Galloway v. Howard

• Decision Date: 10 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. CIV-08-285-C.,CIV-08-285-C.
• Citation: 624 F.Supp.2d 1305
• Parties: Robert William GALLOWAY, Petitioner, v. Bruce G. HOWARD, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

624 F.Supp.2d 1305

Robert William GALLOWAY, Petitioner, v. Bruce G. HOWARD, et al., Respondents.

No. CIV-08-285-C.

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

December 10, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert William Galloway, Hodgen, OK, pro se.

Thomas L. Tucker, Attorney General's OFC, Oklahoma City, OK, for Respondents.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ROBIN J. CAUTHRON, District Judge.

This action for habeas corpus relief brought by a prisoner, proceeding pro se, was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Robert E. Bacharach, consistent with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Judge Bacharach entered a Report and Recommendation on November 19, 2008, to which Petitioner has timely objected. The Court therefore considers the matter de novo.

Petitioner's objection merely restates his original arguments and, without factual support, argues he is entitled to a hearing and relief. To the contrary, there is no argument of fact or law not fully considered and correctly rejected by the Magistrate Judge, and no argument of fact or law is set forth in the objection which would require a different result.

Accordingly, the Court adopts, in its entirety, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, and for the reasons announced therein, denies this petition for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is likewise denied. A judgment will enter accordingly.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ROBERT E. BACHARACH, United States Magistrate Judge.

The Petitioner, Mr. Robert Galloway, is a state inmate seeking a writ of habeas corpus and an evidentiary hearing. The Court should deny both requests.

BACKGROUND

After negotiations with the State, Mr. Galloway agreed to plead guilty and accept:

• concurrent ten-year sentences for the charges of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and driving under the influence and.

• a concurrent one-year sentence for driving under a revocation.¹

However, Oklahoma County Judge Twyla Mason Gray stated that she would not accept a ten-year sentence for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. See Transcript of Proceedings, Plea and Sentencing at pp. 4-5, State v. Galloway, Case Nos. CF-2001-2227, CF-2004-2506 (Okla.Co. Dist.Ct. July 20, 2005) ("Transcript of Guilty Plea"). The plea agreement was then renegotiated to reflect a 25-year sentence for that charge. See Plea of Guilty Summary of Facts at p. 3; Transcript of Guilty Plea at p. 6.

Mr. Galloway entered a guilty plea and obtained a sentence of concurrent terms involving:

• 25 years for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,

• 10 years for driving under the influence, and

• 1 year for driving under revocation.

Plea of Guilty Summary of Facts at pp. 1-6; Judgment and Sentence, State v. Galloway, Case No. CF-2004-2506 (Okla.Co. Dist.Ct. July 27, 2005).

Appearing pro se, the Petitioner moved to withdraw the guilty plea. Motion to Withdraw Plea, Galloway v. State, Case No. CF-2004-2506 (Okla.Co.Dist.Ct. July 27, 2005). After a hearing,² the state court rejected the motion³ and Mr. Galloway appealed through counsel.⁴ The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ("OCCA") affirmed. Summary Opinion Denying Certiorari, Galloway v. State, Case No. C-2005-790 (Okla.Crim.App. Apr. 5, 2006) ("OCCA Certiorari Opinion").

Thereafter, Mr. Galloway applied for state post-conviction relief. See Application for Post-Conviction Relief, Galloway v. State, Case No. CF-2004-2506 (Okla. Co. Dist. Ct. June 8, 2007) ("Application for Post-Conviction Relief"). The state district court again denied relief,⁵ and the OCCA affirmed.⁶

The Petitioner then initiated the present action, alleging:

• involuntariness in the guilty plea,

• ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel,

• excessive sentence for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and

• due process violations surrounding reinstatement of a charge after the preliminary hearing. Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody at pp. 5-14 (Mar. 19, 2008) ("Petition").

STANDARD FOR HABEAS RELIEF

The applicable standard turns on how the state appellate court had treated the underlying issue. When the state appellate court had not addressed the merits, the federal district court exercises its independent judgment. See, e.g., Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir.2002).

If the OCCA did rule on the merits, the federal district court bears a "secondary and limited" role. See Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir.1998).

For example, a state court's determination of a factual issue triggers a narrow standard of review in two respects. First, the finding is presumptively correct, requiring the challenging party to respond with clear and convincing evidence. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000). Second, when factual allegations are involved, a federal court can grant habeas relief only if the state court had made "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2000).

The federal district court also engages in limited scrutiny of legal determinations when the state's highest court has addressed the merits. In these circumstances, the federal court considers only whether the state appeals court's conclusions were "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).

The threshold issue is whether federal law clearly establishes the constitutional protection underlying the Petitioner's claim. See House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1018 (10th Cir.2008) ("The absence of clearly established federal law is dispositive under § 2254(d)(1)."). "[C]learly established law consists of Supreme Court holdings in cases where the facts are at least closely-related or similar to the case sub judice. Although the legal rule at issue need not have had its genesis in the closely-related or similar factual context, the Supreme Court must have expressly extended the legal rule to that context." Id. at 1016-17 (footnote & citations omitted). For this purpose, Supreme Court holdings "must be construed narrowly and consist only of something akin to on-point holdings." Id. at 1015. In the absence of Supreme Court precedents, "a federal habeas court need not assess whether a state court's decision was `contrary to' or involved an `unreasonable application' of such law." Id. at 1017.

If Supreme Court precedents do establish the underlying constitutional right, the federal district court must ask whether the state court decision was contrary to Supreme Court precedent. These circumstances may exist when the state court had:

• applied a rule that conflicted with governing Supreme Court holdings or

• reached a conclusion different from the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts.

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (citation omitted).

If these circumstances are absent, the federal district court must determine whether the state court decision involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedents. See supra p. 4. Application of Supreme Court precedent is considered "unreasonable" when the state court unreasonably extends, or refuses to extend, prior decisions. See House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1018 (10th Cir.2008).

FAILURE TO ISSUE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A special judge conducted a preliminary hearing and dismissed the charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing Proceedings at p. 26, State v. Galloway, Case No. CF-2004-2506 (Okla.Co.Dist.Ct. Apr. 18, 2005) (Doak, Special Judge). The State appealed, and a state district judge reversed and ordered reinstatement of the charge. Order to Bind Defendant Over for Trial, State v. Galloway, Case No. C2004-2506 (Okla.Co.Dist.Ct. May 3, 2005). Mr. Galloway points out that in reversing; the state district judge did not issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law. According to the Petitioner, the omission constituted a deprivation of due process and entitles him to a writ of habeas corpus. Petition at p. 5; Petitioner's Brief in Support at pp. 8-10.⁷ The Petitioner is mistaken.

The state court of criminal appeals requires entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law when a district judge reviews a magistrate's dismissal of charges at a preliminary hearing.⁸ The district judge entered a written order, but arguably violated the rule by failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court may assume arguendo that the state rule was violated.⁹ Even then, Mr. Galloway could only obtain habeas relief if the violation of state law had resulted in a deprivation of due process. It did not.¹⁰

INVOLUNTARINESS OF THE GUILTY PLEA

Mr. Galloway alleges that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of coercion and misapprehension about the agreement. Petition at p. 14; Petitioner's Brief in Support at pp. 21-22. The Court should reject these claims, as the state district court and OCCA reasonably concluded that the plea was knowing and voluntary.

I. The Constitutional Test

"On review, a federal court may set aside a state court guilty plea only for failure to satisfy due process." Cunningham v. Diesslin, 92 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause permits a guilty plea only if it is knowing and voluntary. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The plea must represent a deliberate, intelligent choice,¹¹ and the defendant must have "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence."¹²

II. Coercion

According to Mr. Galloway, Judge Gray coerced a guilty plea by frightening him with the likelihood that a jury trial would result in a sentence of 50...