Gallotta v. Burns
| Docket Number | 23-P-236 |
| Decision Date | 25 January 2024 |
| Parties | ALAN R. GALLOTTA & another[1] v. JEFFREY G. BURNS & another.[2] |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (), are primarily directed to the parties and therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 2 3.0
On February 19, 2020, the defendant, Jeffrey Burns, was driving on Washington Street in Braintree when he crossed the center yellow lines and collided with a vehicle occupied by the plaintiffs, Alan and Dianne Gallotta.[3] A civil complaint was filed by the plaintiffs claiming that Jeffrey negligently operated the motor vehicle and caused their injuries and that Jeffrey's wife, Marcia,[4] as owner of the vehicle, was liable for Jeffrey's negligence and for negligent entrustment. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs with respect to the claim against Jeffrey and awarded damages. The jury found in favor of Marcia with respect to the claims against her. Jeffrey and the plaintiffs appealed.[5] We address each category of evidence that Jeffrey argues should not have been admitted before addressing the category of evidence the plaintiffs argue should have been admitted.
Background.
We summarize the relevant trial evidence and procedural history as follows. The defendants were married and lived together for the duration of their marriage. Marcia was the registered owner of a Ford Explorer, which she allowed Jeffrey to drive. Although she was aware of Jeffrey's driving history and knew that he had been involved in driving accidents in the past, she testified that she had no concerns about his ability to drive or concerns that he would drive under the influence of alcohol.
On the night of the collision, Jeffrey was driving Marcia's Ford Explorer on Washington Street in Braintree. He crossed the double solid lines on the road and crashed into the plaintiffs' car. The head on collision injured the plaintiffs and caused significant damage to both vehicles.
After arriving on the scene, Braintree Police Officer John Cole spoke with Jeffrey. Jeffrey told Officer Cole that he was arguing with his wife on the phone before the collision and was not paying attention to the road. Officer Cole observed that Jeffrey was supporting himself with a trash can located on the sidewalk, his eyes were bloodshot, his breath had a strong odor of alcohol, and his speech was "thick-tongued" and slurred. After Officer Cole asked if Jeffrey had consumed any alcohol, Jeffrey admitted to consuming two to three beers prior to leaving his house.[6]
The plaintiffs commenced an action raising negligence claims against Jeffrey as the driver and Marcia as the owner and claims of negligent entrustment against Marcia. During the final pretrial conference, the judge heard arguments regarding the defendants' motion in limine to preclude any evidence of Jeffrey's alcohol consumption prior to the accident. The judge denied the defendants' motion, ruling that the evidence of alcohol consumption was relevant and admissible. The judge also heard arguments regarding the defendants' motion in limine to preclude evidence of Jeffrey's registry of motor vehicles (RMV) driving history. The judge allowed this motion in part, allowing evidence of Jeffrey's RMV driving record from October 29, 2002, to February 10, 2013, and precluding evidence of Jeffrey's RMV driving record prior to October 29, 2002.
A jury trial began on September 7, 2022. On the second day of trial, the defendants objected when the plaintiffs sought to offer hospital records of Dianne's medical expenses. After hearing arguments, the judge allowed the evidence. The defendants also objected before the plaintiffs sought to introduce testimony regarding their respective injuries and accompanying life expectancy tables. The judge invited the defendants to object and renew their argument when the plaintiffs were on the stand, but the defendants never did during Dianne's testimony, nor during Alan's testimony about his own injuries, and the testimony was accordingly admitted into evidence.
The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs against Jeffrey. They found that Jeffrey was both negligent and the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries and awarded damages. The jury found that Marcia, as owner of the vehicle, was not negligent in allowing Jeffrey to drive her car, because she did not have the authority or means to control Jeffrey's use of the car at the time of the accident. On the issue of negligent entrustment, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Marcia, finding that Jeffrey was not an incompetent or unfit driver. This timely appeal and cross appeal followed.
Discussion.
Jeffrey argues that the judge abused his discretion in allowing in evidence of his alcohol consumption because the probative value was outweighed by the potential that it might prejudice or inflame the jury. "Relevant evidence is admissible as long as the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Reyes, 483 Mass. 65, 74 (2019). "In weighing the probative value of evidence against any prejudicial effect it might have on a jury, we afford trial judges great latitude and discretion and will uphold a judge's decision unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Fan, 490 Mass. 433, 443 (2022). Here, the judge weighed the probative value and prejudice of the proffered evidence and allowed the evidence to be admitted because it was "at the heart of the negligence claim." We see no abuse of discretion in this ruling.
In a negligence action, "the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that the defendant committed a breach of the duty to use reasonable care, that the plaintiffs suffered actual loss, and that the defendant's negligence caused their loss." Glidden v. Maglio, 430 Mass. 694, 696 (2000) . Jeffrey argues that the evidence of his alcohol consumption was overly prejudicial and not needed because it was undisputed that he crossed the centerline and struck the plaintiffs' vehicle. Indeed, in his opening statement to the jury, counsel for the defendants conceded this fact. However, prior to trial, the defendants had not conceded that Jeffrey had breached his duty to use reasonable care as a driver and they did not stipulate to negligence at trial. Accordingly, despite the fact that trial counsel told the jury that Jeffrey caused the collision, the plaintiffs still bore the burden of proving the elements of their case, including negligence by Jeffrey. Evidence that Jeffrey had been drinking alcohol prior to the accident was certainly relevant and exceedingly probative.
Jeffrey similarly argues that his guilty plea of negligent operation of a motor vehicle in the related criminal matter could have been used to prove his negligence instead of the evidence of alcohol consumption and that the evidence of alcohol consumption was overly inflammatory and prejudicial. Again, we see no reason why the plaintiffs should be constrained in proving their case by limiting relevant evidence. The plaintiffs are not required to prove their case using only evidence that is least harmful to the defendant. See Farnham v. Lenox Motor Car Co., 229 Mass. 478, 481 (1918) (). The evidence of Jeffrey's admission to alcohol consumption prior to the accident and Officer Cole's observations was strong evidence to establish negligent operation. Given that it was "within the judge's discretion to decide whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the possibility that it would mislead or prejudice the jury," Kobico, Inc. v. Pipe, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 103, 109 (1997), there was no abuse of discretion in allowing evidence that Jeffrey had been drinking prior to the accident. Accordingly, the trial judge acted within his discretion in concluding that Jeffrey's alcohol consumption was relevant and the probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendants.
Jeffrey also argues that evidence of his alcohol consumption should not have been admitted because there was no evidence that alcohol consumption caused the crash. In essence, he argues that evidence of alcohol consumption should have been excluded because Jeffrey was found not guilty on the criminal charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Jeffrey fails to cite to any case law to support this contention, and, in any event, this argument lacks merit. While the defendants were certainly free to argue to the jury that alcohol did not contribute to the collision, it was not error for the judge to admit relevant evidence about alcohol consumption. The criminal charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and the charge of negligent operation of a motor vehicle are two separate offenses.[7] See Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1022 (2019). A finding of not guilty on a...
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