Galloway v. Hartman, 38

• Decision Date: 20 September 1967
• Docket Number: No. 38,38
• Citation: 156 S.E.2d 727,271 N.C. 372
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Dohonov GALLOWAY v. William E. HARTMAN.

Page 727

156 S.E.2d 727

271 N.C. 372

Dohonov GALLOWAY v. William E. HARTMAN.

No. 38.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 20, 1967.

Potts & Hudson, Brevard, and Van Winkle, Walton, Buck & Wall, Asheville, for plaintiff.

Uzzell & DuMont, Asheville, for defendant.

BRANCH, Justice.

Appellant contends the court erred in allowing defendant's motion for nonsuit, in that there was sufficient evidence of actionable negligence on the part of defendant to carry the case to the jury, and in that plaintiff's evidence, taken in the light most favorable to her, did not establish that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

In order for plaintiff to survive the motion for nonsuit, she must first offer sufficient evidence, when taken in the light most favorable to her, and when she is given the benefit of all permissible inferences to be drawn from it, to support all essential elements of actionable negligence. McFalls v. Smith, 249 N.C. 123, 105 S.E.2d 297; Lake v. Harris Express, Inc., 249 N.C. 410, 106 S.E.2d 518; Barefoot v. Joyner, 270 N.C. 388, 154 S.E.2d 543.

'Actionable negligence embraces negligence and proximate cause. The elements of each have been clearly defined. Ramsbottom v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 138 N.C. 38, 41, 50 S.E. 448; Hall v. Coble Dairies, 234 N.C. 206, 67 S.E.2d 63, 29 A.L.R.2d 682. There is no controversy as to these well established rules.' Williamson v. Clay, 243 N.C. 337, 90 S.E.2d 727.

The collision involved in this appeal occurred at an intersection where the traffic moving in defendant's direction was controlled by electrically operated signals. It is admitted in the pleadings that this traffic signal was erected and maintained by the City of Hendersonville.

Municipalities have plenary power to regulate traffic at intersections. Upchurch v. Hudson Funeral Home, 263 N.C. 560, 140 S.E.2d 17. This Court held in the case of Kelly v. Ashburn, 256 N.C. 338, 123 S.E.2d 775, that stop signs erected by the State Highway Commission and local authorities on an intersecting highway or street pursuant to G.S. § 20--156(a) is a method of giving the public notice that traffic on one is favored over the other, and that a motorist facing a stop sign must yield. In that case the Court further stated: 'Stop signs at intersections are in such general use, and their function so well known, that a motorist, in the absence of notice to the contrary, may presume that they were erected by lawful authority.' While that case relates to a stop sign, rather than an electrically controlled signal, it would seem that the reasoning applied in that case would likewise be applicable to the present state of facts. Moreover, this Court considered the effect and meaning of electrically controlled traffic signals in the case of White v. Cothran, 260 N.C. 510, 133 S.E.2d 132, where Denny, C.J., speaking for the Court, said:

'The meaning and force to be given to electrically operated traffic control signals, in the absence of a statute or ordinance, 'is that meaning which a reasonably prudent operator of an automobile should and would understand and apply. Queen City Coach Co. v. Fultz, 246 N.C. 523, 98 S.E.2d 860. Traffic signals of the kind here described are in such general use that it is, we think, well known by motor vehicle operators that a red traffic light is a warning that the highway is closed in order to permit those using the intersecting highway safe passage through the intersection. Hence, prudence dictates that he should stop.' * * *.'

'When a motorist approaches an electrically controlled signal at an intersection of streets or highways, he is under the legal duty to maintain a proper lookout and to keep his motor vehicle under reasonable control in order that he may stop before entering the intersection if the green light changes to yellow or red before he actually enters the intersection.'

We hold that there is sufficient evidence here to allow the jury to find that defendant drove his automobile through a red traffic signal so as to endanger persons and property passing on the intersecting highway, or that he failed to keep a proper lookout for persons or vehicles traveling on the public highway, thus causing the collision and plaintiff's personal injuries and property damage. Plaintiff's allegations and evidence were sufficient to allow the court to submit the issue of negligence to the jury. The remaining and decisive question is whether plaintiff's evidence established that she was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence should be allowed only when plaintiff's evidence, taken in the light most favorable to him, so clearly establishes the defense that no other reasonable inference or conclusion can be drawn therefrom. Waters v. Harris, 250 N.C. 701, 110 S.E.2d 283; Hood v. Queen City Coach Co., 249 N.C. 534, 107 S.E.2d 154. Further, nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence should be denied if diverse inferences upon the question are permissible from plaintiff's proof. Wooten v. Russell, 255 N.C. 699, 122 S.E.2d 603.

Defen...