Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Brewer
Decision Date | 27 January 1928 |
Docket Number | (No. 9047.) |
Citation | 4 S.W.2d 320 |
Parties | GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. CO. v. BREWER. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Lavaca County; Lester Holt, Judge.
Action by J. S. Brewer against the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company. From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood, of Houston, and Marcus Schwartz and W. T. Bagby, both of Hallettsville, for appellant.
Henry S. Paulus, of Yoakum, and Fly & Ragsdale, of Victoria, for appellee.
This suit was brought by appellee to recover of appellant the sum of $25,000 damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of appellant.
Plaintiff's petition alleges, in substance, that he received the injuries of which he complains while engaged with other employees of appellant in its yards at Yoakum, Tex., in loading heavy timbers, called "stringers," upon one of appellant's cars; that the timbers were loaded on the car "by means of a hoisting machine which consisted of a power appliance, a crane, pulleys and chains, or cables and hooks; that appellee was required to fasten the hooks used in hoisting the timbers, in one end of the timber to be hoisted, and another employee of the appellant was required to fasten the hook in the other end, and that after said hooks were securely fastened that fact would be communicated to another of appellant's employees, who put into operation the motive power that was required to hoist and lift the timber from the ground to the car, and the stringer would then be pulled in position on the car, after which the grappling hooks would be released, and this process of loading continued until the work had been completed; that appellee fastened the grappling hook used by him securely in one of the pieces of timber desired to be loaded, and his coemployee also fastened the grappling hook used by him in another part of the timber, and the necessary signal was given to hoist the timber; that while said timber was being so hoisted, the chain or cable appliance, or some connection used therewith for said hoisting, broke or became disconnected, and as a result said timber, or one end thereof, fell to the ground, and in so falling struck appellee in the back, which caused him to suffer great pain and permanently injured him; that his injuries are permanent and that he is wholly incapacitated from performing any remunerative labors and from earning any money as a laborer; that as a result of said injuries he has become nervous, is unable to sleep at night, and cannot put on his own shoes and lace them up, and generally is unable to perform the ordinary duties of dressing and undressing himself."
The negligence pleaded as the cause of plaintiff's injury will be hereinafter shown.
Appellant (defendant) answered by general demurrer, by special exception to that part of paragraph 9 of appellee's petition wherein he attempted to base a recovery upon the value of his labor in and about his own home, by a general denial, and by special denial, especially denying that the hoisting machine, chains, hooks, and other parts belonging thereto and used on the occasion in question were defective in any respect or insufficient to lift the timbers which were being loaded, and alleging that said machine was in perfect condition and was scientifically constructed and built, and that it was the same kind of machine that is generally in use by railroads and other companies where heavy timbers are to be moved and lifted from one position to another; and also especially denying negligence in the operation of said machine and charging contributory negligence on the part of appellee in placing the grappling or timber hooks fastened by him in an improper place, thereby causing the stringer or timber to fall, and in failing to place himself in a safe position and place after said hooks were fastened and while the hoisting machine was being operated. Appellant also pleaded that at the time of said injury it was engaged in interstate commerce and appellee assumed the risk incident to said work.
The trial in the court below resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee in the sum of $12,500.
Appellant first complains of the ruling of the trial court refusing its application for a continuance. This application was based upon the ground that by the amended pleading filed by plaintiff on the day the case was called for trial he had set up a new and different cause of action from that theretofore pleaded by him, and defendant not having any notice of plaintiff's change of his cause of action was not prepared to meet it with evidence then at its command, but by continuance of the cause could procure such evidence.
Conceding that the application contains all of the statutory requisites of a first application for continuance, the court did not err in refusing it, because the facts stated therein are not supported by the record, in that the amended petition on which the case was tried did not set up a new and different cause of action from that theretofore pleaded by the plaintiff. The negligence upon which the cause of action is based is thus pleaded in the amended petition upon which the case was tried:
The allegations of negligence in the superseded pleading are as follows:
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