Galletta v. FCA U.S. LLC
| Decision Date | 14 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | A157293 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | GIANNA GALLETTA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FCA U.S. LLC et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. CGC-17-559203
Plaintiff Gianna Galletta appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding a vehicle manufactured by defendant FCA U.S LLC (FCA) and sold to her by defendant Putnam Chrysler Jeep Dodge (Putnam) to have been unmerchantable, but also finding she suffered no compensable damages. She contends that the evidence compels a monetary award in her favor and that the trial court misinstructed the jury. We shall affirm the judgment.
Galletta bought a new 2014 Jeep Patriot vehicle from Putnam on June 24, 2013. The vehicle was financed over 72 months, with total payments of $36, 706.80.
On August 8, 2013, Galletta brought the vehicle to Putnam's service department, complaining the airbag light was on. The light was not on at the time of service, but Putnam found a stored code (B1C12) that indicated a circuit in the head restraint control system was low. Putnam cleared the code and concluded that the system was operating as designed and no further repairs were required unless the condition became "active" again.
A few weeks later, on August 29, 2013, Galletta one more brought the vehicle to Putnam, reporting the airbag light was coming on and off randomly. Putnam again pulled the "B1C12" code, found the driver's side headrest circuit-which is responsible for airbag deployment and seatbelt tension in the event of an impact-was low, performed diagnostic tests, and ordered a replacement part.
In late September 2013, Putnam's service department replaced the headrest and the wiring harness, and concluded the problem was resolved. The service order and invoice reflected a $20 charge for gasoline, but the "comments" section stated, "gas voucher." On September 28, while the vehicle was in the service center, Galletta contacted FCA and said that because "the airbags are not working and the service center has failed numerous times to diagnose/fix the problem, I do not feel safe driving that vehicle." She said she had filed a complaint with the Better Business Bureau and contacted a Lemon Law lawyer. Two days later, on September 30, Putnam told Galletta the vehicle was ready to be picked up.
On October 1, 2013, Galletta again brought the vehicle to Putnam's service center, reporting the same problem with the airbag light. Putnam removed the driver's side seat and carpet and found a problem with the wiring near the seat. Putnam repaired and rerouted the wires and taped them up. The odometer showed a total mileage of 5, 397. The light did not come on after that point.
Aside from the ambiguous reference to $20 for gasoline in late September-which we will discuss later-the invoices show all these repairs were carried out at no cost to Galletta.
A couple of weeks later, Galletta looked under the seat and saw what appeared to her to be sloppy mechanical work, with one of the pieces not plugged in. She was uncertain whether the reason the airbag light was no longer coming on was that the problem had been fixed or that the airbag had been disconnected. She contacted Putnam, spoke with the manager and tried to make another appointment, but she did not bring the vehicle to Putnam for this problem again because the dealership said it would not provide a rental vehicle. She called another dealership about the wires under the seat and was told she would have to return the vehicle to Putnam. She made no effort to address her concerns with the wires after that.
After October 2013, Galletta testified, she did not feel safe driving the vehicle. Nevertheless, she continued to do so for more than three and a half years before bringing this action during which time the vehicle's mileage reached approximately 60, 000 miles. In the intervening years, Galletta brought the vehicle to Putnam only one more time, on March 11, 2014. She asked to have the oil change light reset, and the tires were rotated. She did not make any complaints about the airbag system or loose wires.
Galletta was involved in two accidents after Putnam made the repairs, one in the fall of 2014 that she described as "very minor," and a "rear-end[er]" in January 2018 that resulted in a "minor injury" but no severe damage to her vehicle. On neither occasion did the airbags deploy.
Galletta's boyfriend contacted FCA on March 1, 2017 on her behalf and said the vehicle had had multiple problems, including airbag concerns, that the couple did not feel safe in the vehicle, and that Galletta wanted FCA to buy it back. An FCA representative offered assistance with the repair process, and Galletta said she preferred to take the vehicle to another dealership closer to her home. An inspection carried out on defendants' behalf in August 2018 during the course of this litigation, when the vehicle's mileage was 96, 211, showed no problems with the airbag system and the airbag wires under the driver's seat appropriately secured.
Galletta filed this action on May 26, 2017, alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790, et seq.; the Song-Beverly Act) and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.). She sought reimbursement for the entire amount paid or payable for the vehicle and incidental and consequential damages.
The jury was asked to consider three claims. As to the first, violation of express warranty in violation of the Song-Beverly Act, the jury found Galletta bought a vehicle that was manufactured or distributed by FCA; that FCA provided a written warranty; and that the vehicle did not have a defect covered by the warranty that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety to a reasonable buyer in Galletta's situation. As to the second, failure to complete repairs within 30 days, the jury found the vehicle had defects that were covered by FCA's written warranty to Galletta, but that it, or its authorized repair facilities, did not fail to complete repairs within 30 days so as to conform to the warranties. Defendants thus prevailed on these causes of action.
It is the third claim the jury considered, for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, that is directly at issue in this case. (Civ. Code, § 1791.1.) After finding Galletta bought a vehicle manufactured or distributed by FCA and sold by Putnam in the course of their business, the jury answered "Yes" to the question, "Was the vehicle not of the same quality as those generally acceptable in the trade or was the vehicle not fit for the ordinary purposes for which the vehicles are used?" The jury was then asked to determine the amount of damages Galletta was entitled to receive as restitution for the vehicle, and it responded, "$0."
The trial court entered judgment in defendants' favor and awarded them their costs in an amount later determined to be $5, 666.88.
Galletta moved for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the ground she was entitled to damages for the amount of the vehicle and her incidental expenses of $20.00 once the jury found defendants breached the implied warranty of merchantability. The trial court denied the motion.
Galletta contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for JNOV because the uncontroverted evidence showed she was entitled to damages for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
A trial court may grant a motion for JNOV "only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support." (Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68.) In reviewing the denial of such a motion, we affirm if there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the verdict. (Ibid.) To the extent the issue presented on appeal raises purely legal issues, however, our review is de novo. (Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1138.)
Under the Song-Beverly Act," 'an implied warranty of merchantability guarantees that ' (Civ. Code, § 1791.1, subd. (a).)" (Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 26.) This implied warranty" 'arises by operation of law' and' "provides for a minimum level of quality." '" (Ibid.) (Atkinson v. Elk Corporation of Texas (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) This test requires a vehicle not only to "provide[] transportation from point A to point B," but also encompasses it being" 'in safe condition and substantially free of defects.'" (Isip, at p. 27.)
Where the implied warranty of merchantability has been breached the Song-Beverly act authorizes the buyer to "bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief." (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (a).) If the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance of the goods and exercises any right to cancel the sale, section 2711 of the Commercial Code applies. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (b).) That provision, in turn, provides in part that, with respect to such rejected goods, the buyer who cancels may recover "so much of the price...
To continue reading
Request your trial