Gallant v. Boise Cascade Paper Group

• Decision Date: 07 April 1981
• Citation: 427 A.2d 976
• Parties: Ralph GALLANT v. BOISE CASCADE PAPER GROUP and Employers Insurance of Wausau. Ralph GALLANT v. ETHYL CORPORATION and Travelers Insurance Company.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 976

427 A.2d 976

Ralph GALLANT v. BOISE CASCADE PAPER GROUP and Employers Insurance of Wausau.

Ralph GALLANT v. ETHYL CORPORATION and Travelers Insurance Company.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Jan. 5, 1981.

Decided April 7, 1981.

Preti, Flaherty & Beliveau, Keith A. Powers, Portland (orally), Preti, Flaherty & Beliveau, Albert J. Beliveau, Jr., Rumford, for plaintiff.

Norman & Hanson, Theodore H. Kirchner (orally) and John M. Wallach, Portland, for Boise Cascade.

Robinson & Kriger, Sarah A. Thornton and Roland Beaudoin, Portland, for defendant.

Before WERNICK, GODFREY, NICHOLS, GLASSMAN, ROBERTS and CARTER, JJ.

GLASSMAN, Justice.

Ralph Gallant was injured in 1974 while employed as a sheet metal worker for Ethyl Corporation. He received compensation for total incapacity from Ethyl's insurance carrier, Travelers Insurance Company, until May 29, 1978. Gallant claimed that his injury was aggravated in 1978 while he was employed as a process controller in the laboratories of Boise Cascade Paper Group. He filed a petition for award of compensation against Boise and its insurer, Employers Insurance of Wausau, and simultaneously filed a petition for further compensation against Ethyl and its insurer, Travelers. After a joint hearing on these petitions, the Workers' Compensation Commission found that as a combined result of the 1974 and 1978 injuries Gallant was totally disabled. Unable to determine the extent to which each injury contributed to his total incapacity, the Commission determined that compensation should be apportioned equally between the two employers. A single decision to that effect issued from the Commission on February 21, 1980.

The Commission's decision, ruling on both the petition for further compensation and the petition for award of compensation, was confirmed by two pro forma decrees in the Superior Court, Oxford County. One pro forma decree was presented to the court by Boise, and the other was presented by Gallant. This appeal followed. Because of the Commission's failure to make requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, we vacate the pro forma decrees and direct the Superior Court to remand this matter to the Commission for further proceedings.

Following the Commission's decision, both Boise and Gallant filed timely requests that the Commission make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 99. In a written order ruling upon these motions, the Commission stated: "This Motion is hereby denied as detailed Findings of Fact have been made and no further findings are warranted or necessary."

Prior to 1978, the Commission had an affirmative duty to make specific factual findings in order to enable the Law Court "to determine whether competent evidence supports the commission's decision and whether its decree is based either upon a misapprehension of fact or a misapplication of law to the facts." Dufault v. Midland-Ross of Canada, Ltd., Me., 380 A.2d 200, 203 (1977); Guerrette v. Fraser Paper, Ltd., Me., 348 A.2d 260, 262 (1975). In 1978, the Legislature amended 39 M.R.S.A. § 99 to give the Commission the option of not making written findings of fact and conclusions of law unless specifically requested to do so. P.L. 1978, ch. 632. See Sutherland v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Me., 402 A.2d 50 (1979). The intent of the amendment was to facilitate the making of Commission decisions. If a party felt aggrieved by a summary decision, it could by motion require the Commission to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon those findings. Counsel could thus obtain an adequate foundation for appellate review. See Statement of Purposes, Leg. Doc. No. 2010, 108th Leg., 2d Sess. (1977). The statute places an affirmative duty upon the Commission, when requested, to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. 39 M.R.S.A. § 99 provides in pertinent part:

The commissioner shall, upon the request of a party made as a motion within 10 days after notice of the decision, or may upon its own motion find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon .... Id.

In cases in which factual findings are not made because not requested, we treat the Commissioner "as having made whatever factual determinations could, in accordance with correct legal concepts, support his ultimate decision, and we inquire whether on the evidence such factual determinations must be held clearly erroneous." Gorrie v. Elliott Jordan & Son, Me., 408 A.2d 1008, 1011 (1979). This is a rule of convenience adopted to implement the legislative objective while at the same time permitting appellate review of clear error in those cases in which there is no legal obligation upon the Commission to make findings.

Those parties before the Workers' Compensation Commission who desire stricter appellate review of the Commission's factfinding and legal analysis may by motion require the Commission to state specific factual findings and legal conclusions. If the Commission fulfills its statutory obligation, there is no occasion for ...