEAGATE OF GULFSTREAM CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Appellees/Cross Appellants.

Nos. 81-455, 81-2052.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

Jan. 12, 1983.

Herbert L. Gildan of Nason, Gildan, Yeager & Gerson, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants/cross appellees.

Richard H. Gaunt, Jr., of Law Offices of Frank G. Cibula, Jr., West Palm Beach, for appellees/cross appellants.

BERANEK, Judge.

These consolidated appeals involving a final judgment and an order on attorneys' fees, grow out of a complex, intra-condominium controversy. Plaintiffs/appellants are three individual unit owners and defendants/appellees are the condominium association and its board of directors. We reverse.

The complaint sought a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and damages. The trial court heard testimony and received substantial documentary evidence at a non-jury proceeding. The facts were not in substantial controversy. Most were drawn from the condominium declaration and various other documents of public record. After considering these operative facts, the court entered a final judgment ruling solely on the prayer for injunction. The injunctive relief sought was denied on the ground that it would result in unjust enrichment to the plaintiffs. No ruling was made on the general request for declaratory decree nor on the prayer for damages. Plaintiffs appeal and defendants cross appeal. Plaintiffs contest the injunction ruling, but no attack is asserted as to the absence of rulings on damages or declaratory decree. On cross appeal defendants contend the court erred in denying a motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties.

The condominium association was the lessee of real property on which certain recreational facilities were constructed. The rent on the recreation lease was, without serious dispute, a common expense pursuant to the definition stated in Section 718.115, Florida Statutes (1981). In the initial stage of its existence, the association apportioned the total monthly rental of $19,062 in equal assessments of $52.95 per month against each of the 360 condominium units. Eventually, the developer/landlord offered the unit owners a modified individual buy-out proposal whereby each unit owner was allowed, but not required, to purchase a 1/360th interest in the land which was the subject of the recreation lease. The purchase price was $8,000 per unit. Some 298 unit owners bought a 1/360th interest, while 62 owners chose not to purchase. The new landlord (now composed of the original developer and the 298 unit owners purchasers) agreed to reduce the rent to reflect the partial buy-out by simply relieving the purchasers of their proportionate share of the rental assessment and by reducing the association's total rental obligation by this same amount. The result was that the 62 unit owners who did not purchase an interest were assessed the normal and regular sum of $52.98 per month per unit for the purpose of paying the reduced monthly rent of $3,280.90. The 298 unit owners who bought an interest were not assessed for any portion of the reduced rent.

The plaintiffs asserted that this transaction violated the general condominium law, the declaration of condominium, and the condominium by-laws which all require that each unit owner bear a share of the common expenses proportionate to his or her ownership interest. Plaintiffs specifically relied upon Section 718.115(2), Florida Statutes (1981), and Section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes (1981). Basically, they argued that the rent, now reduced from $19,062 to $3,280.90, was a common expense, and as such the association was required by the above statutes and condominium documents to assess it against all unit owners according to their proportionate share, which, in this case, should have resulted in precisely equal assessments. The result would be that each of the 360 unit owners would pay $9.11 per month instead of $52.95 per month being paid by the 62 unit owners. Plaintiffs contended that the association...