Galvan v. City of La Habra
| Decision Date | 08 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. SACV 12-2103 JGB (RNBx) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | MANUEL GALVAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LA HABRA, A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY; OFFICER JASON SANCHEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND DOES 1 THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE Defendants. |
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment originally filed by Defendants City of La Habra andOfficer Jason Sanchez (collectively, "Defendants").1 ("Motion," Doc. No. 46.) After considering the papers timely filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, and the arguments presented at the March 31, 2013 hearing, the Court DENIES the Motion.
Plaintiff Manuel Galvan ("Galvan") filed his Complaint against the Defendants on December 5, 2012. (Doc. No. 1.) On January 3, 2014, Galvan filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") stating five claims for relief: (1) deprivation of civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Officer Sanchez); (2) deprivation of civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (City of La Habra); (3) deprivation of civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ();2 (4) battery by a police officer (all defendants); and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (all defendants).
On March 1, 2014, Defendant Officer Jason Sanchez ("Sanchez") filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Sanchez appears to seek summary judgment on all claims, but only specifically addresses the § 1983 claims and the battery claim. In support of the Motion, Sanchez filed the following documents:
On March 10, 2014, Galvan filed an Opposition to the Motion. ("Opp'n," Doc. Nos. 50, 593.) In support of the Opposition, Galvan filed the following documents:
On March 17, 2014, Sanchez filed a Reply. (Doc. No. 62.) In support of the Reply, Sanchez filed the following documents:
On August 25, 2011, Galvan traveled to Linda Galvan's house. (FAC, ¶ 14.) Galvan and Linda7 were married but separated at the time, and the California Superior Court had previously issued a restraining order requiring Galvan to be at least 100 yards awayfrom Linda at all times. (Id.) Linda called the police, and Sanchez responded to the call. (FAC, ¶¶ 15-16.) Galvan alleges that although he did not have a weapon and was in the "surrender position," with his hands in the air, Sanchez shot him three times. (FAC, ¶¶ 16-18.)
Along with the Motion, Sanchez also filed a Request for Judicial Notice, as well as a Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice. In the RJN, Sanchez requests the Court to take judicial notice of:
In the SRJN, Sanchez requests the Court to take judicial notice of:
• The Orange County District Attorney's internal investigative report of the August 25, 2011 incident, dated June 28, 2013 (Osterberg Decl. Ex. K).
Sanchez requests that the Court take judicial notice of the documents in the RJN pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 201 as those documents are court records. Pursuant to FRE 201, the Court "may judicially notice a fact that is not subject toreasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FRE 201(b)(2). A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. See Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998)). Matters of public record include state court records. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2002) (), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2012).
Galvan has filed objections to Exhibits 2 and 3 of the RJN, arguing those exhibits are inadmissible pursuant to FRE 410. (See RJN Obj. 2-3.) There is a distinction between whether the Court may take judicial notice of a fact and whether that fact is admissible, however. See, e.g., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v.Merck KgaA, No. 96-1307, 2000 WL 35717873, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2000) (); In re James, 300 B.R. 890, 896 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2003) (). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS judicial notice of the documents attached to the RJN, and addresses Galvan's objections to that evidence below.
With respect to the SRJN, however, the basis for judicial notice is less clear. Sanchez contends that "the facts contained in this document are not subject to reasonable dispute, and the facts contained therein are capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned." (SRJN at 2.) The Court disagrees with this assertion, to the extent Sanchezclaims the Court can take judicial notice of conclusions of law or determinations of fact made by the Orange County District Attorney's Office during its internal investigation. The events of August 25, 2011, are at issue in this action and therefore the Court cannot conclude that the District Attorney's Office's conclusions are "not subject to reasonable dispute." Accordingly, the Court DENIES Sanchez's request judicial notice of this document.
"A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e). At the summary judgment stage, district courts consider evidence with content that would be admissible at trial, even if the form of the evidence would not be admissible at trial. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001).
Sanchez objects to some of the facts stated in Galvan's SGD, on the basis that they are irrelevant and lack foundation. (See generally, Sanchez Evidentiary Objections.) "[O]bjections to evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant, speculative, and/or argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself" and are thus "redundant" and unnecessary to consider here. Burch v. Regents of Univ. of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006); see also George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 854 (9th Cir. 2013) () (citation omitted). Thus, the Court does not consider any objections on the grounds that the evidence lacks foundation, is misleading, vague, ambiguous, conclusory, speculative, conjecture, compound,irrelevant, or argumentative. These objections are challenges to the characterization of the evidence and are improper on a motion for summary judgment.
As discussed above, Galvan objects to the consideration of his nolo contendere plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 410. That objection is discussed more fully later in this Order.
a. Hearsay Objections
Galvan also objects to various statements attributed to him by investigators from the Orange County District Attorney's Office. (See Doc. No. 55.) The Court has not relied on any of the statements made in that interview in the resolution of the Motion, and therefore these objections are OVERRULED.
Sanchez objects to numerous statements in the SGD arguing they misstate the deposition testimony of Galvan, Linda, and Sanchez. (Sanchez Evidentiary Objections ¶¶ 76-77, 84, 87-92, 96, 98, 102-105, 125, and 128.) Those objections are OVERRULLED. As sated above, those objections go to the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility of the testimony. See Elston v. Toma, No. 01-1124, 2004 WL...
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