Galloway v. Fed. Tort Claims Act
| Decision Date | 31 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:17-CV-1314,4:16-CV-572 |
| Parties | CHARLES LEONARD GALLOWAY, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER [Resolving ECF Nos. 62, 80]
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Charles Leonard Galloway's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 62, supplemented at ECF No. 78) and Defendant the United States of America's1 (the "United States" or the "Government") motion to dismiss and for summary judgment (ECF No. 80). The Government filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 82) to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff did not file a reply. Plaintiff also did not file a response in opposition to the Government's motion. Insofar as Plaintiff's other filings reflect an argument in opposition to dismissal or summary judgment, however, the Court liberally construes the content of those filings. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence in support of his motion, nor in opposition to the Government's motion.
For the reasons stated herein, summary judgment is granted in favor of the United States as to both remaining claims. Any claim of negligence or medical malpractice arising from Plaintiff's June 2014 seizure is dismissed.
Plaintiff advances two distinct claims against the United States, both arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").2 The first sounds in medical malpractice, and the second sounds in ordinary negligence.
Plaintiff has been in federal custody since 2011 and is scheduled to be released in 2028. ECF No. 80-2 at PageID#: 350; see BOP Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/mobile/find_inmate/. He arrived at the Federal Correctional Institution in Elkton, Ohio ("FCI Elkton"), in 2012, and he was transferred to FCI Schuylkill in Pennsylvania in November 2018. ECF No. 80-2 at PageID#: 363, 366.
In September 2013, while housed at FCI Elkton, Plaintiff presented to sick call complaining that his "tongue didn't work." Case No. 4:16-CV-572-BYP (N.D. Ohio, filed Mar. 9, 2016), ECF No. 1 at PageID#: 4; Case No. 4:17-CV-1314-BYP (N.D. Ohio, filed Jun3 22, 2017), ECF No. 62-2 at PageID#: 262. He was turned away, however, when the physician insisted Plaintiff was "faking it." Case No. 4:16-CV-572, ECF No. 1 at PageID#: 4; Case No. 4:17-CV-1314, ECF No. 62-2 at PageID#: 262. The nurse, perceiving that Plaintiff wasbehaving in a threatening manner, called an emergency, and Plaintiff was placed in the Special Housing Unit for several days. Case No. 4:16-CV-572, ECF No. 1 at PageID#: 4; Case No. 4:17-CV-1314, ECF No. 62-2 at PageID#: 262. While there, on September 18, 2013, he suffered a stroke. Id. at PageID#: 367. Plaintiff was transported in an ambulance to an outside medical facility and eventually to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Youngstown, Ohio, where an evaluation revealed that surgery was not necessary. Case No. 4:16-CV-572, ECF No. 1 at PageID#: 4; Case No. 4:17-CV-1314, ECF No. 78 at PageID#: 323; ECF No. 80-4 at PageID#: 504. He was later transported to another facility for rehabilitation. ECF No. 80-4 at PageID#: 504.
Over the course of the following years, Plaintiff was treated for complications resulting from his stroke, including "residual seizure disorder[,] aphasia[,] abnormal gait[,] and movement disorder."3 See ECF No. 80-3 at PageID#: 470-503; ECF No. 80-2 at PageID#: 391-404. Specifically, he was prescribed a twice-daily dosage of anti-seizure medicine ("Keppra") and was counseled that his safety, including adherence to that prescription, was "paramount." See ECF No. 80-3 at PageID#: 475; ECF No. 80-2 at PageID#: 398 ("two times a day"). Despite those complications, Plaintiff's "comprehension . . . remains intact," ECF No. 80-2 at PageID#: 467, and he routinely presents as "alert and oriented," ECF No. 80-3 at PageID#: 473, 477, 498, 500. Plaintiff acknowledges that he falls down often. ECF No. 80-2 at PageID#: 366-68.
On June 6, 2014, Plaintiff suffered a seizure. Although Plaintiff suggests he "couldn't have missed [a dose]" of his anti-seizure medication, medical records reflect that his seizureoccurred because Plaintiff "[m]issed 10 doses of Keppra." ECF No. 80-3 at PageID#: 472. Plaintiff was immediately sent to St. Elizabeth's Hospital to be checked, id., and he reports no complications or injuries arising from the June 2014 seizure.
On November 3, 2016, while walking through the dish line at the chow hall, Plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet floor. Case No. 4:17-CV-1314, ECF No. 1 at PageID#: 3; see ECF No. 80-3 at PageID#: 496-501. He says an inmate who worked as a dishwasher was spraying water indiscriminately on the counter and on the floor. ECF No. 80-2 at PageID#: 363-64, 383-84. Plaintiff does not know whether wet floor signs were placed in the chow hall at the time, id. at PageID#: 388, but he acknowledges that the chow hall was well lighted and that he was familiar with the area around the dish line. Id. at PageID#: 378-79, 363-64.
Plaintiff was taken immediately to Health Services, and from there he was transported to a local hospital for a precautionary CT scan. Id. at PageID#: 386-88; see ECF No. 80-5 at PageID#: 531. The CT scan was returned negative for any brain injuries. ECF No. 80-2 at PageID#: 386-88; see ECF No. 80-5 at PageID#: 531. Back at FCI Elkton, Plaintiff was examined, given acetaminophin ("Tylenol") for pain, and sent on his way. See ECF No. 80-2 at PageID#: 421-30; ECF No. 80-3 at PageID#: 495-501. Several follow-up visits revealed some pain in his back but no lasting injuries. ECF No. 80-3 at PageID#: 490-95.
Summary judgment is appropriately granted when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show "that there is no genuine dispute as to anymaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F. 3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2005). The moving party is not required to file affidavits or other similar materials negating a claim on which its opponent bears the burden of proof, so long as the movant relies upon the absence of the essential element in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party must "show that the non-moving party has failed to establish an essential element of his case upon which he would bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial." Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F. 2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992).
Once the movant makes a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute. An opposing party may not simply rely on its pleadings; rather, it must "produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be resolved by a jury." Cox. v. Ky. Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995). To defeat the motion, the non-moving party must "show that there is doubt as to the material facts and that the record, taken as a whole, does not lead to a judgment for the movant." Guarino, 980 F.2d at 403. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party when deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Aickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
"The mere existence of some factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment . . . ." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The factunder dispute must be "material," and the dispute itself must be "genuine." A fact is "material" only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. In determining whether a factual issue is "genuine," the Court assesses whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find that the non-moving party is entitled to a verdict. Id. ().
There is no genuine dispute that, when Plaintiff initially presented to sick call in September 2013 complaining that "[his] tongue didn't work," the doctor dismissed him and said, repeatedly, that Plaintiff was "faking it." Case No. 4:16-CV-572, ECF No. 1 at PageID#: 4; Case No. 4:17-CV-1314, ECF No. 62-2 at PageID#: 262. Plaintiff spent the next several days in the Special Housing Unit. At some point during his placement there, he began to vomit, and he was transported in an ambulance to an outside medical facility, and eventually to St. Elizabeth's Hospital. ECF No. 78 at PageID#: 323; ECF No. 80-4 at PageID#: 503-04.
Plaintiff had suffered a stroke; specifically, an intracerebral hemmorhage, for which a medical evaluation indicated no surgery was required. ECF No. 80-4 at PageID#: 504. A subsequent CT head scan showed "evidence of dead (irretrievably lost) brain tissue . . . at the time of presentation" at the hospital. Id. Plaintiff implies, but does not expressly argue, that earlier intervention by medical staff at FCI Elkton would have mitigated the resulting damage tohis brain, and that ignoring Plaintiff's early symptoms at his initial presentation to sick call amounted to medical malpractice.
Under Ohio law, a medical malpractice claim must satisfy four elements: The plaintiff must show "(1) the existence of a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, (2) a breach of the defendant's duty, (3) causation based on probability, and (4) damages." Loudin v. Radiology & Imaging Servs., Inc., 924 N.E.2d 433, 454 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (citing Stinson v. England, 633 N.E.2d 532, 537 (Ohio 1994)).
The Government's expert...
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