Galloway v. Zuckert, 88-267
Decision Date | 23 August 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 88-267,88-267 |
Citation | 447 N.W.2d 553 |
Parties | Joseph M. GALLOWAY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Alan ZUCKERT, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Joseph M. Galloway and Clair J. Galloway, Des Moines, pro se.
Jonathan C. Wilson and Diane M. Stahle of Davis, Hockenberg, Wine, Brown, Koehn & Shors, Des Moines, for defendants-appellees/cross-appellants.
Heard by OXBERGER, C.J., and SCHLEGEL and SACKETT, JJ.
This appeal arises from a landlord tenant dispute. A jury rejected both the tenants' claims and the owners' counterclaim. The tenants have appealed and the owners have cross-appealed.
The appellants challenge several instructions and evidentiary rulings, as well as the denial of a judgment n.o.v. on one of their claims. The appellees contend there was no evidence to support that part of the verdict rejecting their counterclaim for unpaid rent.
The plaintiffs, Joseph and Clair Galloway, leased office space in a commercial office building in Des Moines. In 1984 the office building was purchased by the defendants, Alan and Janice Zuckert. Various disputes soon arose between the Galloways and Alan Zuckert concerning terms of the lease, renewal of the lease, and conditions of the building. The Galloways also alleged that Alan Zuckert interfered with their business relationship with a fellow tenant, a professional secretary service which the Galloways employed.
While the parties were in contention, Alan Zuckert sent a letter to Joseph Galloway and also sent copies of the letter to two other persons, one of whom did business with the Galloways. Joseph Galloway contends this letter falsely accused him of breaking his word.
The Galloways later filed the present suit, alleging breach of lease, interference with a contractual relationship, and libel. The Zuckerts counterclaimed for unpaid rent.
Our scope of review in this matter is for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4.
I. The Galloways claim that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that the statements in the letter written by Alan Zuckert constituted libel per se. In Vojak v. Jensen, 161 N.W.2d 100, 104 (Iowa 1968), the supreme court defined libel and libel per se.
Libel is defined as a malicious publication, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs and pictures, tending to injure the reputation of another or to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule or to injure him in the maintenance of his business.
Among statements which are libelous per se are those which charge business incompetence or lack of skill in the trade occupation, profession or office by which one earns his living.
These two definitions show the statements in the letter fall within the definition of libel and not libel per se. The statements in question, such as Zuckert was unable to do business with Galloway "on a handshake," may tend to injure the plaintiff in the maintenance of his business, but they do not specifically charge him with incompetence or lack of skill. However, the court explained the Vojak holding in Kelly v. Iowa State Education Association, 372 N.W.2d 288, 295 (Iowa App.1985). The court held that, Id.
The statements in question still cannot be said to be libelous as a matter of law. In addition to the definition set out in Vojak, the court in Kelly would also include statements that impute dishonesty as being libel per se. The statements by Zuckert, that he was not able to do business with Galloway "on a handshake" or that he did "an about-face," are not synonymous with calling the appellant a liar nor do they impute dishonesty to any great degree. The court in Kelly recognized that when a publication is ambiguous, it is for the jury to decide whether a defamatory meaning was conveyed. Kelly, 372 N.W.2d at 296. The statements in question were sufficiently ambiguous to allow their submission to the jury, and it was not error to instruct the jury that the statements in the letter constituted mere libel.
The Galloways next contend it was error to include actual malice as an element of proof in the jury instructions. The term actual malice, as opposed to legal malice, merely means a plaintiff must prove the existence of malice while under legal malice the law presumes that it exists. The court in Vojak set out the elements of libel and libel per se. Vojak, 161 N.W.2d at 104. The court includes malice as an element in both libel and libel per se. Appellant argues that including the element of actual malice in a claim for mere libel is...
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