Galligan v. Leonard

• Decision Date: 07 January 1910
• Citation: 90 N.E. 583,204 Mass. 202
• Parties: GALLIGAN v. LEONARD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

204 Mass. 202

90 N.E. 583

GALLIGAN v. LEONARD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 7, 1910

COUNSEL

Robert Luce and Louis Swig, for petitioner.

H. F Hathaway, for respondent.

OPINION

RUGG J.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus brought by a member of the fire department of the city of Taunton to compel the chief of that department to make up its pay roll in accordance with the terms of an ordinance fixing the pay of members of the fire department. The validity of this ordinance is attacked. The decision of that question depends upon these facts: The city council of the dity of Taunton passed the ordinance on December 31, 1908; it was presented to the mayor on January 2, 1909, who neither approved nor returned it with his written objections to the city council; and on January 4 1909, his term of office and that of every member of the city council expired. Rev. Laws. c. 26, § 9, provides that such an ordinance as this shall be presented to the mayor, who, if he approves, shall sign it; if he disapproves he shall return it, with his objections, to the city council, which shall again consider it, and if two-thirds of the members of each branch present and voting by yeas and nays pass it notwithstanding the objections, it shall be in force; and also, that it 'shall be in force if it is not returned by the mayor within ten days after it has been presented to him.'

This statute applies to the case at bar, as both parties have in their arguments assumed, for St. 1882, p. 171, c. 211, § 22, which confers upon the mayor of Taunton a certain veto power, does not refer to ordinances like the one we are now considering. It is therefore not necessary to determine which statute should be followed in cases covered by the language of both. See Copeland v. Springfield, 166 Mass. 498, 44 N.E. 605.

The purpose of this general statute is to protect the municipality against hasty and ill-considered legislation and to secure for every measure deliberate, intelligent and enlightened review by the one officer everywhere in this commonwealth elected by the suffrages of all the voters. It is a part of the evolution of legislation respecting the administration of cities, which has been in progress since 1821 in this commonwealth when the first city charter was enacted. For 30 or more years, the theory of administration was to preserve the early town form of local government by substituting in part the meetings of the city council for those of the citizens in the town meeting, and by transferring the executive and administrative duties formerly devolving upon the selectmen to the mayor and members of the board of aldermen constituting a single board. In most of the early city charters the mayor was scarcely more than an official figurehead, having few substantial powers beyond those of an alderman. Experience seemed to demonstrate the necessity of clothing the mayor with greater power, and from time to time acts to this end were passed conferring upon him among other prerogatives a qualified veto. The first statute giving to the mayor any veto power was the Fall River charter (St. 1854, p. 180, c. 257, § 21), but it was there confined to those subjects as to which towns might pass by-laws. The second city charter of Boston (St. 1854, p. 373, c. 448, § 47) was the first to give to the mayor a general veto upon all acts of the city council. It was in substantially the same phraseology as that of the present provision of the Revised Laws. By St. 1873, p. 560, c. 139, it was made permissive to the voters of each city to confer the power upon its mayor, and by St. 1876, p. 174, c. 193, it was imposed by general law upon the mayor of all cities. Legislative restriction of the powers of boards of aldermen and city councils and an increase of those of the mayor has continued to grow until by the city charters enacted recently, the mayor is the one executive officer, except that in 1908 three charters with a wholly different plan of administration were passed. St. 1908, p. 524, c. 559; Id. p. 719, c. 611; Id. p. 542, c. 574. He is responsible directly to all the people, and is possessed of large administrative functions. For a collection of the various acts of incorporation of...