Galloway v. Galloway
| Decision Date | 06 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | E-21-043 |
| Citation | 2023 Ohio 29 |
| Parties | Jennifer L. Galloway Appellant v. Kyle L. Galloway Appellee |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
2023-Ohio-29
Jennifer L. Galloway Appellant
v.
Kyle L. Galloway Appellee
No. E-21-043
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, Erie
January 6, 2023
Trial Court No. 2020 DR 0004
Leslie O. Murray, for appellant.
Gina M. McNea, for appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Jennifer L. Galloway, appeals the October 1, 2021 judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, granting her a divorce from defendant-appellee, Kyle L. Galloway, and entering orders relating to spousal support and the division of marital assets. For the following reasons, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the trial court judgment.
I. Background
{¶ 2} Jennifer Galloway and Kyle Galloway married on October 20, 1990. On January 8, 2020, Jennifer filed a complaint for divorce; Kyle counterclaimed. The matter proceeded to trial on October 6, 2020, after the parties could not agree on spousal support and the division and value of certain property. The magistrate issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, and Jennifer filed objections. In a judgment journalized on October 1, 2021, the trial court implicitly overruled Jennifer's objections and adopted the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Jennifer appealed and assigns seven errors for our review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED RELEVANT EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE LOCATED AT 6903 PORTLAND ROAD SANDUSKY, OH 44870
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED ESTABLISHED LAW THAT A MERE SIGNATURE ON A DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A RELEASE OF DOWER RIGHTS.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD, DESPITE TOTAL LACK OF EVIDENCE, THAT THE PARCELS LOCATED AT 1812 STATE
ROUTE 13, GREENWICH, OH 44837 WERE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEE.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE RELEVANT FACTORS OF O.R.C. 3105.18 AND DID NOT AWARD THE APPELLANT WITH SPOUSAL SUPPORT.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY QUALIFIED A PORTION OF THE HELOC DEBT AS PERSONAL, WHEN IT WAS ACQUIRED PRIOR TO THE PARTIES['] SEPARATION, AND IS THEREFORE MARITAL DEBT.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE PARTIES' ACCOUNTS AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.
SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO RETURN APPELLANT TO HER FORMER MAIDEN NAME.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 3} Jennifer's seven assignments of error challenge several aspects of the trial court's judgment entry of divorce, including (1) its rejection of her expert's opinion concerning the value of the marital residence; (2) its rejection of her claim that she did
not intend to release her dower rights as to real property Kyle sold to his father; (3) its conclusion that real property gifted to Kyle by his parents was his separate property; (4) its refusal to award spousal support to Jennifer; (5) its allocation of $15,000 as debt attributable to only Jennifer; (6) its valuation and division of certain marital assets; and (7) its failure to restore Jennifer to her maiden name.
{¶ 4} We address each of Jennifer's assignments of error in turn.
A. Opinions Concerning the Value of the Marital Residence
{¶ 5} Jennifer and Kyle both presented expert testimony concerning the value of the marital home. Jennifer presented the testimony of Christopher Wechter, a broker, who provided a broker price opinion in October of 2020, and estimated the value of the home at $375,000.00. Kyle presented the testimony of Donald Leto, an appraiser, who appraised the property as of October 22, 2019, and who estimated the value at $280,000. Jennifer claims that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting her expert's opinion concerning the home's value.
{¶ 6} Jennifer argues that (1) the value of the home greatly increased between the time Leto appraised it in October of 2019, and Wechter valued it in October of 2020; (2) Leto failed to consider features that increased the value of the property including trees and woods, a building, the school district, proximity to shopping, and updates Kyle made to the house after the appraisal; and (3) Leto valued the home against comparables that were located outside the school district and further away from shopping and industry
instead of comparing it against comparables in the vicinity of the home. Jennifer insists that Wechter provided a line-by-line explanation of items missing from Leto's appraisal and fully explained the deficiencies in Leto's appraisal, but the trial court failed to consider Wechter's opinions and incorrectly adopted Leto's valuation.
{¶ 7} Kyle responds that Leto inspected both the interior and exterior of the home, while Wechter viewed only the exterior. He claims that several factors affected Leto's valuation, including the fact that (1) the home is heated by wood only; (2) the home has no air conditioning; (3) the home has no water source-water must be hauled to the property; (4) the home had previously been used as a pole barn and was converted into a house; and (5) the home has no basement. Kyle emphasizes that Wechter acknowledged that he was unaware that the home had previously been used as a pole barn, a factor that could affect its value, and Wechter valued a barn on the property at $100,000 even though he never went into it. He points out that Leto explained that the higher-value comparables Wechter used to value the home had important differences, including the quality of the exterior construction and interior finishes, heat and air conditioning, square footage, and the existence of basements.
{¶ 8} The valuation of marital assets is typically an issue of fact for the trial court. Ruetz v. Ruetz, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1037, 2003-Ohio-4091, ¶ 41, citing Hacker v. Hacker, 5 Ohio App.3d 46, 47, 448 N.E.2d 831 (5th Dist.1981). In determining a value, the trial court is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of
the witnesses. Wideman v. Wideman, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-02-030, 2003-Ohio-1858, ¶ 21. It may "accept or reject either party's opinion as to the value of the marital home, so long as its decision is support by evidence in the record." Id., citing Murray v. Marina, Inc. v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio App.3d 166, 173, 703 N.E.2d 846 (6th Dist.1997). To that end, we review a trial court's valuation of marital property using the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Jackson v. Jackson, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-12-013, 2014-Ohio-1145, ¶ 17, citing Schuller v. Schuller, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-96-012, 1997 WL 51223, * 2 (Feb. 7, 1997). This means that we will affirm the trial court's valuation determination if it is supported by competent and credible testimony. Smith v. Smith, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-89-3, 1990 WL 1357, *6 (Jan. 12, 1990).
{¶ 9} Here, Wechter's valuation was performed more recently than Leto's, however, Leto testified that the average sales prices had not changed since the time he performed the appraisal-it had just become easier to sell houses. More importantly, the trial court judgment specifically observed that Leto inspected both the exterior and interior of the house, while Wechter performed a drive-by inspection of only the exterior. This was clearly important to the trial court's decision. The trial court was free to make credibility determinations and weigh the evidence as it deemed appropriate. This means it was free to reject Jennifer's expert's opinion concerning the value of the home. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 147 Ohio App.3d 513, 526, 771 N.E.2d 303 (7th Dist.2002)
("The court did not give much weight to the appraisal submitted by Garner because it appeared that he did not actually visit the site.").
{¶ 10} Accordingly, we find that the court's decision declining to accept Jennifer's expert's valuation was supported by competent, credible evidence. We find Jennifer's first assignment of error not well-taken.
B. Release of Dower Rights
{¶ 11} In January of 2014, Kyle sold ten acres of property-acquired during the marriage, but titled only to him-to his father, Dennis Galloway, for $36,000. In connection with that transfer of property, Jennifer signed a quitclaim deed, releasing her dower rights. The trial court concluded that the divorce proceedings were not the proper forum-and it refused-to "unravel" this transaction that had occurred six years earlier. It noted that Jennifer had benefitted from receipt of the proceeds of that sale. In her second assignment of error, Jennifer challenges the trial court's conclusion. She claims that her signature on that document did not effectively release her dower rights because she was misled into signing and did not intend to convey the property.
{¶ 12} Jennifer argues that under Ohio case law, when a party to a marriage does not understand what "dower rights" means and believes that a document is being signed for the tax benefit of the marriage, the mere signature on the document signing away dower rights is not enough to accomplish release of those rights. She claims that she was asked to sign the deed to reach a beneficial tax result-not to convey property-and she
relied on Kyle to act in her best interest. Jennifer maintains that the ownership of that property was an essential part of the marital estate and part of the parties' retirement plan. She insists that while Dennis bought the property, he holds it in trust and intends for it to revert to Kyle when Dennis dies. Jennifer contends that Kyle should not be gifted property that was supposed to be a marital asset.
{¶ 13} Kyle responds that (1) Jennifer has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating a lack of intent...
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