Gallman v. Springs Mills

• Decision Date: 10 November 1942
• Docket Number: 15463.
• Citation: 22 S.E.2d 715,201 S.C. 257
• Parties: GALLMAN v. SPRINGS MILLS et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

22 S.E.2d 715

201 S.C. 257

GALLMAN v. SPRINGS MILLS et al.

No. 15463.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 10, 1942

McDonald Macaulay & McDonald, of Chester, for appellants.

Hemphill & Hemphill, of Chester, for respondent.

BAKER Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court affirming an award of the South Carolina Industrial Commission under the terms and provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of this State.

The facts are undisputed. The parties to this case are bound by the said Act. The respondent is employed by Springs Mills. The plant of the employer consists of a large tract of land near the city limits of Chester, S. C. On said tract of land is situate a large manufacturing plant or cotton mill surrounded by warehouses and other appurtenances, and all around over said premises are situate numerous dwelling houses rented by the employer to its employees only, and all of the streets and sidewalks in the mill area and between the cotton mill building and a public highway, which does not lead up to the mill, are privately owned and privately maintained by the employer. On the morning of January 25 1940, respondent (employee) was awakened as usual by the 4:30 a. m. siren. He arose, dressed for work, ate his morning meal and remained in the dwelling which he occupied in the "Mill Village" until the sounding of the 5:45 a. m siren which was intended to notify him and other employees working on the same shift that it was time to start for work. Upon the sounding of the 5:45 a. m. siren, the respondent, dressed in his work clothes and carrying the tools needed and used by him as a weaver in the mill, left his dwelling and proceeded to walk upon and along one of the streets provided by Springs Mills towards the cotton mill, his place of employment. After he had travelled approximately three-fourths of the distance between his residence and the cotton mill and was within a short distance thereof, he slipped and fell at a slick place on the ice on the sidewalk portion of the street and sustained injuries, including a badly broken arm, necessitating loss of time from work, medical treatment and other expenses.

The sole issue is: Did respondent's injury arise "out of and in the course of the employment?"

The question presented has not heretofore come before this court. Our guides therefore must be the language of the statute, the principle of liberal construction of the statute to which this court has repeatedly committed itself, and the general rules of statutory construction that control in applying the language of the Act.

However much we might sympathize with the respondent, and regardless of what we may think the law should be in a case of the present character, it is not within our power to translate this sympathy and conviction into law. That is a strictly legislative function.

We recognize the tendency of appellate courts to adopt a very liberal view of what constitutes an accident arising "out of" and "in the course of" the employment in dealing with questions of the present character. All text-book writers and the decisions of the various state courts are in accord with the general rule that in determining whether an accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, each case must be decided with reference to its own attendant circumstances; and that the question whether injuries sustained by an employee in going to, or returning from, his work are compensable, is governed by the circumstances and facts of the particular case. Therefore, it is useless to attempt to generalize from the decided cases, none of which, as far as we have been able to find, deal with the precise situation here before the court. There is an abundance of cases holding compensable injuries to employees sustained in going to and returning from work, but the controlling consideration was that in actual fact the employee, at the time of the accident, was engaged in the performance of some duty for his or her employer, or was proceeding in the course of his or her employment from one part of the plant to another, or was in the act of entering or leaving the place of employment.

The cases of Covington v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 158 S.C. 194, 155 S.E. 438, and Ward v. Ocean Forest Club, Inc., 188 S.C. 233, 198 S.E. 385, have such distinguishing features as to be of no value in determining the issue here involved; and come within an exception to the general rule.

In the first-mentioned case, it was necessary, in order to reach his place of employment (a tower on the side of the track), for Covington to ride or drive a railroad velocipede upon and over the tracks of the railroad company across Pee Dee River and the river swamp, a distance of approximately two and one-quarter miles, and he was provided with this velocipede by the railroad company. While returning from his work on this velocipede, Covington was injured. The court held that under the circumstances of that case Covington was still engaged in the discharge of the duties of his employment. One of the authorities cited for such holding was Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221, 222, 72 L.Ed. 507, 66 A.L.R. 1402, and from which case broad and liberal language was quoted, but it must be borne in mind that such broad and liberal language was used in connection with the facts of that case. There the employees of the Brick Company approaching the brick yard from the east had to cross railway tracks (the doing of which is always attended by danger) adjacent thereto in order to reach their place of employment, and in so doing Giles was struck by a train and killed. The controlling reason for the holding that Giles' death arose out of or in the course of his employment was stated by the court as follows: "Since the only way of access to its brickyard from the east was across the railway tracks, the company necessarily contemplated the crossing of them by its employees. No definite line of travel being indicated by the company or followed by the employees, who, with the company's full knowledge and acquiescence, habitually crossed wherever they saw fit, it results that, however the crossing was made, the risk thereby incurred was reasonably incidental to the employment and became annexed as an implied term thereof."

Attention is called to the fact that the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, Rev. St.Utah 1933, 42-1-43, provides compensation for personal injury or death of an employee by accident "arising out of or in the course of his employment." And to the further fact that the question for determination by the United States Supreme Court was whether the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act and amendments thereto, which provides compensation for personal injury or death of an employee by accident "arising out of or in the course of his employment" as it was construed and applied to the facts by the court below, contravenes the due process of law clause of the 14th Amendment.

In Ward v. Ocean Forest Club, Inc., transportation was furnished to the employee from her home to the Club, and from the Club to her home as a part of the contract of employment, and it was while being transported under the contract that the employee was injured. Therefore, her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment.

It is a recognized rule that where an employee, by reason of his employment, is exposed to perils peculiar to public streets, an injury sustained while using a street or highway is compensable, where the nature of his work requires that some part thereof or connected therewith, be there performed. Thus the "doctrine of street accident cases" had its conception and birth.

The opinion in the case of Favorite v. Kalamazoo State Hospital, 238 Mich. 566, 214 N.W. 229, permitting an employee, a nurse, to recover...